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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine in detail the concept of impediments to 
legal capacity( 'awirid al-ahliy)ýah) in Islamic law in comparison ivith the Egyptian Civil 
Code of 1948 (ECC). It is undertaken on the premise that 'aw&id is regulated in Islarruc 
law within its primary sources as well as the work of classical and contemporary jurists. 
There is a general notion that the ECC regarding legal capacity has drawn heavily upon 
Islamic law, thus, the present study attempts to verify this claim by showing the 
similarities and differences between the two systems. 
This research employs library based methodology. It has adopted a combination 
of Islamic and Civil law approaches to the subject of impediments to legal capacity. With 
respect to Islamic law reference has been made first to the Qur'an and the Sunnah 
together with their commentaries. As far as the works of jurists are concerned, the study 
focuses only on the four Sunni schools of laNNI, namely: the Ijanarl, Ma-lik-i, Shdfi'-l and 
Uanbali. Reference has also been made to the works of contemporary jurists. For the 
purpose of comparison with the ECC the latest amendment of the Code (up to December 
2003) has been the main reference. In addition , commentaries of the ECC and other 
related legislation as well as the writing of jurists have also been referred to. 
This thesis consists in six chapters preceded by an introduction and ending with a 
conclusion drawn from the analysis therem. The first chapter acts as an introduction to 
the general theory of legal capacity outlining the basic features of the concept The 
remaining five chapters represent the core of the research. i. e. impediments to legal 
capacity . Chapter two 
is devoted to examining minority (Oghar)and its effect on 
contract. The concept of insanity Oundn), prodigality (5afah) and duress (ikrih), as Nvell 
as mistake (ghalat) are examined in chapters three, four, five and six respectively. It has 
been found that although there are differences between the two systems, such as the use 
of different terrninologies, the study concludes that to a large extent the concept of 
impediments to legal capacity in the ECC is in harmony with that of Islamic la', N-'. In the 
case of dissirriilarities, suggestions have been made to reN ise some provisions *in the ECC 
to be in line with or approximate to that of Islarnic law. 
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION 
The transliteration used in this thesis is based on Encyclopedia of Islam with slight 
variation, 
Consonants 
(ham-za) L).; z (055d) 0 
17-1 (bd') b J. (ta') t 
c-*j (ta') t (Zdl) -7 
(thd) th ('ayn) c 
(ghayn) gh 
(ha-') (fa- ') f 
(kha-') kh (qaf) q 
(da-l) d (kdf) k 
(dha-l) dh (lam) 
r (mim) m 
(zay) z ýj (nfin) n 
04 (Sin) s (waw) NN" 
04 (shM) sh h 
LýI= (pd) (ya') y 
Vowels 
(fatbah) a longfatbah a 
(kasrah) I long kasrah 
(pfammah) u long ýIammah 
Tanw m' is represented by an, in, un respectively 
Transliteration involves only Arabic words. Others will be written in italics 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ECC Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 
EMECC Explanatory Memorandum of the Egyptian Civil Code 
EgCC Egyptian Court of Cassation 
PBUH Peace be Upon Him 
CPC Civil Procedure Code 
LGP Law of Guardianship Over Property of 1952 
(x : xx) Relating to Quotations from the Our',; #7 where x 
indicates sii-rah (chapter) and xx indicates jyah (verse) 
such as ( 1: 2) which means s Ckat al-FAtihah verse 2 
XVI 
INTRODUCTION 
Freedom to enter into contract is one of the features of Islamic law of contract. 
According to this principle, every person is entitled and eligible to be part of the 
contracting party as long as certain requirements are fulfilled. A person 1 aid to be is si 
competent when he is fully possessed of legal capacity. However, there is a limitation 
imposed by the SharAah upon certain parties from entering into a contract if there is 
impairment in legal capacity, so imposed either to protect one of the contracting parties 
or both. This is known as 'impediments to legal capacity' ('awjripfa1-ahIiyyah) Nvhich is 
the crux of the present study. 
Objectives of the Research 
The purpose of this study is to examine in detail the concept of impediments to 
legal capacity in Islamic law; thus, reference will be made to both primary and secondary 
sources of Islamic law encompassing the Quran and the Sunnah as well as the works of 
jurists; classical and contemporary. The study also aims to establish that Islamic law has 
regulated the concept of impediment. In addition, this study will also make a comparison 
between Islamic law on impediments to legal capacity and Egypfian law. There is a 
general belief that Egyptian law regarding legal capacity has drawn heavily upon Islamic 
law; thus, this study will endeavour to ascertain this claim by shoWIng the similarities 
and differences between the two systems. In the case of dissimilarities between Egyptian 
law and Islamic law, suggestions will be made to revise these dissimilarities. 
Scope of the Research 
Islamic law on impediments to legal capacityý is the crucial part of this study. 
The research will touch only on matters relating to contract, which have a monetary 
element in nature such as sale; thus, the contract of marriage, for instance, will not be the 
focus of the study despite the presence of monetary element since the nature of this 
contract is more connected with personal status. Discussion will also be restricted to 
impediments which have their counterpart in Egyptian law, regardless of the legal 
terminology used by this law. Thus, the concept of duress Ukr5h) and mistake (ghalaý) in 
spite of being categorized under the topic of defects of 'will' ('uy5b al-ir&tah) 1 will be 
included in this study. Furthermore, the relationsfiýp between 'impediments to legal 
capacity' and 'defects of will' in the Egyptian Civil Code 2iS so close that some writers 
conclude that the existence of both would lead to the same effect. This is further 
strengthened by the fact that these two concepts are discussed under one umbrella term 
by the vast majority of jurists .3 
It is to be noted that Islamic law in a broader sense has 
recognized a number of impediments; however, this study is only confined to those 
which concern contract; namely, minority( pghar), insanity( jun On), prodigality (safah) 
duress (ikrih) and mistake (ghalat). As such, impediments such as journey( sqfar) and 
menstruation (ýqyd) will be left out. Apart from this, another criteria taken into 
consideration in determining the area of research is that the ECC has clear provisions 
' Defects of will (Uj)i7b al-iridah) and defects of consent( 'uj) Cib al-riýtq) are synonymous, both 
terms will be used interchangeably throughout the this study. 
'Hereafter cited as the ECC 
' Some jurists discuss these concepts under causes of nullity (asbg al-bil , 
dAn) while other discuss 
them under defects of consent( 'uyi7b al- riO7). According to this latter, factors such as deception 
(ghubn) and mistake (ghala. ý are indications (qarinah) of defects of consent as similar to 
minority sigh9r which is also considered as indication to defects of _consent. 
See, al-HajJ, 
NaMriyyat al-Bu d9nfi al-Fiqh aI-IsI,, Tmiwafi al-Qgn Cr al-Madanial-Misr-1, n. p, n. d, p. 35 7 
2 
regarding these impediments. It is important to note that in discussing legal issues 
emphasis will be given to the Sunni school especially those belonging to the four famous 
schools of thought. ' The reason for restricting this study to the Sunni sect is due to the 
ract that Egypt belongs almost exclusively to this sect. Indeed, the exhausting number of 
references and divergences of opinion among the Sunni school increase the need to 
narrow down the focus of the research. 
With regard to Egyptian law, the study will focus on the New Civil Code of 1948. 
However, some other laws such that of Guardianship Over Property of 1952 and that of 
Personal Status will be referred to whenever necessary. 
Methodology of the Research 
The proposed study attempts to explore the concept of impediments to legal 
capacity in Islamic Law and Egyptian law. Tberefore, research methodology is mainly 
library based in nature. With respect to Islamic law, reference will be made first to the 
text of the Qur'dn and Sunnah together with their commentaries. 
With regard to the classical Sunni '; schools of law, the opinions of the four 
established schools, namely Hanafi, Malik-i,, Shafi'i and Hanbali are to be consulted. The 
classical manuals such as al-Mabsiý4 Mawjhib al-JaIP, Al-Mc? lmd and al-Mughni, are 
examples of various books representing these schools. Aside from this, classical books 
on principle of jurisprudence (us X al-fiqh) such as Kashf al-Asrar and al-TawýA are of 
equal importance to the topic of impediments to legal capacity which is treated quite 
'These schools are: the Ijanafi, die Maliki, the Shafil and the 11janbali. 
3 
comprehensively therein. The works of contemporary scholars are no less important; 
thus, for instance,. the writing of Ahmad Ibrah-im and Khallaf on Ns subject will be 
analysed . 
It should be noted that in citing the views of jurists, the writer will not cite any 
opinion from any book which does not constitute an original source. For instance, al- 
7 
Mughm, despite the fact that its author is Hanbali, also contains other opinions such as 
those of Hanafi and Shafil: thus the opinion of Hanafi cited in this book "rill be omitted 
unless expressed by Hanafi in their own works. 
For the purpose of comparison with Egyptian law, the latest amendment of the 
New Civil Code of 1948 ( up to December 2003)WIll be the main reference; of equal 
importance are commentaries to this Code, such as al- Wasit by al- Sanh5ri, al-Ta'liq 'ala 
al- Qjn i7n al-Madam; by Anwar Tulbah and the like. The Code referred to is in the 
Arabic version and its translation into English, especially that of 'Abd al-Fattdb Murad, 
however, if there is any discrepancy between the two, the Arabic version will prevail. 
Besides this, as the nature of the study is Egyptian law in general and the Civil 
Code in particular; reference will also be made to the works of Egyptian jurists pertaining 
to this research. Therefore, books like al-Madkhal da al-Qjni7n by Nabil Ibrahim, 
Ma, ýjdir al-IltizAin by Faraj al- Suddah, Dur i7s fi Nazariyyat al-Iltizim by Muhammad 
'Ali Uthmdn and Mayjdir al-ffaqq by al-Sanhiiri Null be consulted. As in the case of the 
Code itself some of the works of Egyptian law conceming the research are available in 
English; if any confusion between views arises, the Arabic work will thus prevail. 
4 
Equally important to this study are the Egyptian Court rulings. Although Egý'pt 
follows a civil legal system whereby the rulings of one court does not bind the other or 
even itself, the value of these decisions can be seen from the strong tendency from judges 
to follow the previous judgments of the Highest Court-the Court of Cassation-. ' Constant 
reference will therefore be made to these rulings as appropriate. 
It should be noted that as far as terminology is concerned, - unless otherwise 
stated -the research will employ the English term followed by its Arabic equivalent in the 
first appearance of any term. However in certain instances whereby the Arabic terms are 
inevitable and commonly used then such terms will take priority. Should there be any 
confusion reference may be made to the glossary provided at the end of this thesis. In any 
discussion involving Islamic law, unless otherwise stated the term jurists will refer to 
both classical and modem jurists. Similarly if a discussion involves Egyptian law the 
term jurist will refer to those who are experts in Civil law, this includes law 
commentators (shurrdb al-q. 5ndn), academicians, lavvyers and the like. It is equally 
important to note that the English translation of the Qur'dn is based on Abdullah Yiisuf 
Ali; occasionally the original text in Arabic is maintained whenever necessary. 
' Created in 1931 the Court is at the apex of the ordinary justice. It is divided in two chambers: 
civil(civil and commercial cases, personal status) and criminal. Its main function is to control the 
judgements of the Court of Appeal following a motion for cassation introduced by any interested 
party including the public prosecutor. '17he motion must be founded on an error of law which 
would have been committed by the lower court. The allegations can be the misapplication or 
misinterpretation of law, irregularity in die language of the judgernent or procedural errors. Other 
than cases punishable with death penalty the control of the Court of Cassation only bears on these 
questions and not on the facts. See, Maugiron, Nathalie Bernard and Dupret, Baudouin (editors), 
Egypt and Its Laws, Kluwer law International, London/ The HagLie/ New York, n. d, p. xxxi 
5 
Literature review 
The present study is not a pioneer in this subject; rather it is undertaken based on 
previously related works. As far as classical jurists are concemed - to the best of the 
writer's knowledge - there is no specific book devoted to the subject of impediments to 
legal capacity (awji-i(l X-ahliyyah). Most of the works of jurists on this subject are 
found scattered throughout huge volumes of fiqh literature. However, the Hanafi school 
is disfinguished from others since they devoted a specific chapter to impediments within 
their work on uyal al-fiqh such as Kayhf al-AsrAr by 'Abd 'Az-iz al-Bukhar-i.. As for other 
schools the treatment of this topic is mostly carried out within the heading of mahkii-m 
c alayh (person upon whom legal rules are addressed); example of this kind of work is al- 
Muga#ýi by al-Ghazali. 
With regard to contemporary literature on the subject, a number of writings have 
contributed to the shaping of the present study such as the work of Husayn al-Nfiri 
entitled: Dirisah fl'Awiri ý/ al-Ahliyyah . In this 
book, the author has discussed in quite 
detail the theory of impediments to legal capacity, nevertheless, the scope of such a 
concept has been narrowed down to cover only mental illnesses. Apart from this, 
although there are discussions relating to Egyptian law, it appears that such discussions 
are selective in nature,, in the sense that that not every part of impediments is treated from 
both Islamic and Egyptian law. 
Another important work is 'AwJriý al-ahliyyah 'Ind al- týsdliyyin by al-Jab5n. As 
obvious from the title, the author has adopted the perspective of uydl al-fiqh to be the 
basis of his study to cover all types of impediments. In other words,, contrary to al-Nuri's 
6 
work, al-Jaburi is more comprehensive in terms of widening the concept of 
impediments. 
Apart from the above mentioned, there are some works dealing with the subject 
of impediments to legal capacity in a different approach in that such a concept is treated 
from a different nomenclature i. e. defects of consent (uyCib al-riýYj) vviftn the 
framework of the theory of contract. This kind of writings has been carried out mostly by 
modem jurists, be they of Islamic or Civil law. Examples of this approach are Magdir 
al-Haqq by al-SanhUri and al-Milkiyyah wa Na.? uriyyat al-ff, 5q by Ab5 Zahrah. 
In the light of this, the present study is undertaken to differ from the previous 
works in two aspects. Firstly, a combination of different perspectives namely, 
perspectives of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and its principles (usi7l) as well as modem 
law. Secondly, this study focuses only on types of impediment which are related to 
contract. 
Outlines of Chapters 
This thesis consists of six chapters excluding the introduction and the conclusion. 
The introduction explains the purpose of the research, its scope and the methodology 
used as well as the outline of the chapters. 
Chapter one is devoted to introducing the general theory of legal capacity which 
includes the meaning of such a concept. It also deals with the general meaning of 
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impediments to legal capacity (ctwirid). The discussion involves both Islamic law and 
the ECC. 
Chapter two focuses on minority (sighar) as an impediment It explains in detail 
the meaning of minority and its effect on contracts in both Islamic law and the ECC. In 
doing so the meaning of contract and its relationship to disposal and obligation are also 
discussed. 
Chapter three deals with insanity Oun5ýi) and its effect on legal capacity. Apart 
from discussing the concept from Islamic law and ECC, the meaning of insanity has also 
been explained from medical perspectives. This chapter also touches on imbecility 
('atah) as an impediment to legal capacity and its differences from insanity. 
Chapter four is designed to explain the theory of prodigality (safah) M Islamic 
law and the ECC. Unlike other impediments the meaning of prodigality from literal and 
legal point of view as well as its effect on contracts are discussed extensively. 
Chapter five deals with duress (ikrjh). It covers issues ranging from definition, 
classification to the measurement of duress. The chapter also discusses the effect of 
duress on contract and legal capacity in both Islamic law and the ECC 
Chapter six is about mistake (ghalat) from the perspective of Islamic law and the 
ECC. Four main issues are examined namely, the meaning of mistake, the existence of 
such concept in Islamic law, its measurement and its effects on contract. 
Finally, the conclusion consists of an overall analysis and findings of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL CAPACITY (AHLIYYAH) 
1.1. Legal capacity in Islamic law and the ECC 
1.1.1.1slamic law' 
1.1.1.1 Literal meaning 
The equivalent Arabic word for legal capacity is ahliyyah which derives from the 
Sih j word a ha Ia( J The author of Mukhtjr al-. b2 presumably categorized it as an 
already understood word. Thus, he gives no definition other than stating some examples 
on how to use the word correctly. The other meanings of ahliyyah are fitness 
(ýaljbiyyah)) and deservingness( istibqjq). We say for example that a person is ahl to do 
this work, meaning that he is fit to do it. In addition we also say that a person is ahl to be 
3 honoured i. e. he deserves to be honoured . 
Having said this, it should be noted that the literal meaning of ahliyyah is not 
confined solely to the positive aspect, 4 nor does it apply only to jurisprudence (fiqh ) 
literature only. Tberefore, some writers are inaccurate in stating that the literal meaning 
for ahliyyah is the fitness of a person to perform an act, or for its demand of him or for 
' Islamic law is also referred to as the Sharlah. Since this term is widely used there is no need to 
explain it in detail. hi brief Islamic law is the commandment or prohibition of the lawgiver to his 
servant. This was revealed through the Qur'An and the Sunnah of the Prophet PBUH. After the 
demise of the Prophet PBUH other methods of deducing legal rules such as ymj' (consensus) 
and qiy& (analogy) were systematically used by jurist. See, Malu-nasdni, $ubbi, Falsafat al- 
Tashrl al-Isl&nj, English edition by Farhat J Ziadeh, Penerbitan Hizbi, Malaysia, 1987, p. 6 and 
pp. 76-82, seel also, ZaydAn, cAbd al-Kar-im, al-Madkhal li Dirkat al-Sharlat al-1sl&niyyah, Ddr 
'Umar al-Khat! 5b, Alexandria, n. d, p. 38 
2Ai_ Razi, Mubarnmad bin Bakr, Mukhtir al- $iffiffP, edited by Shihab al-Din Abi! 'Umar, Dar 
al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 56 
3 See : Al-Zuhayli, Muhamniad . al-Nazari"), fft al- Fiqhi"ýah , D, #r al-Qalam. 
Damascus, 1993, 
l 'edition, P. 13 0 
' For instance the term ahl al-Nir(hiliabitant of hell) is used in many places in the Qur'an 
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his entitlement for it. 5 This is because such a meaning only implies restricting the 
positive aspect of the word, whereas the reliable sources of Arabic lexicon 6 are silent on 
this restriction. 
1.1.1.2 Technical meaning 
Legal capacity (ahliyyah) generally means the competence of a human being to 
acquire rights or have obligations required of him. According to the Ijanari, this is an 
attribute by which a human being becomes entitled and qualified to receive rights or bear 
responsibilities .7 AI-Zarqa' defines it as a quality presumed by the law to be in a person 
rendering him capable of receiving a legal injunction. 8 Al-IjiJi gives a more precise 
definition where he states that Legal capacity is an attribute given by a lawgiver to a 
person, in order to become entitled to be the subject of legal injunctions. 9 El-' Alami 
refers to it as the fitness of a person to enter into obligation that is to bind and be bound. 'O 
It seems from the above definitions that the technical meaning for legal capacity 
as a term can barely be found without referring to its classification, as these definitions 
either cover some of the classification or all of it. It can also be concluded that legal 
capacity is a set of qualifications in accordance with which the person becomes able to 
' Ahmad Hasan : The Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic research Institute, International 
Islamic University Islamabad, n, d, vol, I p. 294. 
6 See for instance, al-Fayrflz Abadi, al-Qffm as al-Mubit, edited by Maktab Tabql-'q al-Turath, 
Mu'assat al-Risgah, Beirut, 2003,7"' edition, p. 963 
' Al-Bukhan-*, 'Abd al-'Azi?, bin Mutiammad, Kashf al-Asr&, al-Firi7q al-Hadithah 1i al-Tibdah, 
1995,2dedition, vol 4. p237, 
' AI-Zarq5', Mustafa- 
, al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al- 
'Am Dar al-Mr, Damascus, 1968,9 1h edition, vol 
2, p. 73 7 
9 See al- Kurdii , 
Ahmad al-Iiiji, al -Aýwffl al- ShakhAvyah, ManshCrAtJ&n(ah Halab, 1990, p. 
10 El-Alarm. Dawoud S, The Marriage Contract in Islamic Law, Graham & Trotman, London, 
1992, p. 49 
10 
acquire rights, bear obligations and conduct actions and transactions that are able to 
produce their legal effect. " In the field of Islamic law,, when the word ahliyyah is used 
alone, it normally refers to ahliyyat al- ada' (active legal capacity) 
1.1.1.3. Legal capacity in Legal Texts (NuyayShariyyah) 
As a matter of fact every discussion concerning Islamic law must be referred to 
its source. The primary sources are the Qur'an and the Sunnah followed by consensus of 
jurists Qjmd )and analogy (qiydv) The first two sources are also known as legal texts 
(nu, y, 7, Y shar'iyyah). As far as ahliyyah is concerned there is no direct verse from the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah stating clearly the terminology of ahliyyah as used by the Jurists. 
However,, this is not to suggest that there is no basis from these two sources regarding the 
concept of legal capacity since there are several verses which are connected with legal 
capacity (ahliyyah). Amongst others are: 
In the Qur'an (48: 26) Allah says: 
" Allah sent down His tranquillity to His Messenger and to the believers and made them 
stick close to the command of self restraint. And well were they entitled to it (wa 
ahlah. q) " 
Commenting on the verse Ahmad Hassan states that the word ahl used here 
implies right and obligation relating to capacity, 12 and according to some authors 1-3the 
basic authority for all the preposition of law relating to legal capacity is the Qur'anic 
" ZahiT, Mahdi, The Legal Capacity of Women In Islamic Law [1996] ALQ, p. 245 
12 Ahmad Hassan, The Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 295 
" See Mir Wali ullah, Muslim Jurisprudence and the Quranic Law of Crime, Taj Company, 
Delhi, 1990, p . 
68 
II 
verse (2: 286) whereby Allah says: " On no soul doth Allah place a burden greater than it 
can bear"' 
In addition in (7: 172) Allah says: 
"When thy Lord drew forth from the children of Adam from their loins, their 
descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves (saying). Am I not your 
Lord? They said: Yea we do testify. (This) lest you should say on the day of judgement 
of this we were never mindful. " 
The above verses denote by implication the basic requirements for a human being 
in order to be held responsible for his deeds. This is actually among the matters relating 
to legal capacity in Islamic jurisprudence. 
1.1.1.4. Types of legal capacity 
Broadly speaking, there are two main categories of legal capacity : receptive legal 
capacity-(ahliyyat al-wuji7b) and active legal capacity( ahliyyat al- add). These two can 
be further divided into incomplete( n5qisah) and complete( kimilah) 14 
14 See for instance , Zahu , 
Atunad al-Najdi , Uyi7l al-Fiqh al-IsIm-m' 
Dir al-Thaq9fat al- 
'Arabijyah, Cairo. n. d, vol 1, pp. 164-166 , al-Bach 
'Abd al-Ijanild, Vawjbit al-'Uqi7d 
Maktabah Wahbah, Cairo, n. d, lt edition, pp. 159-160, Dabflr, Anwar MaWid, ol-Madkhal li 
Dir, ffsat al-Fiqh al-Ishtni, Dir al-Thaqfffat al-'Arabijyah, Cairo, 1986, pp. 432433 
12 
1.1.1.4.1 Incomplete receptive legal capacity (ahlýyyat al-widi7b al- njqisah I) 
This type of legal capacity has been defined as the fitness of human beings to 
acquire rights but not to undertake duties or responsibilifies. 15In other word 'incomplete 
receptive legal capacity' only possesses a positive aspect called 'indebtedness' 
(da-'iniyyah) 16 
. This kind of legal capacity is associated lArith the foetus (Iamh) before 
delivery. The incompleteness of fis foetus is due to two reasons; firstly, the foetus bears 
two possibilities, viz: it might be delivered alive or dead. If it is delivered dead, then it 
acquires no rights. But if it is delivered alive, certain rights will be given to it. With only 
these possibilities, it is not entitled to all rights. Secondly, during pregnancy the foetus is 
considered as part of its mother. As a result, some legal consequences affecting its 
mother will also involve it Tor instance,, if its mother is manumitted then it will be 
similarly affected. 
The basis for in incomplete receptive legal capacity is 'humanity'(insJP7iyyah) 17 
However,, due to the uncertainty of life for the foetus, it only enjoys the positive aspect 
of this capacity: that is to acquire some rights and bear no obligation. 
" See AI-Husari , 
Abinad, al-gukm al-Shar 'I WamayViruhu, Affr al-Al, Beirut, 1997, P 
edition p. 224, 
16 AI-ZarqA'_, al-Madkhal vol 2 p. 741 
17 EI'Alami, Dawoud S, Legal Capacity with Special Reference to the Marriage Contract, ALQ 
, May, 1991, p. 191. There are also 
jurists who opined that dhimmah is the basis for ahliyyat-al- 
wwjt7b; see Musa, MutianiniadYusuf al-AmwX wa Nazariyyat aI-'Aqdf! a1-FYqh al-Islimi DAr 
al-Fikr al-'Arabi, Cairo, 1996, p. 292 
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1.1.1.4.2. Complete receptive legal capacity( ahliyyat al- ipidfib al-k-dmilah) 
The definition given to complete receptive legal capacity is the fitness of a person 
for receiving rights and taking responsibilities. 18 Contraiy to incomplete receptive legal 
capacity (ahliyyat al-wuji7b al- mdqiýuh) which only possesses the positive aspect, this 
type of legal capacity has both the positive and the negative aspect. In other words, a 
person possessing thýs capacity can be both debtor and creditor. 
The jurists are agreed that the basis for this legal capacity is human life, but they 
are of different opinions as to when it begins. The Ijanari are of the opinion that it starts 
- 
PI. 
after the major part of the baby has been delivered whereas the majority hold that the 
baby must be fully delivered for this capacity to begin. 19 This kind of legal capacity will 
remain until death and some jurists even opined that it would remain after death until the 
deceased's debt is fully settled. 20 
1.1.1.4.3. Active legal capacity (ahliyyat al- ada) 
This generally refers to the capability of a human being of producing acts to be in 
accordance with the Shari 7 ah . 
21AI- Zarqd' defines it as the fitness of a person to 
exercise activities which are dependent on 'reason' (caqý to be legally valid 22 . Another 
" DabUr, al-Madkhal p. 434 
'9 AI-Sabiim, 'Abd al-Rahmdn, al-Madkhal Ii Dirisat al-Tashrf al-Isliflint, Maffiaah Riy9d 
Damascus, 1980,4hedition, vol2. p. 29 
20 This view was criticized by Khall5f He wrote : There is no reason to adopt such a view In 
fact the characteristic of human being will vanish upon his death. Therefore he no longer 
possesses dhimmah and ahlijyah be it complete or incomplete. As for the argument that their 
creditor can still claim their debt it is because the debt has become the responsibilities of the heirs 
to settle it. See : Khallaf, Abd al-Wahhab, 71mu UYN al-Fiqh , Maktabat al-Dawat al- 
Isl&nijyah, Cairo, ii. d, p. p. 136-137 
21 Ani-ir Badshah, Taysir' al-TaWr, Dir al-Fikr, n. d, vol2, p. 447 
22AI-Zarqd', al-Madkhal, vol 2 p. 742 
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definition offered by Abii Zahrah is the competence of a person to acquire rights and to 
create them for others through his verbal action Qaýurrqfjt qawliyyah)'3. It is quite clear 
that al-Zarqa's definition is more comprehensive since it includes word and deed rather 
than confming it to verbal action. Similar to receptive legal capacity this type of capacity 
can also be divided into 'complete' and 'incomplete' due to the development of the life 
of human beings . 
24 Incomplete active legal capacity (ahliyyat al-adj' al -njqi,, -, ah) is the 
fitness of a person to conduct certain actions only. The cause for this capacity is 
discernmen t25 (tampi); thus, a discerning child is only entitled to conduct some 
transactions. With regard to complete active legal capacity (ahliyyat al-adj' al-k, ýnilah) 
it is the highest degree of legal capacity when a person is fit to conduct action without 
any limitation. This is achieved by reaching the age of majority with no mental 
deficiency. In addition to these two kinds of legal capacity-, a person could be lacking 
both types of active legal capacity, as in the case of the insane. 
The above classificafion for active legal capacity is in accordance with the view 
of the majority of jurists. On the other hand the Shafi'-i are of the opinion that a person 
may only be of full or be lacking in capacity. This is because the bases for this capacity 
1 26 in their view are both puberty (buh7gh) and reason(aq) 
'3Abu Zahrah , Muhammad, al-Milki"vh wa 
Nazariyyat al-'Aqdflal-Sharlat al-Islkniyyah 
Dir al-Fikr al-'Arabl', Cairo, 1977, p . 281 24 MfIS5 
, al-AmwN, p. 
295 
25 Some add reason( 'aql )together with discernment as the basis for this capacity. This is *in mV 
opinion not necessary as in order_to be discerning one must possess reason . See Badrdn , Abfl al 
cAyni 
, Tffrikh al-Fiqh al-Islknj* wa 
Na-priyyat al-Milkijyah wa al-'Uqi7d , Dir al-Nahaat al- 
'Arabiyyah, Beirut, n. d, p. 428 
26 AI-Zuhayli, MOanimad , al-Nazari")at al- Fiqhiyyah , p. 
13 6 
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1.1.2 The Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 (ECC) 
Introduction to the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 
Before elaborating the meaning of legal capacity as applicable in the ECC, it is 
worth introducing the background of Civil law in general and the ECC in particular. To 
begin with, the history of Civil law has its origins in what was introduced in Rome for 
the purposes of governing matters relating to its citizens. This set of laws applied only to 
the citizens of Rome,, however; foreigners were subject to what was known as the People 
Law. Civil law then developed during the reign of Justinian to become synonymous with 
Roman law by the unification of law to govern all regardless of their citizenship, and the, 
compilation of the Encyclopaedia of Civil law. 27 The meaning of civil law broadened in 
medieval times to cover a set of rules applied in individual private relationships 
regarding both financial and personal matters. Thus, the Civil law was also known as 
28 
private law. However, at the present time, the notion of this law has become narrower 
_. nl 29 after the separation of some of its content to create a new independent law. 
As stated above,, the Civil law governs relationships among individuals in terms 
of both financial and personal status. This is the situation in most countries adhering to 
the Civil law system such as France and Italy. In Egypt, however, the Civil Code 
concerns only matters pertaining to financial status, leaving personal status to be 
governed by religious law. 30 When the New Civil Code was promulgated in 1948, the 
situation remained unchanged except for few provisions concerning legal capacity 
2' Tandghfi, SamirAbd al-Sayyid, al-Nazariyyat al-'Ammah li al-QinCmMunsha'at al-Ma'Arif, 
Alexandria, 1984, pp. 576-577 see also, J. A.. C. Thomas, Roman law, in An introduction to Legal 
Systems, edited by J. Duncan M Derret, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, p. 1 
28 Salamah, Abmad, al-Madkhal Ii Dir&at al-Q, ýn&z, Ddr al-Nahow al-'Arabijyah, Cairo, 1974, 
p. 6 
29jbid 
30 See, Lutfl, Uusam Matimild, al-Madkhal Ii Dir&at al-Q&7 Cui F! Dw' Arg' al-Fiqh iva Aliks- n 
aI-Qapf, ff', aI-Nasr al-Dhahabili al-Tibdah, Cairo, 1998, p. 62 
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3 'which were attached to the Code. Nevertheless, provisions for legal capacity can still be 
found in personal status law. 
The reasons for excluding personal status may well be because of religious 
factors as well as historical. As observed by Ahmad Salamah, 32 the importance of 
nationalism over universalism led to a distinction between financial and personal matters. 
This is because,, as far as personal matters are concerned, there is no unified law for all 
Egyptians, rather, the law follows the religion of the litigant. 'Ibus, what was applied to 
the Muslims is different from that applied to the Christian or the Jew". This is not the 
case when the litigation involves financial matters, as all are governed by a unified law 
regardless of sect. 
In addition, the formal sources of both financial and personal status have 
contributed to the exclusion of personal status from the Civil Code. With regard to 
fmancial status,, the formal sources are legislative provision, custom, Islamic law and 
natural law. As for personal status, the main source is religion and it has very little 
codified law compared to fmancial status. 34 
This said,. the question arises as to what exactly is meant by personal status and 
what criteria are taken into consideration in distinguishing this concept from financial 
status. The vagueness of the concept can be seen from defiriitions offered. In fact, there is 
no single and solid definition of personal status( aPwj1 syahkgyyah), the reason being 
that no standard measurement exists to differentiate between what is considered as 
31 Anderson, J. N. D, The Sharl'a and the Civil law ( The Debt Owned by the New Civil Code of Egypt and 
Syria to the Sh, 1ý4a) The Islamic Quarterly, Vol 1, No 2, July 1954, p. 35 
32Salamah, al-Madkhal, p. 8 33 Lutfl, al-Madkhal, p. 62 34 See, Salamah, al-Madkhal, p. 9 
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personal status and what is financial, and where the two elements are combined. " If the 
element of finance were to be considered as the measurement, there are transactions such 
as gift and endowment which are still considered personal, in spite of the apparent 
element of finance. 
In spite of this difficulty, the ruling of the Egyptian Court of Cassation 36 has to 
some extent shed light on the meaning of personal status. In one of its rulings, 3' the court 
states: 
"What is meant by personal status is a set of characteristics which distinguish 
human beings from others, such as the state of being female or male, married, 
widow or divorced whether legitimate child or not, enjoying full legal capacity or 
not due to legal process Also included are endowment, gift and bequest due 
to religious nature. 
This was echoed in a later ruling by the same court: 
"According to this court's ruling, personal status is a group of characteristics, 
which differentiate human beings from others [ ....... ], with regard to monetary 
matters, these are considered as fmancial. '-38 
The difficulty in determining personal status can be traced back as early as the 
emergence of the term personal status itself Before the introduction of foreign law 
during Mohamed Ali's reign, Islamic law had been prevalent in the country, in the sense 
that every aspect of litigation would be tried according to the Shartah, regardless of the 
nature of cases be it criminal 6indyah) or transaction (mu', ýwlah). Since the term 
mu'Jýnalah in Islamic law includes both financial and family matters, there was no need 
'-'Tanaghii, al-NaMriyyah, p. 273 
' Hereafter cited as EgCC 
37 EgCC dated 21/6/1934 
38 EgCC, dated 28/4/1985, It is remarkable that although the period between the two rulings is 
about fifty years, there is still no difference between the two. This concludes that the meamng of 
apwX shakhsiyyO has not developed very much. If Islamic law is accused of being rigidity by 
some quarters the same is true with regard to the modem law 
18 
to differentiate between them as far as the court jurisdiction is concerned. Nevertheless, 
all matters relating to personal status like marriage, divorce and the like might be referred 
to as family law (aýkdm al-usrah or munikahit) 
However,, after the advent of foreign law (especially that of French), the 
terminology of personal status (aýmjl shakhg)yah) has been used instead of family la", 
(aýk, -vn al-usrah) in spite of the superiority of Shari ; ah court over personal status. The 
term personal status is rather used to have its counterpart in French Civil Code despite 
the fact that the concept of personal status in French law is not identical to that of Islamic 
law. This is due to the obvious role of religion in Islamic law compared to French law. 
According to some juriStS39, the terminology of personal status was justifiably 
used when there was separation in court jurisdiction; i. e. a special court to look into 
matters relating to personal status, and another for financial matters. However, after the 
abolition of the Sharfah courts by virtue of law No 462 of 1955, all litigation has been 
put under a unified system - the National Court. Thus, the continuous usage of personal 
status is no longer justifiable. 
In my opinion, although this argument has its strengths, the term personal status 
has a very close connection with religious points of view. For Muslims no law repugnant 
to Islam shall be imposed on them, especially those related to their personal matters. As 
for the rest of the law it can be seen that there are provisions in the ECC which are not in 
accordance with Shari '; 'ah. In other words, matters relating to personal status are too 
sensitive to be touched upon by foreign law when introduced in Egypt. 
" See, Tanaghii, al-Namrijyah, pp. 277-279 
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It should be noted that the New ECC was promulgated in 1948 to repeal the old 
one and came mto force in 1949.40 In general, the sources of this Code were described as 
comparative law, Egyptian civil law and the Sharlah. In drafting this Code reference 
was made not only to the French codes but also to all major codes systems such as 
Germanic and Polish codeS41 . The ECC contains 1149 articles divided into four main 
chapters with provisions relating legal capacity are mainly placed in the preliminary 
chapter. 
Having said that, as far as the meaning of legal capacity is concerned, the ECC 
does not stipulate any definition for it, leaving the matter to be interpreted by jurists and 
judges. Some jurists define this term as the fitness of a person to receive rights and bear 
obligation as well as perform legal actS42, while others refer to it as the capability of a 
person to be subject to rights - whether for or against him - and to assume legal acts 
related to such rights. 43 It is observed from these definitions that, similar to Islamic law , 
Egyptian law also recognizes two type of legal capacity; receptive and active. Yet, the 
Muslim jurists seem to have restricted legal capacity to human beings as can be seen 
from their defmitions. 44However, Egyptian jurists have clearly extended the concept of 
' See, Enid Hill, Al-Sanhuri and Islamic law, Cairo Papers on Social Sciences., The American 
University Press, Cairo, 1987, pp. 66-70 
Richard A. Debs, The Law of Property iri Egypt, Islamic law and Civil Code, n. p, n. d, p. 147 
4' Abri Satit, Abmad Hishmat, Na, ý--ariyyat a1-I1tiz&nf1a1-QAnCBi al-Madanlal-Mi.. sri, Maktabah 
Wahbah, Cairo, 1945, p. 10 1 
43 See for instance, Yahyd, cAbd Wadfld , Durds F! Mab, #di' a1-Qjmb7, Dar al-Nahflat al-' Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1980, p. 262, Shanab, MOammad Labib, al-Madkhal 1i Dir&at al-QinCm, D& 
al-Nah & a12Arabiyyah, 1968, p. 129, Salamah, al-Madkhal , p. 3 1, al-Sharag, Mubammad Ali Abdullah, , Hukm al-TasarrufAt a1-QAnCmiyyah 
1i Fjqid al-Ahliyyah fi al-QJMCM al-Yamanl 
Dir&ah Muqdranah, Phd Thesis, Cairo University, p. 26 
4' The word hunian being ( insAn) as appears in classical definitions of legal capacity seems to 
suggest that there was no systematic treatment regarding juristic person in Islamic law. This has 
perhaps led some authors such as Schacht to deny the existence of juristic person in Islamic law, 
see, Introduction, p. 125. It is worth citing the words of Abdur Rahirn regarding the stance of 
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person to cover both natural person and juristic person, such as companies and 
corporations. 
45 
1.1.2.1 Receptive legal capacity 
Similar to Islamic law, this is the fitness of a person to acquire rights and bear 
obligations i. e, his fitness to be either in positive or negative aspect regarding rights. In 
other words receptive legal capacity is the fitness of a person in order that he receives 
rights and performs duties. 46 Some jurists while discussing the concept of legal capacity 
have also referred to it as legal personality (shakhgyyah qAm7niyyah) as evidenced by al- 
Sanh5ri 's statement. After defining 'receptive legal capacity' he writes; 
"In fact, receptive legal capacity by this definition is from legal point of view the 
person itself. Thus, a person- whether natural or juristic- is considered as such in 
the eye of law due to the fact that he is entitled to receive right and bear duties. 
Accordingly all human beings ( after the abolition of slavery) are deemed to be 
legal persons fulfilling the criteria of legal capacity 47 
Muslim jurist toward the concept of juristic person (shakhgyyah itib&iyyah). He states :" It may 
be doubted whether the earlier jurists would recognize an artificial or juristic person. The state or 
community is regarded by them as holding and exercising the rights of God on His behalf 
through the Imam. Similarly the deceased is spoken of as having rights and obligations and not 
his estate, for the law deal both with a man's spiritual and worldly rights and obligations of a 
person cannot be said to be altogether lost on his death, inasmuch as he is entitled to have his 
funeral expenses and his debts and other obligations discharged out of the estate. But later jurists 
seem Inclined to recognize an artificial person, for instance they would allow a gift to be made 
directly to a mosque, while the ancient doctors would require the intervention of a trustee" , 
The 
Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, PLD publishers, Lahore. n. d, p. 218, see also al- 
KhWi, Aýmad Mabmiid, Na, --ariyyat al-Shalchgyyat a1-1tibAriyyah bayn al-Fiqh a1-1s1&n1'wa al- 
Qgnai al-Wadi, -* D& al-Sal&n, Cairo, 2003,1" edition, p75 onwards. 
" Article 52 of the ECC concerning juristic person among others states; juristic person are I-the 
states, the Provinces, Towns and Villages in accordance with the provisions fixed by law, besides 
The administrations, department and other public institution to which the law has granted the 
status ofjuridical personality. 
46 Al- Badrdwi, cAbd al-Munim, al-Namriyyat al-'Ammah 1i al-Iltiz&nit, n. d, n. p, p. 116 
cAijdwi, Mugafa-, Vamffbit ol-Ahliyyah wa 'Awgrioihifi al-Fiqh al-Isl&n1wa a1-Q&? C#i ol- 
wadi, r Majallat al-Buhuth al-Fiqhijyah wa al-QAMmiyyah, Azhar university, Damanhdr, 1986, 
vol 2, p. 129 
Tg' al- 47 Al-Sanliflrii, cAbd al-Razzdq, al-Wasit IT $barh al-QAnCo al-Madani al-Jadid, DAr IP 
Turath al-'Arabj, Beirut, n. d, vol 1, p. 268, Also belong to this view are Abd Munc im Faraj al- 
$uddah 
_, 
see; Mayffdir al-fltiz&n, D& al-Nahpfat al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo, n. d, p. 160, Jamil al- 
Sharq5wi 
, 
Dur asfi al-Nazariyyat al'Aammah 1i al- Haqq p. 120 
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Therefore, according to this view legal personality can be either incomplete on 
complete in a similar way to receptive legal capacity 48 ; hence foetus in the womb is said 
to possess incomplete legal personality because of the incompleteness of its legal 
capacity. 
On the other hand,, there are jurists who distinguish between 'legal capacity' and 
'legal personality' in the sense that every one possesses 'full legal personality', even the 
foetus in the womb. With regard to the extent of right which this personality can acquire 
this may differ from one person to another In other words, according to this view legal 
capacity can be either incomplete or complete whereas this is not the case M legal 
personality. " 
1.1.2.2. Active legal capacity 
As in Islamic law when the word legal capacity is used alone it refers to active 
legal capac, ty 50 which is defined as the capability of a person to perform "legal acts" 
(ta, yarrufjt q, §n 5ýiiyyah) or to utilize his right 51. The term "legal acts" here denotes the 
intention directed to create a specific "legal effect"52 . Since this legal effect is caused by 
that direction of intention it does not naturally result in such an effect except by 'a 
conscious willing' of it. 
53 Therefore, in order to make a legal act valid in the eyes of the 
" Similar to Islamic law legal capacity can be divided into two; incomplete and complete. The 
incomplete capacity carries only the positive aspect, meaning that it has only the capability to 
acquire certain rights and it is not responsible to perform duties. This kind of legal capacity is 
restricted to foetus in the womb in similar way to Islamic law, 
49 cM dwi, VawAbit, pp. 13 0-13 1, 
'0 Al-Fiqi, MOammad ' Ali Uthman, Dur dsfiNazariyyat al-Iltiz&n, n. p, 2002,1 edition, p. 115 
51 Al-Sanhiiri, al-Wasi, vol l, p. 268, al-Ball, Z)awdbi. t al-'Uqi7d, p. 163 al-Badrawl, al- 
Nazariyyat al-'Ammah li al-IltizimAp. 118, Salamah, al-Madlchal, p. 39, Juinaili, Hasan, Mabffdi' 
al-Qwb7an, n. p, 1996, p. 400 
52 Al-Ball, Z)awffbit al-'UqW, p. 163 
53 Al-Badrawi, al-Nazarijyah, p- 118 
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law a person from whom this act proceeds must possess active legal capacity. However, 
if the acts involved-whether beneficial or harmful- are physical or tangible ('amal 
m&ldi) 54 active legal capacity is not necessary for a person to be held responsible because 
the law alone determines the effect of such acts. 55 
The basis for active legal capacity is discenunent (tamyiý); thus, every legal act 
should come from "a discerning will"( il-&Iah mudrikah) through 'reason'. Therefore a 
person who is possessed of the highest level of discernment is considered as having 
complete active legal capacity which entitles him to perform legal acts. Likewise, in the 
case of insufficient discernment he is said to be possessing incomplete active legal 
capacity. 
56 
1.2. Relationships between legal capacity and some associated terminologies 
1.2.1 Legal capacity and dhimmah (engagement) 
1.2.1.1 Islamic law 
The discussion on legal capacity in the work of jurists has inevitably led to the 
discussion of dhimmah; literally, a word that has more than one meaning. Among its 
57 
meanings are covenant( 'ahd), peace (amiý7) and guarantee (ýiamjn) . 
Though there is 
somehow a close connection between these three, as far as the research is concerned, the 
most suitable meaning for dhimmah is covenant. 
"A physical act is an act which is not intended to bring legal effect by the will of a person, its 
legal effect is by virtue of law irrespective of whether or not the act was intentional; for example 
when a person damages another's property with or without intent, it is the law which orders those 
involved to pay compensation. See, al-Badrdwi, al-Nazariyyah, p. 118 55 Ibid, p. 120 56 Sanhuri, al-Wasit, 
5' Al-Kab5 sh-1 ,, al-Dhimmah wa al- 
ýIaqq, p. 17 
23 
The word dhimmah appears in the Qur'an in more than one place; for instance, in 
( 9: 10) Allah says: 
"In a believer they respect not the ties either of kinsl-iip or of covenant(dhimmah). 
It is they who have transgressed all bounds. " 
Technically, jurists are of different opinions in defining dhimmah. According to 
some Ijanafi, dhimmah is an attribute by which a person becomes fit for what he is 
entitled to and what he is obliged to do . 
58 It is obvious from the definition that dhimmah 
is a quality attached to a person, and this view accords with some Ma-liki, Sha-fi'i and 
Ijanbali although with some differences in the wording. 59 In contrast, some other jurists 
such as al- Bazdawl and Ibn Malik have opined that dhimmah is not an attribute but is an 
essence (dhit) and soul; thus, they defined dhimmah as a soul or person who bears the 
responsibility through his covenant. 60 In this definition dhimmah has been construed as a 
covenant with the soul, a receptacle of that covenant. The relationship between dhimmah 
and man is one between something being contained (ýAlo and its container (maýal), a 
relationship between a body and its place 61 . Having 
its close relationship with man, 
dhimmah has therefore been personified. That is, the place in which the quality resides 
assumes the name of that quality-( tasmiyyat al- maýal bi ismi al- 
pjjý62 It is perhaps 
Al-Kabashl, al Dhimmah wa al- Haqq, p. 18 
For instance Al-Khirshi from the Malikis says, Dhimmah is a quality assumed. to a person 
which accept iltizin-n (to be obliged)and ilz&n (to oblige) 
Al-Bujayrimi from the Shafici defines dhimmah as: A standing attribute in a person suitable to 
ilz&n and iltiz,, ýn , H&hiyat al-Bujayrimi, vol 
2, p. 406 
Al-Bahfifi from the 11janbaI-1 says; Dhimmah is a quality by which a person becomes fit to 
ilz&n and iltizft, KashshifalýQind', vol 3, p. 289 
'Al-Jabari-, 'Aw&ijJa1-Ah1i")ah, pp. 95-97 
61 Ahmad Ijasan, The Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 298 
62 Ibid 
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according to this view that the personification of dhimmah is necessary to avoid the 
establishment of legal rules (ýmkm shar'i)on a non existent presumption. 63 
Apart from the opinions discussed, there are some other jurists who hold that 
there is no need to give a technical meaning to dhimmah. According to them, even, 
analysis involving dhimmah in fiqh literature refers only to its literal meaning. 64 In their 
view, for example, when the Sharl ah has enabled a creditor to secure repayment from 
his debtor, fis enablement alone is the cause to oblige (HzJýn) and be obliged (iltizim), 
and therefore there is no need to presume the existence of dhimmah. " 
This said,, it is notable that the differences of views regarding the definition of 
-17- animmah whether it is a quality or an essence or neither, render no legal consequences 
upon any rights and responsibilities for human beings, as is argued by Ahmad Ibrahim 
"Human beings are responsible (mukallaf). 66 They are entitled to rights and subject 
to duties no matter what it (the position of dhimmah) is. The assumption as to 
whether dhimmah is existent or not has no effect on such rights or responsibilities. 
The matter (the existence of dhimmah) might be hypothetical, or it might be a real 
phenomenon dwelling in the human being as part of his inseparable essence..... The 
reason for this assumption may only be formalism In order to draw up legal 
injunctions (aýk. JW) in a more systematic and proper manner. Others opine that 
there is no need for such an assumption, rather it is required to focus on undeniable 
facts and to tie legal injunction to it. Actually the outcome (of this disagreement) is 
the same. , 67 
Having accepted this elucidation, the question that may arise is that of the 
relationship between legal capacity and dhimmah. As elaborated earlier, receptive legal 
63 Al-Khafif, Ali al-Haqq wa al-Dhimmah, p 89 as quoted from MahmUd Bilal Mahran , al- Ah liyyah wa 'A wari f 10, ff n. p, n- ý1, p .23 6'Al-Kabash-i, al-Dhimmah wa al-Haqq, p. 26 
65 AbflZahrah, aI-MiIkiyyah p. 274. 
A person upon whom observance of religious practices is incurnbent. 
67 Ibrahim Alýmad, al- Ahlijyah o, a 'AwAriduhff wa al-Wilgyah, Majallat aI-QffnCx wa al-Iqtigfi, 
vol 3,1931, p. 352 
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capacity is the fitness of a person to receive fights and undertake responsibilities. Some 
jurists therefore consider this kind of legal capacity as identical to dhimmah. According 
to them dhimmah thus means the capacity to accept rights and obligations. 68 Conversely, 
the majority of jurists maintain that receptive legal capacity is not dhimmah itself, for 
them receptive legal capacity is caused by dhimmah due to the fact that it comes after 
dhimmah in existence. 69 In addition receptive legal capacity means the fitness of a person 
to assume rights and obligations but dhimmah is the place where these rights and 
70 
obligation reside. Dhimmah is very important to receptive legal capacity but the 
concepts nevertheless are not identical. In other words receptive legal capacity depends 
on dhimmah and follows from it. 71 In my opinion, wfiffle acknowledging juristic 
discussion on the differences between receptive legal capacity and dhimmah it appears 
the relationship between these two term is so close that they are often used 
mterchangeably. 
1.2.1.2 The ECC 
The jurists defme dhimmah as a group of financial rights and duties given in 
favour of a person or against hiM72. It is clear from the definition that dhimmah according 
to Egyptian law is limited to financial aspects only, thus, the dhimmah in the ECC has a 
narrower concept compared to Islamic law. This is because in Islamic law the term 
dhimmah is used for both financial and non-financial matters,, For example, acts of 
6' Ahmad Hasan, The Principle, p 298 
69AI-Kabash-i, al-Dhimmah wa al-, Uaqq, p. 29 
'0 Alynad Ijasan, The Principle, p. 298 
Ibid 
72AI_ Suddah, cAbd Mun 'im Faraj, Uydl aI-Q'7mCw , Matha'ah Mu#qfJ al-tla labi, Cairo, 1965, P. 349 
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worshipping such as prayer and fasting depend on dhimmah in a similar way financial 
matters depend on. 
1.2.2_Legal capacity and Guardianship (wihiyahj 
1.2.2.1 Islamic law 
Guardianship in the parlance of jurists is the legal authority (ýWph shariyyah) by 
which a person is able to create contracts and carry out acts. 73 It has been divided into 
three, namely; restricted guardianship (wihiyah q, ýsirah or dhAtiyah) unrestricted 
guardianship (wiljyah mutaaddiyah) and deputed guardianship (wiljyah niyjbiyah). 74 
The first two kinds of guardianship are the main concern pertaining to the relationship 
between legal capacity and guardianship. Restricted guardianship refers to the authority 
of a person to act on his own behalf whilst the unrestricted guardianship gives him an 
authority to act on another's behalf The correlation between legal capacIvY and 
guardianship is obvious in complete active le al capacity in the sense that the former is a 4.0, -- 9 
prerequisite (shart) for guardianship. Thus, in order to be a guardian a person should 
have attained active legal capacity, whereas a person enjoying this legal capacity may not 
necessarily be a guardian. 75 A clear example of tl-ýs can be seen in a marriage 
guardianship. A grandfather, for instance, although possessing complete active legal 
capacity cannot be appointed as a guardian to conclude a marriage contract in the 
presence of the bride's father. In short, a 'restricted guardianship' seems to be identical to 
complete active legal capacity. 
Shalabi, al-Madkhal, p. 518, DabOr, al-Madkhal, p. 463 
Dabfir, al-Madkhal, pp. 463465 
75 AI-Zuliayll, al-NazariyyAt, pp. 157-158 
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1.2.2.2 The ECC 
Guardianship is an authority assigned to a person which makes him capable of 
76 
performing legal acts on behalf of others, or an attribute attached to a person which 
gives him authority in both financial and personal matters of another person . 
77 It is clear 
from the definition that guardianship concerns the act of person to perform act on other's 
behalf and not for himself The differences between active legal capacity and 
guardianship can be summarized in the follovAng: lz? -, 
-Legal capacity as mentioned is the fitness of a person to act on his own behalf whereas 
guardianship is concerned with the act of a person on behalf of others. 
- Legal capacity is the usual case while guardianship is exceptional 
-In the case of the absence of active legal capacity, this will lead to the nullification of 
acts whereas in the case of guardianship, if this is void then this will not affect other. 
Apart from the ECC, law governing guardianship can also be found in the Law of 
Guardianship Over Property of 1952. 
1.2.3 Legal capacity and Responsibility (mas'dflyyah) 
1.2.3.1 Islamic law 
The term responsibility( mas'Niyyah) is mostly used by jurists in matters relating 
to crime or liabilities of tort It connotes a realistic punishment (mu'dkhadhah w4i' 




"Yaýya, Yam Mubarnmad, al-Madkhal li Dir&at al-Q&7al, Ak al-Nahds al-'Arabiyyah, 
Cairo, 1991,6"' edition, p. 253, al-Sharafi,, Hukm al-Tasarrufffft al-Qjnaniýyy. O, p. 33 
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committing prohibited acts . 
7' Legal capacity differs from responsibility because the 
former is an inseparable quality integral to human beings and by its virtue a person is 
qualified to carry out activities such as concluding a contract. This quality remains with 
him regardless of whether the activities have been actually carried out or not. To 
illustrate, a person of sound mind is qualified to enter into a contract of sale even though 
the sale has yet to be concluded. This is not the case in responsibility because it is a 
dispensable attribute in human e lif . 
79The existence of responsibility is only apparent after 
an activity is actually carried out by human beings. Thus, for instance, a person is not 
responsible for paying blood money( diyah) unless a murder has been committed. 
It is noteworthy that a person lacking in legal capacity such as a minor might be 
held responsible for his actions. For instance, if he causes damage to the property of 
another, he is liable to pay compensation although he has no full legal capacity. 
Another important point in the work of jurists on legal capacity is that they tend 
to discuss it in matters relating to either contract or personal status which also include the 
discussion of impediment to this capacity (awjriaal-ahliyyah). However, with regard to 
crime there is no direct discussion on legal capacity. This is perhaps because of the 
negative impression of the concept of crime itself. For example, a person is entitled to 
conclude a contract and remarkably he is also entitled to commit murder. However, there 
is some common ground in juristic discussion regarding legal capacity and responsibility 
such as in the case of duress. The only difference is that in contract, duress is considered 
" M-Jundi, Mubanuuad al- ShaKidt , 
Jarg'im al-AlidAth Flal-Sharl'at al-lsl,; Y-niyyah , 
Affr al- 
FYkr al-'Arabi, Cairo, 1986,1 st edition, p. 13 
'9 Ibid, p. 118 
29 
as an impediment to legal capacity whereas in crime the term 'obstacle of responsibility' 
(mawjni'mas'Niyyah) is preferred. 
1.2.3.2 The ECC 
Similar to Islamic law, the question of whether or not 'responsibility' is attached 
to a person does not arise unless an act (legal or physical) has been actually done. Hence, 
it is unusual to describe a person as having fitness to perform a physical act (amal 
middi) such as bringing harm to others. But if such harm is inflicted, the person is said to 
be responsible for what he has carried out. In other words, legal capacity is not identical 
to 'responsibility' as a person may be lacking of legal capacity but at the same time he is 
responsible of illicit act committed, therefore according to the ECC a discerning child is 
responsible for damages caused to others irrespective of the incompleteness of his legal 
capacity. 'o 
80 Article 164/1 reads: An individual shall be responsible for his illicit acts as long as he is 
capable of discretion. 
30 
3 Impediments to legal capacity ('awikiýf al-ahliyyah) in Islamic law 
and the ECC of 1948 
1.3.1 Islamic law 
1.3.1.1 Derinition 
As previously discussed, 'receptive legal capacityý is integral to human beings 
from birth to death; and, since the basis for this capacity is humanity itself thus, it will 
not be affected by any circumstances that might occur. For instance, the insane can still 
enjoy receiving rights (which is one of the feature of legal capacity) irrespective of 
insanity. As for 'active legal capacity' it is not permanently integral to human beingsl 
rather its presence might be exposed and vulnerable to changes due to certain factors, In 
Islamic law, circumstances that affect (active legal capacity) are known as impediments 
to legal capacity (amiriýl al-ahliyyah). A brief account of this topic will include the 
defi. nition of awirid and its classification in both Islamic law and the ECC. 
To begin with, it is essential that before exploring the technical or legal meaning 
of ' awirid , the 
literal meariing should also be fully discussed, for it might play a 
decisive role if there is disagreement in legal definitions. The word 'awirid in Arabic is 
the plural of '&id or 'iridah, derived from 'araýh kadha (to become visible, appear 
when one thing appears to prevent another from functioning)8 1 Thus, for example, the 
clouds are also known as ', -kipý because they prevent sunshine from penetrating the 
earth. 82 Similarly, in presenting juristic arguments the mu'jraýbh(contradicfion) is often 
used. It is known as such because sets of evidence may counter each other and prevent 
81 Al-Bukhanii, , Kahsfal-AsrAr, . vol 
4, p. 262 
82Ibid, see also, al-Rffzj-, MuIchtAr pp. 516-517. 
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establishing legal rules( ithbit al-hukm. ). 83 Another salient feature of the literal meaning 
of 'awirid is its non essence attribute. 
84 
As far as legal meaning is concerned, various definitions have been offered for 
cawArid. According to al-Bukhari for example, 'awArid is a matter affecting legal 
capacity which makes it unsustainable as it is. 
85 The term may also be defined as 
whatever affects active legal capacity, resulting either in its removal or changes in legal 
ruling, 86 while another classical jurist, Amir Badshah has summarized 'awirid as 
dispensable circumstances which negates legal capacity in general 87 
From these definitions, it seems that 'awirid is a group of factors by which a 
person is restricted from enjoying rights according to his "will"(ir,; Uah). It may not be 
necessary that 'awArid therefore does remove legal capacity; it may also include factors 
which change legal rules whether great or small as is evidenced by al-Bukhari's 
statement: "Some of thern(awirid) such as sleep and faintness remove active legal 
capacity . Some others effect changes on certain 
legal ruling virtually without affecting 
legal capacity. , 
88 
Aside from the above mentioned,, the definition of 'awjriý can also be found in 
the works of contemporary jurists To mention a few of these Khalldf defines 'awirid as 
something which occurs to a person which has an effect on his mind (aqo and 
"Al-Bukhan, Kashfal-Asrk, vol 4, p. 262. 
84 Al-Tiflazani, Sharb alTalw1h, vol 2, p. 462. 
""A]-BukhAn, Kashfal-Asrgr, vol 4, p. 262. 
86 Al-Talwih 'Ald al-Tawdib, vol 2, p. 462, see also: al-$amrd'T, 'Abdullah 'Abd al-Latifal-Safah 
wa al-Ghaflah wa Atharuhuma f! al-Tasarrufa-t fi al-Sharfat aI-IsI9mO)ah wa al-Q&7 i7n, PhD 
Tbesis, Cairo University, 1976, p. 50 
87 See Taysr- al-Taýrrr , vol 
2, p. 258 





-Niiri refers to discernment (tamyr), or puts limitation on his acts On the other hand, al 
it as a disease affecting mental capability or prudence, while9o Sirdj sees 'awdriýl as 
attributes which affect the legal capacity of human beings. 91 
A thorough exan-dnation of the defuiifions offered by these scholars perhaps leads 
to the conclusion that they either concur with the view of classical jurists (which 
widens the scope of 'aw, ý, iý) or restrict it to certain 'awAriý only, as can be seen in al- 
Nuri's definition. From al-Nuri's perspective it is vital to restrict the concept in this way. 
Indeed, he severely criticizes those jurists who do widen its scope, especially those 
belonging to the Ijanafi. He argues; 
" Most of the matters referred to by the jurists as 'aw&id in fact are not accurate. 
This is evidenced from their discussion of 'aw&id itself in which they concede 
that there is no connection between these factors and legal capacity such as 
mistake, slavery, jest, and death sickness [ ... ] They view 
'awirid not from the 
point of view of legal capacity but rather from the effect of that 'awirid on the 
establishment of legal rulings. Thus, there is confusion between 'aw&id and other 
matters which may have a similar effect on a person's acts... .: 
92 
This view is echoed by another scholar; in his book al-Hukm al-Shar CI; cind al- 
93 Hass-an stresses that the classical jurists have not differentiated between U, yany MI 
impediments ('awirid al-ahliyyah) and "hindrance on performing legal obligation' 
(mAni' al-taklý). According to this view, matters discussed by classical jurists pertaining 
to 'awkid al-ahliyyah can in fact be categorized into three; 'awkid al-ahliyyah such as 
insanity, mini' al-takfif such as menstruation , and 
both cawirid and mAnic concurrently 
such as faintness( ighma'). Regarding this last category, Hassdn differs from al-Mri, as 
according to the latter what is considered as impediment is to be found in 
89Khalldf, 'Abd Watib5b, al-Ahliyyah wa 'Awgridupi, Ma. thdat al-Naýr, Cairo, 195 5, p. 23 
yn, Dirkah fl'Aw&ia al-Ahliyyah fi al-Sharfat aI-IsI&niyyah, Mag aah Lajnat A 1-N&I Husa 
al-Bctygn al-'Arabi, Cairo, 1953 p 101. 
91 Sirgi. MuPammad, Uyal al-Fiqh al- lsl&m, Munshaat al-Ma'drif, Alexandria, 1998, p. 83 
92Dir&ahfl'Aw, #rid al-Ahlijyah p. 93 
93 See, pp-179-180 
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insanity(/un Cm), imbecility(atah) an prodigality(safah) as well as unawareness(ghqflah) 
94whereas the former still considers faintness as an impediment to legal capacity. In this 
regard Hassan states: 
" Some of the impediments mentioned by the jurists can also be counted as 
hindrance (mini' al-takliý, ) as they eliminate the condition of takl#-', at the same 
time they are also considered as impediments (awji-id) due to their effect on 
reason (aqý. For instance, faintness on one hand is an impediment , while one the other it negates "will" from a person; thus from this point faintness is 
considered as hindrance (mini'al-takIr , 95 
Another contemporary jurist, al-Zarqa', also maintains that classical jurists had 
confused the concept of impediment96 with others. Judging from this scholar's writing on 
'impediment' together with the work of the abovementioned contemporary, it can be 
concluded that they are in agreement as to criticizing the scope of impediment as 
discussed by classical jurists. Although there is agreement amongst them with regard to 
the cause for impediment nevertheless they differ as to what can be regarded as 
impediment. As far as the cause is concerned, it seems that the cause of impediment is 
the opposite of its basis; hence, having accepted that the basis is reason and discernment, 
the cause of impediment should accordingly be the lack of these two elements. 
Consequently, according to these scholars, any matter which does not effectively 
influence the reason and the ability to discern cannot be regarded as 'impediment' 97 
Furthermore, the nature of the 'impediment' itself must be exceptional in the sense that it 
may occur only to specific persons. Therefore, 'minority' for instance, is not an 
impediment due to the fact that it occurs to every person. 98 
94 
see Dir&ah p 10 1 
9' Uassan, Ijusayn Ijamid, al-thilan al-Shar' ! Ind al-Uyaliyyffl, Djr al-Nahdat al-'Arabiyyah, 
Cairo, 1972,1 " edition, p. 180 
96AI-Madkhal vol 2. p. 800. 
97 A]-Nu-r-i, Dir&ah, p 96 
98Ibid, 94. al-ZarqA', al-Madkhal, vol 2, p. 812 
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With regard to what should be considered as impediment to legal capacity, al- 
Nuri has restricted it to insariity( jun Fm), imbecility( 'atah) and prodigality( safah) as well 
as unawareness (ghaflah). 99 On the other hand, al-Zarqd', conceding to some of the 
impediments 100 mentioned by the classical jurists, has added indebtedness( 
madyFmiyyah) and bankruptcy( ifl&) to be impediments. 'O' Hassan, however, did not 
clearly express his view, nevertheless, it seems from his writing that he followed al- 
Miri 's poirit of view. 
102 
These then are the views and arguments maintained by some contemporary 
scholars. 103 In short,, it can be concluded that the scope of impediment should not in their 
view be widened to cover what is not actuaUy impediment. This said, it is noteworthy 
that a deeper study of their views leads to the conclusion that these scholars seem to 
contradict their own arguments. Al- Zarqa', for instance, has considered indebtedness as 
an impediment despite the fact that an indebted person still possesses reason and 
discernment. 104 Likewise, what has been mentioned by al-Nuri as impediment such as 
prodigality and unawareness has no connection with the actual cause of impediment to 
legal capacity. In addition, judging from his condition that in order to be impediment a 
matter must be exceptional, it seems that the reason for imposing tWs condition is due to 
misconception and confusion between impediments (awkid) and unexpected matters 
(pw&i)', as evidenced by his statement " Impediment (aw&id) as we have explained, is 
an unexpected matter (umdr griah)occurring to human being it is a state of illness 
99 Al-Nu-n, Dir&ah 
, p. 
10 1 
100 They are insanity, imbecility, faintness, sleep, death sickness and slavery. Also included are 
intoxication and foolishness. 
lo'Al-Madkhal, vol 2, p. 800 
102See, al-tIukm al-Sharl, p. 180 onwards 
'0' The scholars mentioned above represent those who disagree with the view of classical jurists. 
In contrast, there are also contemporaries such as Alu-nad Ibrahim and cAbd al-Wahhab Khallaf 
who follow the classical jurists in their discussion of legal capacity. 
'0' As mentioned earlier, both are the basis for legal capacity. 
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bearing an attribute of continuity which affects the capability of a person to produce legal 47-D --- 
acts"'O' Thus, he excludes minority from being an impediment: it is not unexpected as it 
occurs to every person. 
However,, by referring to the meaning of 'awArid and tawki' from a literal 
perspective it can be seen that there is a difference between the two. The word tiri' in 
Arabic language connotes the meaning of peculiarity in human life; hence, it is not 
synonymous with 'irid (singular of 'awirid .5 since 
the latter does not necessarily have 
this element of peculiarity. For example, human beings are vulnerable to insanity, 
prodigality, sleep and mistakes which are not peculiar to them. Furthermore, 'jrid (which 
means to prevent somethirýg from occurring )106 covers all types of 'awirid, as discussed 
1-- - 
107 
by classical jurists. 
In my opinion, the classical definition of impediment (awgrid) is perhaps put in 
such a way because from the jurist's point of view impediment is the opposite of the 
meaning of legal capacity itself, not its basis. In other words, they look at the effect of 
legal capacity on the act of a person who possesses full legal capacity. Therefore, if a 
person enjoying full legal capacity performs a transaction, the transaction is valid-, 
otherwise if the act is carried out for instance under duress it will be void, despite the fact 
that the basis of legal capacity (i. e. reason and discernment) still exists. To put it simply, 
if legal capacity means the fitness to act , impediment to this capacity means the unfitness 
to perform this act. 
'O'Dirisah, p. 96 
"6 See literal meaning of 'awgrid, p. 31 
'0' See AI-Safah wa al-Ghaflah , p. 
51 
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1.3.1.2 Classification of impediments to legal capacity 
Generally speaking, impediment to legal capacity can be divided into two kinds. 
natural (samjMjyah) and acquired (muktasabah). Indeed, there is no legal implication 
resulting from this classification except fo r the purpose of proper 
arrangement. 108 Moreover, the existing classification is a result of legal reasoning (ijtihid 
)of the jurists in the absence of legal text thereto. 109 Natural impediment"O is related to 
causes that are beyond the control of human beings and result from an act of the 
Lawgiver, III meaning that a person has no choice or will to accept or refuse its presence. 
Since what comes from the Lawgiver is not all predictable, it can be said that this kind of 
impediment is not actually restricted to certain factors only. Nevertheless, as far as 
human knowledge is concerned, the Hanafi have idenfified several factors to be among 
natural impediments; minority (oghar), insanity( jun Fm), imbecility( 'atah) , 
forgetfulness (nisygn), sleep( nawm), faintness (ighma), slavery (riqq), illness (marag), 
menstruation( Payd), post natal blood (nif&) and death (MaWt). 112 It should be noted that 
it is not the intention of this study to examine deeply all these impediments rather as 
mentioned earlier 
113 
the focus will be on minority and insanity. 
114 
"'8AI-ZarqA', al-Madkhal, vol 2, p. 799 
"9 There is no legal text from the Qur', -7n and Sunnah pertaining the classification whether direct 
or indirect. 
"0 Literally, samahviyyah denotes whatever comes from the sky (highness), which is out of a 
person's will. See: Kashfal-Asrgr, vol 4, p 263. 
"' Al-Bukhdn-*, Kashf al-Asr. #r, vol 4, p. 263, Amir Badshah, Taysir alTafirir , vol 2, p. 258, al- 
Tiffazam , Sharp al-TalwO , vol 
2, p. 462, see also: Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Theories of 
Islamic law, Adam Publishers & distributors, Delhi, 1996,1 " edition, p. 91 
112 7 Tays r' al- Tahrkx , vo 
12, p. 258. 
See Introduction, p. 2 
114 Apart from these two, other impediments falling within this category are briefly as follows; 
Forgetfulness (nisy, -Di) 
This is the state of not knowing what was once known which occurs unintentionally. Basically, 
forgetftflness does not remove legal capacity; but it may change some ruling if it occur without a 
person's intention such as eating with respect to a fasting person. 
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In contrast to natural impediments, acquired impediments are those created by 
man, or in which human will and choice are the basic factors; 115 Although there are a 
number of acquired impediments this study will focus only on the concept of 
prodigality (safah) and n-ýistake( ghala, 6, as well as duress (ikrjh) - 
116 
Sleep(nawm) 
As for a sleeping person, as far as crime and contracts are concerned, he will not be held liable 
for what he does when he is asleep; however, he is responsible for paying compensation for 
damages caused. 
Slavery (riqq) 
With regard to slavery, this is a defect in legal capacity created by the Sharlah , being an 
impediment to having the powers of bearing witness and holding the office of a judge or other 
office 
Menstruation (gayd) 
As for menstruation, this is the monthly discharge of blood from the uterus of the woman who is 
neither a diseased nor a minority This impediment does not destroy the legal capacity of a 
woman whether receptive or active. The greatest effect it can have is to prevent particular rituals 
from being valid, such as fasting and prayer. See: Sir5j, U. YiV al-Fiqh, p. 85, Ahmad liasan, The 
Principle, pp. 317-318, 
Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, p. 97, Amir Badshdh, TajýsV al-Tapri-, vol 2, p. 258. 
116 Other acquired impediments include; 
Ignorance Uaho 
This is a quality which is an antonym of knowledge, even where there is probability and 
imagined knowledge. As a general rule, every legal injunction established by the Qur'jn and 
sunnah as well as ýmt, no excuse on the pretext of ignorance will be accepted for those who live 
in the Muslim community, such as ignorance of the obligatory five prayers. However, in certain 
matters ignorance constitutes an excuse; for example, 111 the contract of agency, if an agent is not 
aware that the contract has been ten-ninated, all transaction carried out are valid until he becomes 
aware of the termination. Likewise, in the contract of pre-emption (shufah) the ignorance of pre 
emptor (shaff )about this contract does not invalidate the right of pre emptor. 
Intoxication (sakr) 
hitoxication is a condition which overtakes a man on account of the repletion of his mind with 
the ascending vapours towards it, resulting in the suspension of that intelligence which 
distinguishes between that which is good and that which is bad . The 
jurists are agreed that if 
intoxication is caused by permissible means such drinking wine under duress, all a person's acts 
including contract would be void. However, there is disagreement among the jurists if the 
intoxication is caused 
_by 
forbidden means such as drinking wine voluntarily. According to 
Uanafi and some Shafici, a person who becomes drunk by forbidden means is responsible for all 
his deeds and utterances;, thus, all his act such as contract, divorce and the like are still valid. On 
the other hand , the 
lianbali and the Maliki are of the opinion that the contract of a drunken 
person is void due to the absence of the element of consent which is regarded as the main 
condition for a contract to be valid. 
Jesting (hazO 
Jesting means to titter words or expression as a joke without intending to convey their literal or 
metaphorical meaning. As far as creation (insh. #'&) is concerned the effiect of jesting can 
be 
divided into two; firstly, if jesting involves revocable contracts, such as sale and lease, the 
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1.3.2 The ECC 
According to this Code, factors affecting legal capacity can be divided into two 
categories; impediment to this capacity and defects of will. Impediment to legal capacity 
is a natural or physical factor which affects a person's mind causing the removal of his 
legal capacity or downgrading it. 117 It can be concluded from this definition that the ECC 
has differentiated between two impediments, the first of which concerns only factors that 
remove legal capacity which the Code has restricted to insanity and imbecility. 118 Other 
factors (prodigality and unawareness) will only downgrade legal capacity-, in other words 
in the presence of such factors the legal capacity would be incomplete. 119 Apart from the 
said impediments the Code has also annexed several matters to resemble impediment 
although the terminology may differ. 
With regard to defects of vvill, the Code has restricted this to duress and mistake 
as well as fraud (tad1h) The differences between defects of consent and impediments to 
f IIOWS; 120 legal capacity can be summarized as 0 
I- Impediment to legal capacity affects 'reason' of a person while in the case of defects 
of will the reason still exists, but it affects the consent of a person, 
2-Normally, the period of existence of impediment in human beings is longer than that of 
defects of will. 
contract will be void whereas in the case of that which is irrevocable such as the contract of 
marriage, the contract is valid. See: Ahmad Hasan, The Principle, pp. 341 
Salamah, al-Madkhal, p. 59 
Article 45/1 states; A person devoid of discretion owing to minority, feeble-mindedness or 
insanity is incapable of exercising his right 
119 Article 46: Whoever reaches the age of discretion but has not reached majority and a person 
attaining his majority but is prodigal or imbecile has a limited legal capacity according to the 
provisions of law 
"0 Al-Samr-d'i- , al-Safah wa-al-Ghaflah wa 
A tharuhumJfi-aI-TayarrqfAt, p. 58 
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3. The existence of defect of will does not lead to interdiction (bajr) whereas in the case 
of impediment the rules of interdiction will be imposed. 
In my view, since the existence of either "impediment" or "defects" will lead to the same 
effect, i. e , the mivalidity of an act carried out by a person affected by these two, the 
differentiation is of little significance and hence the terminology used by the classical 
Muslim jurist is preferable. 
1.4. Summary 
Legal capacity in Islamic law has been treated from different perspectives in the 
works of classical jurists; their works (except that of Hanafi) on the subject are not 
unified and are therefore scattered in nature. Contemporary jurists, however, have 
focused in a unified manner on legal capacity in their work on principles of jurisprudence 
(u, y, 71 al-fiqh). Legal capacity in Islamic law is divided into two; Teceptive legal 
capacity' and 'active legal capacity'. The former is concerned with the ability of a person 
to acquire rights and bear duties, whereas the latter is connected with the fitness of that 
person to perform legal acts. These two types of legal capacity are further divided into 
'incomplete' and 'complete'. 
Humanity exists as the basis of receptive legal capacity and under no 
circumstances shall it be removed from human beings. On the contrary, active legal 
capacity may not be permanently integral to human beings, as its existence is vulnerable 
to removal or to changes. These changes which are caused by the presence of several 
factors known also as impediments to legal capacity (cawArid al-ahliyyah ) influence the 
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acts of a person and determine whether those acts are valid or void . Although there is 
disagreement among Muslim scholars (especially those of contemporary jurists) on the 
classification of impediments, generally Islamic law recognizes the following to be 
among the impediments to legal capacity; insanity, minority imbecility, forgetfulness, 
sleep faintness, ignorance, prodigality, mistakes and duress. 
With regard to the ECC, it is accepted that to a large extent the Code follows 
Islamic law in the concept of legal capacity from the definition through to the 
classification. The Code has also recognized the existence of receptive legal capacity and 
active legal capacity. Despite this, there are also differences between the two systems of 
law; for instance, the concept of dhimmah in the ECC is different from Islamic law, as 
well as the notion of legal personality, which covers both natural and juridical persons. 
As far as impediment to legal capacity is concerned, the Code limits this to four factors 
only; insanity, imbecility and prodigality as well as unawareness. The remaining factors, 
which are considered as impediments in Islamic law are classified as 'defects of will' in 
the ECC. In Islamic law,, all factors are discussed under the term impediments to legal 
capacity, although there are some contemporary jurists who tend to follow the 
classification of impediment according to the ECC without convincing evidence. Since 
the purpose of this research is to compare Islamic law with the ECC, the classification of 
Islamic law is thus preferred, bearing In mind that the study will be restricted to 
impediments, wfikh have their counterpart in the ECC regardless of terminology. 
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CHAPTER TWO: MINORITY ffIGHAR)) AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
CONTRACT 
2.1 Introduction 
TNs chapter will attempt to examine "n-iinority" as one of the impediments on 
legal capacity. As such, the notion of minority will be explained concernIng both Islamic 
and the ECC. The concept of contract and its relationships with disposal (taýarruyq and 
obligation (iltizim) will also be elaborated, together how the contract is affected by the 
presence of minority. The discussion will involve an analysis of Islamic law followed by 
the ECC. 
2.2 Meaning of minwity 
2.2.1 Islamic Law 
2.2.1.1 Literal meaning 
In general, the word ýighar(minority) in Arabic is used interchangeably with ýabi 
, 
Odath, ghuhiW and yjfi' all of which literally mean the 'beginning of age'. 1 According 
77 
to al-Suyiifl, what is in the womb is called janh , which after birth it is called Xbi until 
the time of weaning, after which it is called ghulim up to the age of seven. 2 These words 
7 (minor) appears in are used in various places in the Qur'a-n; for instance the word ýaghr 
(17: 24) which read: 
"My lord bestow on them thy mercy even as they cherish me in my childhood 
(saghian)" Likewise the word ýabi is also mentioned in (19: 29) "They said : how can 
we talk to one who is a child(, yabijyjn) in the cradle". In (19: 7) the word ghuhýn also 
' Tank Mukht& al-$ipA, p. 166, In Manzar, Lisgn al-'Arab, vol 7, pp. 282-283 
2 AI-Suyiitli, al-Ashb9h wa al-Naz&r, Affr al-kutub al-'Ilmiyyah. Beirut, I' edition, 1403, p. 240. 
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appears "0 Zakariya We give you good news of a son(bi ghulimin) his name shall be 
Yahya ". In addition the Qur'dn has also used the word #fl referring to one of the various 
stages faced by human beings throughout their lives as stated in (22: 5): "Then do we 
bring you out as babies (tiflan)" 
It is clear from these verses that the Qur'an has used various terms to refer to a stage of 
human life i. e. , the beginning of age. 
2.2.1.2 Legal Meaning 
Legally, minority is defined as a period of age during which a person has yet to 
reach the age of majority, 3 and jurists are unanimously agreed that developmental stages 
of a minor can be divided into two categories; non discerning( ghayr mumayyiz) and 
disceming(mumayyiz). 4 
2.2.1.3 Stage of non discernment in Islamic Law 
Jurists are of different opinions as to the exact period during which a child is 
considered as a non- discerning child. According to the Ijanafi, 5 a child is said to be 'non 
3 Al-Suyiiti, al-AshbA wa al-Nazq'ir, DAr al-Kutub al-71miyyah, Beirut, I't edition, 1403 H, 
p. 219, Ibrahim, 'Atiyyah 'Abd al-MawJiId, Madi Ahliyyat al-$abi-fi al-Tayarruf& al-Wiyyah, 
Dir&ah Muq, #ranah bayn al-Sharlah wa al-Q,, ý, 7&7 al-Madani-, PhD 'lliesis, Azhar University, 
1987, p. 136. See also. al-Buh5ti, Kashshif al-Qind. edited byMustafa Hildl, Dir al-Fikr, Beirut, 
1402 H, vol 3, p. 442, Ibn al-Humam, Sharh Fatý al-Qad, ý, Dir al-Fikr, Beirut, n. d, 2nd edition, 
vol 5, p. 154. As will be discussed later there is disagreement amongst the jurist on how to 
determine the age of majority. 
' See Kashsh. #f al-Qind, vol 3 p. 450, al-Hattab, MawAhib al-JaIll, DAr al-Fikr , Beirut, 1398,2 
nd 
edition, vol 5, p. 62 , al-Hidgyah vol 3, p. 280, al-Sharbim, Mughni a1-Muhtg, Djr al-Fikr, Beirut, 
n. d, vol 2, p. 166, Abi! al-Rish, Mubammad Isma'11, al-. Uajar wa Asbguhu ft al-Fiqh a1-1s1&nj, ' 
Ma 
* 
lbaat al-Aminah, Cairo, 1988,1" edition, p. 29 
5AI-Sarakhsi, a1-MabsqtV&a1-Marifah, Beirut, 1406 H, vol 24, p. 162, Ibn 'Abid-M. Radd al- 
Muht&, D, qr al-Fikr, Beirut, 1386 H,, 2 nd edition, vol 4, p. 257, al-Sharafi, Muharm-nad Ali. ffukm 
al-Taýarrqfjt al-QAn Cmi")ah 1i Fffqid al-Ahft"wh, p. 76 
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discerning' soon after his birth until he reaches the age of seven; this limitation was 
directed by the Prophet (PBUH) himself They argue that in a ffadih narrated by 'Umar 
bin Sa'ad (through his father and his grandfather) that the Prophet (PBLJH) is reported to 
have said " Instruct your children to perform prayer when they are at the age of seven, 
and beat them (if they do not comply) when they are ten years old, and separate them 
their beds ). )6 
TIfis ffadih indicates that when a child reaches the age of seven, he has the 
nlý ability tOunderstand commands and the potentiality to be taught and trained, and thus, he 
is considered to be a discerning child. In addition, there is a report that the Prophet P. B. 
U. H invited his cousin 'Al-i to embrace Islam when he was seven; this further proves that 
a child can understand what is communicated to him. 
On the other hand, the majority of jurists, 7 conceding the authenticity of the 
ýadih 
, 
hold the view that there is no specific age for the beginning of discernment. This 
is because individuals vary in intellectual capacity from one to another; for instance, 
there are persons to whom Allah has granted the ability to understand in the early stages 
of their lives even though they have yet to attain the age of seven. Similarly, there may 
be children whose ability to discern has yet to come, even if they have already reached 
the age of seven. It is therefore, suggested -according to this view- that in order to 
identify the age of discernment, a child should be tested as to whether or not he has the 
ability to understand basic things, such as understanding questions posed to him. In the 
6 Narrated by AN! Ddw-Ud, Kitg al-$alA, chapter 26, t1adith no. 495. It is often at this point in 
his life that the child begins to use his mind and to make use of what he has already experienced. 
In early childhood he becomes fairly capable of absorbing correct statements and reacting 
logically, Abdul Aziz Moliamnied Zaid, The Islamic law of Bequest, Scorpion Publishing Ltd, 
London, 1986, I't edition, p. 18 
' See, A]-NaAawi, al-Majma ' Sharp a1-Muhadhdhab, ed, MahmUd Matralýii, Dir al-Fikr, Beirut, 
1996,1' edition vol 7, p. 26,, MawAib al-jalil, vol 4, p. 244 
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event that he is able to understand, he can be considered as discerning regardless of his 
real age. if it is clear however, that the child does not comprehend, then he is still ýnon 
disceming'. 
Although both groups of jurists put forward strong arguments, I am inclined to 
prefer the view that fixes the age of seven as the age of discernment. This is because - 
having admitted that some people may attain early or late discernment- the age of seven 
(as identified by the Prophet PBUH) is the most common age at which discernment is 
reached, shared by the overwhelming number of children in many situations such as the 
beginning of school. Furthermore, as far as consistency in law is concerned, fixing a 
certain age can assist those working in legal fields (especially the judges) to accurately 
pass their judgment as to whether or not children possess the capacity to discem. In 
addition,, it is rare to find a child who might be discerning before the age of seven; thus, 
according to legal maxim, a "rarity" is tantamount to non existence" (al-nidir ka al- 
ma'dCan). 
2.2.1.4 Stage of discernment 
A child is considered to be discerning upon attaining the age of seven and he will 
no longer be counted as a child when he reaches the age of majority. Attainment of the 
age of majority( buh7gh) is significant in Islamic law, since no legal injunctions are C) 
imposed unless a person has attained the age of puberty which is determIned in two basic 
ways. Firstly, in order to determine whether a person has reached majority, there are 
several signs and indications, in presence of which the age of majority is constituted. 
These signs are known as natural signs of puberty( bulfigh -pbi i ; ). Secondly in the case 
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of the absence of natural signs, jurists have defined puberty as a time when a person 
reaches a certain age; a method known as assumptive puberty (buh7gh taqdH) 
Ac 
., far as natural signs are concerned, some of them are shared by both men and women 
i. e. wet dreams( ibtikvin) and pubic hair( inbit) while others (menstruation and 
pregnancy) concern only women. 
2.2.1.4.1 Wet dreams (iblilim) 
To begin wiffi, a wet dream is a state of producing semen either in dreams or in 
wakefulnesS8 , and the 
jurists are unanimously9 agreed that this factor is a sign of 
attaining puberty. They base their opinion on a verse from the Qur'an (24: 59) in which 
Allah commands: 
"When the cl-ffldren among you come of age(ýulum), let them (also) ask permission as 
have those before them. " 
Here it is stressed that since Allah commands the minor to seek for permission to 
enter a private domain if he or she has experienced wet dreams, then this connotes that 
the minor has reached the age of puberty. 
In addition, the are also several ffadihs which support the above Quranic verse; 
in one of these ffadihs the Prophet PBUH is reported to have said: "Tbe pen is 
8 Al-Sharbint Mughn., al-MuhtWj, vol 2, p. 166 
9 See, In Qudamah, al-Mughm, D& al-Mr, Beirut, 1405 H, 1" edition, vol 4, p. 297, Mughnl' al- 
Muhhy , vol, 2, p. 
166, al-Dardiral-Sharh al-Kabr-', ed, Mulýarnniad 'Ulaysh, Dir al-Mr, Beirut, 
n. d, vol 3, p. 293 
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suspended (liability is exempted) in three cases; a sleeping person until he wakes up, an 
imbecile until he becomes sane and a minor until he experiences a wet dream. 
It is clear from this ffadih that a minor is not considered fit to comply with legal 
rulings, such as prayer and fasting until he or she attains the age of majority through 
experiencmg a wet dream. 
This said, it should be noted that there is no specific age by which a minor is able 
to experience a wet dream, for it may vary from one person to another depending on 
environmental factors; nevertheless, some jurists have identified the age of nine to be the 
earliest age at which this occurs for both girl and boy, while others have agreed on the 
age of ten for boys and the age of rýne for irls. " z: l 91 
2.2.1.4.2 Pubic hair( inb 9) 
Jurists are in disagreement as to whether or not puberty can be determined 
through the appearance of pubic hair. In general, according to the majority of jurists, the 
appearance of pubic hair is considered a sign of puberty; this opinion is based on a jr 
narration concerning ', kfiyyah al-Qurazi who is reported to have said: "I was captured m 
the battle of Banfi Quray? ah, (for judgment to be passed upon us) They (Muslims) 
sentenced to death those who had pubic hair but took as prisoners those who had not. 
They then, searched me and found no pubic hair, therefore I was taken as a prisoner. " 
Moreover, it is also reported that during the time of 'Uthman the Caliph, a minor 
who had committed theft was brought to 'Uthmin. (In passing judgment) 'Uthman 
10 Narrated by Abii I)dwiid, Kitg al-, Uudad, chapter 17, &dlh no. 4403 
11 Mughn-i'al-Muhtffj, vol 2, p. 166 
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ordered: "Search him, (but after searching) they found no pubic hair, thus , they did not 
amputate his hand. 
These ffadihs and others which are similar in meaning clearly show that the 
appearance of pubic hair is considered as a means of determining puberty, since (as in the 
case of cUthman) pubic hair was not found; therefore a legal ruling such as amputation of 
the hand could not be imposed 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the ffadith on which the majority of jurists 
base their evidence, (especially that of Banii Qurayzah )are weak, and consequently 
cannot be relied upon in establishing legal rules. However, this objection itself seems to 
be weak,, since Al-, Pbahabi(one of the expert in badA ) has confirmed that Yadih Banii 
Qurayzah is authentic enough to constitute evidence. 12 
2.2.2. The ECC 
2.2.2.1 Age of discernment 
Jurists are unanimously agreed that a non- discerning child is a person who has 
not reached the age of seven, after which the age of discernment is said to begin. Their 
agreement is based on article 45/2 of the ECC, which reads, "A person who has not ZD 
attained the age of seven is considered devoid of discernment". According to the 
presumption of law, the article also implies that a minor who has attained the age of 
seven is considered as "discerning". However, jurists differ as to both the degree of this 
(. 6 presumption" and whether it is rebuttable or not. 
Talkhj-sal-Mustadrg, voll p 35 cited from MadjAhfiyyata1-Sablp. 113 
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Some jurists" are of the opinion that the above-cited article is not conclusive as 
the opposite meaning could be established, while others opine that the article is so 
conclusive that no other meaning can be assumed. Those who hold the second opinion 
differ amongst themselves as to the detail of this opinion; while some maintain that a 
child who has not attained puberty (although he has reached the age of seven) cannot be 
considered as a discerning child, other hold the view that a minor who is under seven is 
not discerning (even though in reality he has the ability to discern) but if he has attained 
the age of seven he will be considered as discerning( even though in reality he is not and 
has yet to attain puberty) 
14 
Apart from the abovementioned opinion, there are also jurists 15 who hold that 
article 45/2 of the ECC does not contain any "presumption of law" be it conclusive or 
inconclusive. In this regard al-$uddah argues: 
"If we were to follow the view which suggests (that the article) contains "a 
rebuttable" presumption it would mean we have sidelined ourselves from the 
consensus of jurisprudence. This is because by saying so, it will lead to the 
destruction of a legal limitation (of the age of discernment as stated in the article) 
and thus article 45/2 will be meaningless. Jbis said) the view which asserts (that 
article 45/2) does contain irrebuttable presumption seems to be valid; however, it 
contradicts another view which denies the existence of irrebuttable presumption 
of law,, since according to this view in order to constitute proof (in litigation) a 
matter must be rebuttable to give the opportunity to disputing parties to establish 
the opposite" 16 
13 Madkfir, Saml, Nazarijyat al-Haq, p. 50, al-Badrawl, al-Madkhal li al-'UICBn al-QMmijý)ah, 
pp. 614-615. citedftom Madff Ahliyyat al-$abi, p. 131 
14 Al-Sanhdn, al-Way! t, vol l, p. 801 
" Shanab, Muhanunad Lab-lb, al-Ithbitp. 145, Yahyd, Abd Wddiid, Duras fl Qjndn al-Ithbit, 
p. 131 cited from, Ibrah-un, Mal MOanmiad, al-Mcis'aliyyat al-Madaniyyah li 'Ad; nlal-Tamyr, 
PhD Thesis, Cairo University, 1982, pp. 185-186 
16 Ibid 
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It seems that this view is preferable in order to uphold the provision of law (art 
45/2). Otherwise it would be meaningless for the legislator to enact a law which is later 
exposed to be rebutted. 
2.2.2.2 Age of majority 
Unlike Islamic law, the ECC does not contain provision regarding natural signs of 
the age of majority; i. e., the attainment of puberty through wet dream, the appearance of 
pubic hair and menstruation as well as pregnancy, is not stipulated in the Code. The only 
means to identify the age of majority recognized by the Code is through " assumptive 
sign of puberty" which is based on age factor. Although there is no clear provision 
stipulating the age by which a person is considered as pubescent (biligh), it can be 
concluded that the age of seventeen-for both boys and girls-is legally the age of majority 
since in the absence of legal provision the Code itself has resorted to the most 
17 
preponderant views in the Ijanafi school of law , which considers the age of seventeen 
to be the age of majority, a matter which was also supported by the Court of Cassation. 18 
The ECC also contains provisions concerning the age of maturity (rusd) as stated 
in article 44/2 "The maturity of a person is fixed at twenty one completed in accordance 
with the Gregorian calendar". Having attained the age of twenty-one, a person is said to 
be prudent in the sense that he is capable to conduct acts as long as no interdiction is 
imposed upon him. This is clearly evidenced in article 44/1 of the ECC that reads " All 
See also art 3 of Law No I of 2001 Promulgating Personal Status Law. 
In a case brought to the Court it was held that since the legal regulations contained in law 78 of 
1931 are silent about fixing the age of majority at which a child attains puberty ( in order to 
determine such an age) reference should be made to the most preferable view of the Ijanafl 
school. EgCC dated 16/2/ 1982 
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persons attaining maturity in possession of their mental faculfies, and not restrained by 
mterdiction have full legal capacity to exercise their civil rights"19 
2.3 The Effect of Minority on Conti-act 
Since the concept of contract has a broad meaning, it is therefore worth 
mentioning such a concept briefly before examining the effect of minority on it. Equally 
important is the differences between three interlinked terminologies; i. e. contract, 
disposal (taýarruj)and obligation (iltizim) 
2.3.1 Meaning of contract (aqd) 
2.3.1.1 Islamic law 
The word 'aqd in Arabic has more than one meaning among which are the following; 
to fasten (shadd), to fie (rab. 6 




'9 It is important to note that according to Egyptian law, the age of maturity in financial matters 
and criminal matters are twenty-one and eighteen respectively for both boy and girl. However, 
with regard to matters relating to personal status such as maniage, the legal age is set at eighteen 
for husband and sixteen for wife. Although there is justification for these disparities due to 
difference jurisdictions, there exists somewhat contradiction between these ages. For instance, 
while the law regards a boy is mature enough to marry when he reaches sixteen, he has to wait 
until the age of twenty to be mature iii terms of financial affairs. It thus suggested that the age of 
maturity be streamlined to govern all matters be they criminal, financial or personal. 
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The word itself occurs in the Qur'an in many places; for instance, in (5: 1) Allah says: 
"0 You who believe fulfil contract" which according to Quranic commentators means to 
fulfil the covenant. 20 In (4: 33) Allah says: "With whom you have your covenant" 
Undoubtedly the word 'aqd and its derivatives as used in these verses have a close 
connection with the literal meaning of the 'aqd itself, which in spite of its various 
meanings is in fact interlinked. 
As far as technical meaning is concerned, Muslim jurists have looked at the definition 
of contract from two different perspectives- general and specific meaning. 
2.3.1.1.1 General meaning of contract 
This is defined as every commitment (iltiz, ýM) undertaken by a person, whether 
this comrnitment involves exchange with another such as sale, or does not involve 
exchange such as taking oaths, and whether this commitment is religious or concerns 
worldly matters . 
21 In this regard Ibn 'Arabli states: "Having admitted that... the tying of 
caqd may be with Allah or with human beings either in words or deeds , 22 According to 
this definition, every human act can be considered as a contract regardless of its 
classification such as prayer, sale, divorce and so on. 
'0 Tafsr al-Qurti7bledited by al-Bardflni, Atimad_Abd_al-'Al1m, DAr al-Shab, Cairo, 1372 H, 
2'dedition, vol 6, p. 3 3, al-Qurraddghi, 'All Mutiyiddin 'Ali, Mabda' al-RiO flal-' Uq i7d , DA), al- Bash, ff 'ir aI-IsI&niyyah, Beirut, 1985, V edition, vol 1, p. 106 
21 Al-Qurrahddghii, Mabda' al-Riag fif-al-'Uq Cid, vol 1, p. 112, Khafif, 'All, Apk&n al-Mu'&nalat 
al-Shar'iyyah, pp. 204-205 
22 Ibn al-' Arabi-, Ahk&n al-Quran , edited by al-Bajawi, 
cAll Mubamniad, DAr al-Mdrifah, 
Beirut, n. d, vol 2, p-526 
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2.3.1.1.2 Specific meaning of contract 
Before discussing the defmition of contract, it should be noted that when the word 
is used in the works of jurists, it is normally used in the narrow sense, for which various 
definitions exist. For instance,. Ibn Humam defines contract as the combination of offer 
and acceptance from two persons, or from one person only representing both partieS, 23 
while according to Qudri Basha contract is the linkage between offer and acceptance 
from two parties in a manner which brings effect on subject matter. 24 
It can be concluded that 'contract' according to this specific meaning is limited 
only to acts issuing from two persons; i. e., offer and acceptance. Thus, prayer, divorce 
and taking oaths are not considered as contract since they involve one party only. 
2.3.1.2 The ECC 
The Code does not clearly state the definition of contract; instead the manner by 
which a contract is concluded has been stipulated, as can be seen in article 89 which 
reads "a contract shall be concluded once parties mutually exchange the expression of 
congruent volition subject to observing other specific term to be further provided by the 
law for concluding a contract". However, the Preliminary Draft of the Code has defined 
contract as an agreement between two parties or more to create, modify or terminate legal 
23SharP Fath al-Qad, ý, vol 3, p. 187 
24 Basha, Mutiammad Qudri, Murshid al-Hayrin Ad Marifah Ajiwl al-InsAn, Ma. 1haah 
Amriyyah, Cairo, 1891,2nd edition p. 27, see also Nyazi, Liaquat Ali, Islamic law of Contract, 




es, a definition criticized since it does not differentiate between contract and 
agreement. 
26 
Another definition offered by jurists is conformity of two 'wills'(iridah) to 
create,, modify or terminate legal fies. 27 According to this definition a contract is so called 
if two or more parties are involved as in the contract of sale and lease; thus in the case of 
divorce (which comes from one party only) the meaning of contract does not apply. In 
addition, in order to be considered as a contract in the eyes of the law, an agreement must 
concern legal matters; hence, for instance, an agreement between two parfies relating to 
social affairs (such as an invitation to attend a wedding ceremony) is not legally 
considered to be a contract. Apart from this, it is also noticeable in this definition that the 
Code has emphasized the ' subjeCtiVity, 
28 in the sense that it looks more at the 
contracting parties, rather than the remaining elements of contract such as the 'suýject 
matter'. On the contrary -as claimed by some writers- Islamic law emphasizes 
'objectivity' when dealing with contract, as evidenced by Ahmad Ibrahim's statement: 
"Whether or not a person wants to bring the effect of the cause, this effect will still 
legally exist regardless of the will of contracting parties i, 29 
2-'Al- Wasý-, t Vol 1, p. 13 8 
_Qurrahdaghi 
Mabda' al-Ridj 17W-'Uqi7d, vol 1, p. 138, This criticism is refuted because 
26AI -1, 
there is no legal consequence arising from the differentiation see, Wam al-Din, Madkhal al- 
'Ulan al- QAn Cm iyyah wa al-Iltiz &n, p. 15 1 
27 Marqus, Sulayman, al-Madkhal 1i al-WICkn a1-QAnCmiyyah , D, #r al-Nashr 1i al-J&niat al- 
Miýriyyah, n. p, 1957 p. 468, Yahya, Durasf1MabAdi al- Q,; w-ft p. 183 
18 In. contract the term subjectivity (nafg or AN15 refers to real and inner intention over the 
manner in which it is expressed whereas objectivity ( mawddlor middi) means a verbalistic 
exteriorization of inner contractual elements laying a great stress on certain verbal formality. 
See, Owsia, Parviz, Fon-nation of Contract, a Comparative Study under English, French, Islamic 
aand Iranian law, Graham & Trotinan, London/ Dordrect/ Boston, pp. 231-234, Saleh, Nabil, 
Definition and Formation of Contract Under Islamic and Arab Laws, ALQ, vol 5 May 1990, 
P. 110 
29 Ibrahim, Abmad, al-IltizimAtfl al-Shari a1-Is1&nj-, Dffr al-Anyfir, Cairo, n. d, p. 92 
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These seemingly contradictory views between the ECC and Islamic law with 
regard to objectivity and subjectivity can still- in my opinion- be harmonized. This is 
because as far as the ECC is concerned the will of contracting parties is not absolute, 
meaning that they do not enjoy absolute freedom in concluding a contract. In other 
words, the contracting parties have to abide by and not contravene any provision of law. 
Similarly, Islamic law, while emphasizing the role of objectivity, has not totally 
neglected the role of subjectivity In the sense that the 'will' of contracting parties is also 
taken into consideration in determining the validity of a contract. Thus, for instance, the 
contract of the insane person is void due to the absence Of.; Will-). 
30 
2.3.2 Scope of contract 
2.3.2.1 Islamic law 
As previously discussed, the general meaning of contract is so NAide that it covers 
every human commitment (taahhud) whether in the form of unilateral ( such as divorce) 
or bilateral agreement (such as sale), between mankind and their creator such as solemn 
pledge( nadhar), among individuals themselves, or between individuals and 
government, whether monetary or not. The very early scholars in their writings mostly 
use this general meaning. 
Al-Sanird'i, al-Safah wa-alGhaflah wa Atharuhumaflal-Taýarruf, #t, p. 204 
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With respect to the specific meaning as used by the vast majority of jurists. 
contract covers only bilateral ties, whether it concerns individuals, governments, or 
fmancial or non- fmancial matters. 
31 
2.3.2.2 The ECC 
As a matter of fact,, a contract is considered to be such when it is governed by 
private law; i. e., Civil Code. Therefore, matters which fall outside the jurisdiction of this 
Code, such as those of international and public law are not tern-ýinologically considered 
as contract . 
32 For example, international agreements and administrative contracts are not 
in fact contract according to the ECC, as was ruled by the Egyptian Administrative Court 
(EAQ: 
"Administrative contracts differ from civil contracts,, in the sense that the former 
is between public law (represented by juristic persons) and individuals, partners 
or groups targeting public interest in facilitating public utilities; it is therefore 
noticed (in administrative contracts) that the interest of contracting parties is not 
equal, since the public interest must be first taken into consideration before the 
interest of the individuals [ ....... ] This goal must 
be under the control of authority 
in order to organize public UtilitieS..,, 33 
In light of this ruling it can be concluded that the scope of contract in Islamic law is 
wider than that of the ECC because -as previously mentioned-the former recognises any 
linkage between offer and acceptance as a contract regardless of the nature of the 
contracting parties. 
"Mabda'al-Ri4, qllal-'Uq ad, vol 1, p. 145 
32 Yahya, DurdsfiMabidi' al-Qini7pi , p. 
183, al-$uddah, Faraj, MayjOr al-Ilti, -&n , pp. 
54-55ý 
Shanab, Muhammad Labib, Durdsfi NaMriyyat al-Iltiz&n, pp. 24-25 
33 Al-Badrawi, al-Namriyyat al- 'Ammah li al-Iltiz&ngt, p. 43 
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2.3.3 Relationship between contract and disposal(tayarruj) 
2.3.3.1 Islamic law 
It is noteworthy that the classical jurists did not gather into one single place all 
references to a particular area (e. g. theory of contract) as do modem law jurists. 
However, this is not to suggest that the substance of such theories are not existent in 
classical works; on the contrary, the topic of contract for instance is found scattered in 
their writings It is contemporary Muslim jurists who have collected the works of their 
predecessors in a manner in keeping with modem law jurists. Among the theories 
discussed is the theory of contract in which the meaning of disposal is also explained. 
For instance, Abu Zahrah 34 sees disposal as " every verbal act of a person which has a 
future legal effect" and this defmition clearly confmes disposal to verbal aspects only. A 
more comprehensive definition as offered by al-Zarqa 35 is " whatever issues from a 
person in the form of words or deeds which has an effect from the perspective of Shari 
ah "; this latter is the preferred definition since it covers all that which issues from a 
person -verbal act or physical deeds whether willing or unwilling and accordingly it can 
be said that the concept of disposal is wider that that of contract, since the latter only 
36 
concerns verbal acts and is limited to acts issuing from two parties . 
2.3.3.2 The ECC 
Technically, there is no provision in the ECC stipulating the meaning of disposal 
leaving the matter to be interpreted by jurists so as to comply with the needs of public 
34 Al-Milkiyyah wa Nazarijyat al-'Aqd, p. 201 
3-'Al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-'Amm, vol I, p. 195 
" Every contract is disposal ant not vice versa or in other words contract is part of disposal 
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mterest. 37 The jurists for their part have offered various definitions of disposal; for 
instance,, al- Sharqaw-i defines it as "direction of will manifested by words to create a 
legal effect recognized by law whether such an effect is in the form of creation (insha') , 
modification (tadiý or termination of rights (inha- )38 Al-Suddah39 defines this concept 
as initiating 'a pure will' ( ir&tah majipbh) directed to the creation of a specific legal 
effect; al-Faraj while concurring with al-Suddah's adds to this definition " to gam 
transfer, modify or terminate rights" to the definition. 40 
These definitions show juristic consensus that disposal is a kind of act of will 
(amal ir&O) which is considered to be a basis for disposal; however, according to some 
writers, none of these definitions is comprehensive, since the acts of persons lacking in 
will are excluded. Alternatively, suggestions have been made to define disposal as "the 
movement of a person to create a legal effect"41 Similar to Islamic law disposal has a 
broader meaning than that of contract in the sense that it covers both contract and 
(unilateral will' (ir5dah munfari a) 42 
" It can be noticed throughout the provisions of the ECC that it hardly deals with definitions. 
According to al-Suddah the Code is right in doing that because definition is matter concerning 
jurisprudence and it should be left to the jurists to exercise legal reasoning (ytih&l). Maýgdir al- 
Iltiz&n, p. 51 
MAI-Na, pariyyat al-'Ammah 1i al-Idtiz&n, p. 39 
39 MayAdir al-fltiz&n, p. 42 
40 Hasan faraj, MabWi' a1-QJ-n Ch p. 50 
4'Al-Sharafi 
, Hukm al-Taýarrqf& al-Qffn 
afijyah li Effqid al-Ahliyyah , p. 198 42 Al-SharqdWi, Jamil, al-Nazarin)at al-'Afnmah 1i al-Idtiz&n, DAr al-Nahdat al-'Arabiyyah, 
Cairo, 1981 p. 39 
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2.3.4 Relationship between contract and obligation (iftizim) 
2.3.4.1 Islamic law 
In juristic discussion of contract, it appears that the concept of obligation is 
closely related thereto. As such, it is vital to elaborate what is meant by obligation in the 
parlance of jurists (both Muslim and Egyptian) in order to avoid confusion and misuse of 
both terminologies; i. e. contract and obligation 
In Arabic, the word iltiz. §m means to engage dhimmah with something (shagl al- 
dhimmah bishay'in). It also means to impose a duty upon oneself4' 
With regard to technical meaning, as far as classical jurists are concerned, the vast 
majority of them had offered no definition of obligation; this is perhaps, due to the nature 
of classical works themselves in focusing more on branches offiqh (fur 0) and problems 
(masa'il) rather than formulating theories, as suggested by al-Kabashi. In this regard he 
affirms: "The reasons is that the jurists in general were not concerned to compile 
theories in transactions (mu'jmalat) as their main concern was directed to deal with 
'branches' and 'problems' as clearly seen in the books offiqh from various schools"44 
However, al-1jai4ab -a Mdliki jurist - is perhaps the only classical jurist who gives 
the definition of obligation when he states that " the lexical meaning of the term is the 
commitment of a person to do something which he is not obliged to do; in this sense 
obligation includes sale, lease, marriage and other contracts. In the custom of jurists 
obligation means to oblige oneself to do something of good deed( marF#), be it absolute 
"A Dictionary of Modem Written Arabic, p. 865 
44 Al-Dhimmah wa-al-Haq wa al-fltizft, p. 284 
59 
(mu tlaq) or conditional (mu'allaq); thus, it also carries the meaning of donation 
('atiyyah). It (obligation) is also used to denote what is more specific, i. e. the 
commitment to do good deeds using the word obligation and this meaning is the most 
prevalent in present days , 
45 
As far as contemporary jurists are concerned, various definitions of iltiziJon have 
been offered; these are examples: 
-Ahmad Ibrahim has divided obligation into two categories; general and specific. 
The specific meaning is the co=iitment of a person to something well known (mdro 
whether absolute or conditional. As for general meaning, this is the imposing of 
something on a person (done by himself) whether through his will or the Sharlah, ' it 
thus seems that here this jurist was influenced by the definition ivenbyal-liattab. 47 91 
-Ali al-Khafif defines obligation as a personal undertaking (taahud shakhoy) for 
which no person other than the obligor (multazim) is responsible, and which concerns 
only during his lifetime properties left after his death provided that such property is not 
affected by death. 
48 
-AI-Zarqd' defines the term as ' the state of a person being responsible (mukallaj) 
-according to the Shad ah- for carrying out an act or refraining 
from it in the interest of 
others -, 
49 
", Fath al-'All' al-Milik by 'Ulaish , vol 1, p. 
217 quoted from al-Dhimmah wa al-gaqq wa al 
Iltiz&n p. 284 
'6AI-Iltiz&njtfl al-Shar' al-lsl, 7#nj-, p. 21 
' See al-lljaqdb's definition on page 55 
48AI-Khafif, 'Ali, Ta'thr-' al-Mawt fl Uuq i7q al-Ins&7 wa Iltiz&nAtihi, Majallat al-Qgn Cm wa al- 
Iqti, y, W, vol, 6, p. 515 
'9 Al-Madkhal al-Fiqh alVAmm, vol 1, p. 435 
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From these defmitions it can be observed that these scholars had recourse to a 
Civil law approach. For instance, Ahmad Ibrahim's definition is an attempt to approach 
between the meaning of obligation in Islamic law and Civil law, thus; he emphasizes the 
'objectivity' aspect of obligation This is perhaps due - as previously mentioned - to the 
fact that there is no specific manner of dealing with obligation in the works of classical 
jurists; therefore, to compare the concept of obligation in Civil law with that in Islamic 
law contemporary Muslim jurists have chosen the approach adopted by the Civil Law 
jurists. This is conceded by al-Sanh5ri when he states: 
"Obligation or personal right (Paq shakhsi) is an expression (ta'bir) which we 
borrowed from western jurisprudence because it is not usual for this expression to 
occur in Islamic jurisprudence; we will see that the reason is that what we call 
iltizAin in Islamic law in fact,, consists of several legal ties (rawjbit qjn aniyyah) 
distinguishable from each other. Classical Muslim jurists did not attempt to put 
.- Pý50 these ties united and governed by one system called i1fizam 
Looking at the above definitions one might conclude that they contain two 
aspects of obligation, the first of which is a result of the 'will' of human beings, whether 
it involves two 'wills' such as sale or one will such as solemn pledge (nadhar). The 
second aspect is concerned with the will of the Shari 'ah meaning that the Shari , 'ah 
alone imposes such obligation regardless of the will of human beings such as obligatory 
maintenance required from the husband. Therefore, according to these definitions the 
sources of obligation includes contract, single vAll, good deeds, bad deeds and the Shari' 
'ah itself 
'0 Al-Sanhu-n-', MasAdir al-Ha fi al-Fiqh al-Ishtn Dir al-Nahdat al- 'Arabiyyah. Cairo, n. d, q 
Vol 1, P. 9 
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2.3.4.2 The ECC 
The word obligation in the ECC is also synonymous with personal right (ýaq 
shakh, yi), nevertheless, the latter is rarely used in legal fields in the sense that the legal 
text by which it is governed is not often found using the term personal right per se due 
to the prevailing usage of obligation Even though both terms are identical in term of 
their connotation obligation is more dominant, perhaps due to the essential role of 
obligor(multazim) in creating obligation itSelf. 51 
Jurists differ in defining obligation. This disagreement has arisen from their 
different approaches to the way obligation must be looked at. Those who prefer to look at 
obligation from a subjective point of view (nazrah nafsiyyah) define it as 'a legal tie 
(rJbiph qjni7niyyah) between a creditor and a debtor by virtue of which the debtor is 
obliged to perform certain act or refrain from it in the interest of creditors'. On the other 
hand those belonging to an objective point of view (nazrah middiyyah) defme obligation 
as 'a legal condition (ýjlah q, -ýiFmiyyah) the goal of which either the performance of or 
refraining from certain acts by specific persons 52 
Apart from this, there are also jurists 53 who combine the two approaches in their 
definition; thus, according to them obligation is a legal condition by virtue of which a 
person is tied to perform an act or refrain from it. 
" Sharq5w-i, al-Nazariyyat al'Ammah lial-Iltiz-im, pp. 8-9, Salarnah, al-Madkhal, p. 257 
52 Al-SharqdwiT, al-Nazariyyat, p. 9 
5' Among those are al-Sardifln, Sulaiman Marqus, al-Badrawi and a-Suddah, see, Sharqdivi, al- 
Nazarijyat, p. 10 
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Having said this, it should be noted that the definition of obligation must not be 
connected to either approach per se; rather, the term itself must be looked at regardless of 
external factors. Thus, it is suggested that obligation be defined as a legal obligation 
resting on a person's shoulders to perform fmancial acts in favour of another person. 54 
According to this definition, a matter cannot be considered as obligation unless 
three criteria are fulfilled. Firstly, obligation must concern legal obligation (wjjib qAn &d) 
in the sense that it is recognized and governed by law; for instance, if a debtor does not 
fulfil his obligation toward the creditor ( i. e. repayment of debt) then the latter has the 
right to secure his money through legal process. Therefore, matters that do not concern 
legal obligation such as those of moral and religious commitment are not considered to 
be obligation. Secondly, this legal obligation requires a specific person upon whom it is 
incumbent at the time obligation comes to force. This is because the existence of 
obligation is not imaginable without a person bearing its requirements.. 
Another criteria of obligation is that it concerns matters which are monetary or 
can be valued financially such as repayment of debt. Consequently, any legal obligation 
not involving finance such as the obligation of a wife to obey her husband is not 
obligation. FourtWy, this legal obligation must be in the interest of a specific individual; 
however it is not necessary for this person to be actually available at the time obligation 
is created as he might become available on its execution. For instance, if a person offers a 
reward for those who find a lost item, obligation is already created at the time the offer is 
54 Al-Fiqi, MWianimad Ali, Durdsf! Nozariyyat al-IltizAm , p. 3, 
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issued regardless of persons concerned. In other words, the existence of a debtor is a 
55 requisite for the creation of obligation whereas this is not the case for the creditor. 
This said, similar to Islamic law, the concept of obligation in the ECC Is mder 
than that of contract since the latter is part of the former. To put it simply, every contract 
is obligation but not vice versa. However, compared to Islamic law obligation in the ECC 
has a narrower scope as it is lirnited to 'legal obligation' only together with monetary 
matters, while this is not the case mi Islamic law. 
2.3.5 Types of Contract 
2.3.5.1 Islamic law 
Jurists have divided contract into numerous categories; however for the purpose 
of this study the focus will be on categories which have a close connection to the present 
study. 
2.3.5.1.1 Classification of contract according to bindingness (luzi7m) and non- 
bindingness (ghayr litz i7m) 
Contract can be divided into 'binding' and 'non- binding'. The binding contract 
refers to that which cannot be revoked unless by mutual consent from both contracting 
parties such as sale, lease, transfer of debt, sharecropping, gift etc. The non- binding 
contract is a contract that gives authority to the contracting parties to revoke the contract 
"rithout prior consent from another party. This contract includes the contract of 
55 Al-Fiqi, DurasfiNazariyyat al-Iltiz&n , p. 4 
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partnership, agency, loan etc. In addition, a contract may be a mixture of both elements, 
in the sense that it may be binding for one of the contracting parties but non- binding for 
another. For example, the contract of pledge( rahn) is binding upon the pledgor (rdhin) 
not the pledgee (murtahin), thus the pledgee has the right to terminate the contract even 
without the consent of the pledgor, however the pledgee must agree before the pledgor 
can tern-ýnate the contract. 
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2.3.5.1.2 Classification of contract according to its validity (#ýbah) 
Contract may also be classified according to the nature of its legal attribute (waý, ýf 
shar'i ) The jurists are of different opirfions as to this classification. According to the 
Hanafi the legal effect of a contract can be either valid(PýIb) void (b, ýdý or 
irregular(f&id). 57 A contract is valid when all its elements and pre-requisites are 
58 fulfilled resulting in bringing legal effect( A& shar'iyyah). In other words, a valid 
contract is what is lawful in terms of essence and quality( al-mashra' dhiitan wa 
gfatan)59 .A contract 
is considered to be void if the pillars of the contract are breached, 
such as when a contract issues from an insane person or a person lacking in competence 
the contract is void as though it had never been formed. Similarly, if the underlying cause 
of the contract is dissolved and it concerns the object of sale as for example, when it 
involves an unlawful object then the contract will also be considered as void 
60 
Mmad Ibrahim, al-Iltizamitfial-Shar'al-Islimi*, pp. 192-193 
57Ibid, p. 190 
58 Khafif Ali, Abk, *n al-Mu'Amalat al-Shariyyah, p. 364, Abu Zahrah, al-Milkiyyah wa al 
Nazari"ýat al-'Aqd, pp. 369-370 
59 Al-Qurradagh-i, Mabda al-Riflff li7al-'Uq t7d, vol 1, p. 15 5 
60 Rayner, S, E, The T'heory of Contracts in Islamic law, Graham & Trotman, 
London/Dordreclit/Boston, 199 1. l't edition, p. 150, Mas, #dir al-Haqq, vol 4, pp. 146-147 
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, L. for irregular contract, according to the Hanari, this is defined as when 
something in the contract is defective other than the pillar or the cause. In other words, 
the contract is lawful with regard to its essence but not to its quality. 61 For example, in 
the contract of sale if the price is unknown the contract would be irregular. Contrary to 
the Hanafi's view which divides contract into three categories, the majority of juriStS62 
including the Mdliki,, the Shaf? i and the Hanball maintain that a contract can only be 
divided into valid and void. While concurring with Ijanari in the meaning of a valid 
contract, they do not differentiate between void and irregular contract as both terms can 
be used interchangeably. 
In fact this disagreement between the Hanafi and the majority of jurists resulted 
from their disagreement on another principle; i. e. the effect of the prohibition issuing 
from the SMWO on certain contracts. According to the majority of jurists, when the 
Shari '; 'ah prohibits from entering into a contract, it renders such a contract to be non- 
existent, rneanýing that if a person concludes a contract which is prohibited by the Sharb 
Ch his act cannot be considered as contract which is then nullified as if it never existed, 
regardless of the kind of prohibition (nahi) whether it refers to the essence or the quality 
of the contract. 63 They base their opinion on a ffadih in which the Prophet PBUH was 
reported to have said " Every act which is not in accordance with our practice is 
rejected"64 . Since a void contract 
is repugnant to the Sharlah, it is clear from the ffadih 
that no legal effect can be sustained. In addition, they argue that what is absolutely 
61 The Theory of Contract, p- 15 0 
62 Masidir al-Haqq, vol 4, p. 147 
63Ai- KliafifAfik&n al-Mu 'knalat, p. 369, Mas, #dir, #I-gdqq, vol 4, pp. 147-148 
6' Narrated by Buklidni and Muslftu 
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prohibited is considered as sinful; hence it is inconceivable to accept that a contract can 
still have a legal effect when the contract itself is prohibited. 65 
On the other hand, the Uanafi opine that if the prohibition concerns the essence 
and essentials of the contract such as its pillars and subject matter, the contract would be 
null and void; however, if the prohibition merely refers to an attribute of the contract it 
will nullify the attribute only, while the nature of the contract remains lawful. " They 
argue that the existence of a contract relies on the existence of its pillars, and if there is 
any prohibition which does not concern the pillars in themselves such a prohibition will 
not render the pillars to be non-existent and as such, the contract therefore still exists. 
According to them, when the Sharlah forbids something, such prohibition will not 
necessarily affect the existence of that thing. This is because of the possibility of 
combining prohibition and existence, since the effect of prohibition is revocation of the 
contract as sinful which does not deny the existence of the contract, rather, in order to 
revoke a contract the existence of that contract is required in the first place . 
6' The 
difference between the lianafi and the majority on the concept of voidity (bu#jn) and 
irregularity (fasA is also due to the degree of evidence by which a contract is forbidden. 
VVI-ffle the majority hold that such a degree plays no role in determining whether the 
prohibition constitutes voidity or irregularity, the Hanafi maintain that if the prohibition 
is deemed through conclusive evidence (qafi) the effect will be void. Otherwise if the 
evidence for the prohibition is not conclusive then the contract would be merely 
irreoar. 68 
65 Al-Qurradaghl, Mabda'aI-Ria5f! a1-'Uqad, vol 1, p. 163, see also, Abu Zalmh, al-Millciyyah 
pp. 370-372 66AI- Khafif, Ahk&n al-Wimalat al-Shariyyah, p. 369 
67 Abu Zahrah, al-Milkiyyah, p. 3 71 
6' Kliallaf 'Ilm Uyal al-Fiqh, pp. 126-127 , al-Qurraddglýj, 
Mabda' al-Rifli fi al-'Uq d, vol 1, 
pp. 170-171 
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2.3.5.1.3 Classification of contract according to its effectiveness (nqffidlt) 
A valid contract can be divided into enforceable (n. ýfidh) and suspended( 
mawq i7f) Jurists are agreed that if a contract issuing from a competent person fulfils all 
requirements as to its pillars and essentials, such a contract is regarded to be enforceable 
at the time of conclusion. For example, if in a contract of sale the buyer who is 
competent agreed to buy a car the sale would be enforceable with immediate effect. On 
the other hand, jurists are not agreed as to the meaning and validity of a suspended 
contract; according to the Ijanafi and the Mahk-i this is a contract which has fulfilled all 
requirements other than that relating to the contracting parties. In other words a contract 
would be suspended if the contracting parties have no authority to enter into the contract. 
A clear example is in the case of unauthorised agent ffiuadli). The significance of " 
suspension" lies in the fact that there is no legal effect when the contract is concluded 
unless consent is obtained from those concerned, otherwise such a contract will remain 
suspended. For example, in the contract of sale the ownersl-ýp of the sold object will not 
transfer to the buyer if the real owner does not agree to this. . 
Al-Shafi'i, however holds 
the view that a suspended contract is one of the categories of void contract due the fact 
that the authority- of the contracting parties is a condition for the creation of a contract, 
not only for its enforcement. Thus, according to him every contract issuing from those 
who have no authority to conclude it would be void at the time of concluding that 
contTac . 
69 
c 69Abu Zalirah, al-Milkiyyah wa Nazariyyat al- Aqd p. 3 7, Abi-nad Ibrahim, al-Iltiz&nfft, pp. 19 1- 
192 
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2.3.5.2 The ECC 
There is little difference between the ECC and Islamic law regarding the 
classification of contract. The ECC also recognises terminologies such as a binding or 
non-binding contract, effective or suspended contract, valid or void contract. It should 
also be noted that jurists have classified contract according to legal purpose. For instance, 
if the purpose is to verify whether or not a contract involves exchange of property then 
that contract is classified as either synallagmatic (mu5wapbh) or donotary (tabarru', it) 
. 
70 Likewise if the purpose is to look at the role of time in the conclusion, contract is 
divided into immediate (fawri) and temporary ( muaqqat). This means that a contract 
could thus at one time bear more than one criterion , 
for example a contract could be both 
'immediate' and 'temporary' - 
70 Al-BadravA, al-Namriyyat, p. 84 
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2.3.6 Can a minor enter into a contract? 
2.3.6.1 Islamic law 
It is noteworthy that since the contract of sale is regarded as prototype for the 
remaining norrýinal contracts ('uqi7d musammit) , all rules relating to sale will also apply 
to other contracts unless if there is significant disparity . The rules relating to the 
contract of minors are divided into two categories; a non -discerning and a discerning 
child. 
2.3.6.1.1 A non- discerning child ( yabighayr mumayyiz) 
Generally, juriStS71 are in agreement that a non- discerning child cannot enter into 
any kind of contract, be it beneficial to him or not. This is because the cNld at this age is 
considered to be lacking in reason . However, the juristic interpretation of the absence of 
reason( Cadin a -CaqI )must be correctly understood. What is perhaps meant here is the 
absence of a sufficient level of understanding enabling the child to conclude a contract. 
The jurists however, pay little attention to the actual subject matter (maqW 'alayh) of a 
contract made by a non -discerning child. Indeed, there is a view in the Hanball 
72 school 
of law which upholds the validity of a contract made by a non-disceming child, provided 
that the subject matter of the contract is trivial. For instance, in a contract of sale, the 
contract is valid if the sold item is trivial. 
Having said this, the question arises as to how to deterrnine whether or not the 
subject matter is trivial. Should it be left to the discretion of the child or the authorities to 
" Al-Majm d' vol, 9, p. 147, In Rusd, Bidgyat al- Mujtahid, DAr al-Fikr , Beirut, n. d, vol 2, 
p. 129 
12 Al- Buhilti, KashshAfal- Qind, vol, 3, p. 151 
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decide it? To answer this question, it is an acceptable fact that any matter which has no 
direct legal injunction should be referred to custom, meaning that if the matter is 
approved as trivial in the light of custom, the contract would then be valid; hence, it is 
suggested that this view be preferred. 
2.3.6.1.2 A- discerning child (, yabJ7mttmayyiz) 
The law relating to the contract of a discerning minor differs according to the 
nature of the contract itself. Generally, tl-ýs element can be divided into three; purely 
beneficial, purely harmful or a mixture of beneficial and harmful. A purely beneficial 
contract refers to that bringing benefit to the child without any return such as receiving a 
gift; according to the majority of jurists such a contract if entered into by a discerning 
child is considered valid even though concluded without the consent of the guardian. 73 
They argue that the wisdom behind the guardianship relates to the supervision of the 
interests and welfare of the child in order to prevent him from falling into harmful 
activities since he cannot make proper judgments due to lack of mental capacity. As this 
kind of contract is by no means harmful the consent of the guardian would therefore be 
meaningless. " 
With regard to a purely harmful contract the jurists are unanimously agreed that a 
child is not allowed to be a contracting party because of the nature of such contracts, 
which involve the discharge of ownership from the child without any return. Falling 
13 Al-Kds5ni, 'Ald' al-D-ni, Badff'i'al-Sanff'i, Djr al-KitAb al-'Arabi- Beirut, 1982,2d edition, 
vol 7, p. 171, al-Sharbmi, Muhaiiuiiad al-Khatib, Mughnial-Muhtij, Dir al-Fikx, Beirut, n, d, vol 
2, p. 166, MawAib alý JaU, vol 5, p. 62, al-Hajar wa Asbffbuhu p. 30 
" Al-Badk', vol7, p. 17 1, Mabda'al-Riý(j, vol I, p. 276 
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within this kind of contract are the giving gifts, contract of guarantee, loan and the like. 
The jurists are also agreed that the consent of the guardian in these contracts Nvill be of no 
effect,, in the sense that the contract is considered as null and void even after obtaining 
the consent of the guardian. To this effect al-Kdsan-i states; " The purely harmful contracts 
are not valid according to the consensus of the jurists , 75 
As for a contract which brings both benefit and harm such as a contract of sale, 
lease, partnership and the like, there is disagreement amongst the jurist as to the validity- 
of this kind of contract. According to the Hanaf-ji, a child is entitled to carry out this kind 
of contract; however the validity of it is not to be finalized until the consent of his 
guardian is obtained. Therefore, for instance in the contract of sale, the effect of sale 
including the transfer of ownership from the seller to the buyer is not final, pending the 
decision made by the guardian. In other words, once the sale is concluded it is said to be 
valid at the time of concluding but at the same time its effect is suspended (mawqF#'ah). 
The Hanafi contend that a non discerning child should not be prevented from exercising 
his right as he also possesses legal capacity,, but due to the incompleteness of this 
capacity the right of a discerning cl-iild to conclude a contract is not absolute. Hence, if 
there is a possibility of suffering from loss in his contract the guardian will nullify that 
contract. Likewise, in the case of gaining profit such a contract will also be ratified by the 
guardian. However, if the guardian prefers to remain silent, meaning he neither endorses 
the contract nor does he object to it, then the contract will remain suspended until the 
child reaches the age of puberty, at which time he has the right to opt (khiy&) i. e to 
decide whether to nullify or ratify the contract. 76 
75AI-Bad&', vol 7, p. 171 
76 Ibid, Ridd al-Muhtffr vol 6, p. 154 
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The Shdfii on the other hand do not differentiate between a non- discerning and a 
discerning child with regard to the validity of a contract carried out by him. A child 
according to the Shafi'i has no capacity to conclude a contract. In this regard al-Nawa'"q 
states " The sale carried out by a child is not valid, neither is a lease nor remaining 
contracts, whether for himself or for others... whether with the consent of his guardian or 
not', 77 . This 
is because 'prudence' (rusd) is one of the pillars of contract in the absence of 
which a person is not entitled to conclude a contract. This opinion is further based on 
several quotations from the Qur'an and the Sunnah . 
in the Qur'an(4: 6 )Allah says: " 
Make trial of orphans until the age of marriage if then ye found sound judgement in them 
release their property to them" Commenting on the verse al-Shafi'i affirms " the verse 
indicates that interdiction on the orphan will not be lifted until two things are achieved ; 
puberty and prudence', 78. It is also argued that the meaning of sufahd in the Qur'an (4: 5) 
as interpreted by Ibn 'Abbas is both a child and those who have mental weakness '9. In 
addition, the Prophet PBUH was also reported to have said " The pen is lifted (liability is 
exempted) from three persons; a sleeping person until he wakes up, a child until he 
experiences wet dreams, and an insane person until he recovers , 80 . This ffadih shows 
that since legal injunction (tak1A) is lifted from a child , this means that 
if he enters into a 
contract he is not bound to fulfil his obligation since ilz,. ýn (to oblige)is the result of 
taklý' In where a child is not commanded, for one of the features of contract is the 
fulfilment of its actual content based on the Qur'anic verse (5-1): " 0 you who believe 
fulfil the contract" Al-Nawawl has expounded the ýIadih by saying: " If the sale is valid 
" Al-Majm d, vol 9, pp. 148-147 
"AI-ShWi, Mubammad bin Wrlis, , APkkn al-Qur'ki, edited 
by 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Khaliq, 
DAr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah. Beirut, 1400 H vol 1, p. 138 
'9 lbid, vol 2, p 184 
'o Narrated by al-Timiidh-i, Kiig al-Hudi7d, chapter 1, Hadith no. 443 
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(from a child ) it will require the child to deliver (the sold item) , the ffadih clearly 
states that there is no such obligation upon a child", 81 . 
However,, the majority of jurists refute this argument claiming that the Quranic 
verse and the ffadih are both mistakenly understood and taken out of context. The first 
verse cited by the Shafici in fact indicates that the handover of property to orphans is not 
permissible until they reach puberty and prudence while the second verse prohibits 
giving the prodigal their wealth and there is no dispute on this. Moreover, the 
prohibition from handing over does not necessarily render a contract carried out by a 
child void when the consent of the guardian is obtained since this latter will eventually be 
the contracting party. 82 In the same vein the ffadih quoted does not show that a contract 
remains void in the event of obtaining consent from the guardian. 83 
The Hanball, while concurring with Hanari on the validity of a contract of a child, 
have also emphasized that such consent must be obtained before the contract is carried 
out and within the scope of this consent. Thus for instance, if the consent only pernuts 
the child to conclude a contract worth a specific amount, then that child is obliged to 
84 
follow the condition,, otherwise the contract would be void . 
It seems that the view of the majority is here preferred which validates the 
contract of a discerning child with the consent of the guardian. This is because the 
evidence put by the Shaffi-as previously discussed- is not felt to be strong enough to 
81 Al-Majm a, vol 9, p. 148 
81 Mabda'al-Ridjfl al-'Uq ad, vol 1, p. 282 
" Ibid 
84 Kashshifal-Qiilj', vol 3, p. 457, al-tIajar wa Asb, #buhu, p. 32 
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support their argument. Furthermore, a discerning child possesses a certain level of 
capacity to understand and discriminate between what is beneficial and what is harmful. 
This said, apart from the foregoing juristic discussion regarding the contract of a 
child in general, the jurists have discussed in detail certain kinds of contract carried out 
I-- - by a discerning child. These include bequest, hire and trading. 
Bequest (wa§iyyah) 
There are different views regarding the bequest of a child. According to the 
Maliki, the Hanbali and one view of al-Shafi'i,, the bequest of a child is permissible and 
valid. This is based on the Qur'anic verse (22: 77) : "0 ye who believe bow down, 
prostrate yourself and adore your Lord and do good that ye may prosper". This verse 
shows that Allah has commanded his servant to do good things among which is bequest. 
Since the term 'o ye who believe' is general it also includes children. In addition there is 
a narration which states that a boy from the tribe of GhassAn whose age was ten had 
made a bequest to his uncle; the matter was brought to 'Umar who then validated the 
bequest', 85 It is also argued that bequest is a purely beneficial act, in the sense that it 
brings the child some reward and that nothing detrimental is inflicted upon him whether 
in this world or hereafter. 





88 On the other hand, the Ha1. the Zahir and Shaficl (in another view) opine 
that the bequest of a child is not valid both because he is not fit to comply vAth legal 
commandment (mukallay) and because there exists an authentic Hadih which stresses 
that the liability is exempted from a child until he reaches puberty. This means that any 
act issuing from the child including bequest is not valid. Unlike the previous view. they 
maintain that a bequest is one of the purely harmful acts because it causes loss of 
property in similar way to donation of which a child is not entitled. They also interpreted 
ffad. ih of 'Umar as referring to a child who was about to attain the age of puberty. 
Having weighed both opinions together with their evidence I am inclined to 
prefer the view which validates the bequest of a child. This is because apart from the 
strong textual evidence, in my opinion a bequest cannot be considered as a purely 
harmful act since its effect begins only upon the death of testator( m6p) i. e. the child. 
Furthermore the law of bequest gives the right to the testator to revoke the bequest as 
long as he is alive. 
Can a child hire himselr. 
If a child hires himself to work with another person (to become an employee) the 
Maliki and the Hanbali consider such an act to be a mixture of both harm and benefit 
thus the act will only be valid if the consent of his guardian is obtained89. However, the 
Shafici 90 are of the opinion that a child cannot enter into a contract of hire due to their 
8'Al-Hidjyah, vol 4, p. 234 
87 AI-Muballj, vol 9, p. 330 
81 Mughni-al-Mulit, #j, vol 3, p. 39 
89 Al-Mughni, vol 6, p. 4, al-Sharh al-Saghj-r' vol 2,264 
9OMughn. i-al-MuPhy, vol 2, p. 332 
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condition that m order to be a contracting party a person must be prudent. They even 
consider this hire as purely harmful and as such a child should not allowed to exercise a 
right to it. This view is also shared by the Hanari, except that they hold that in the case 
where the contract is carried out,, the child is entitled to a quoted wage (ujrah musamma). 
it appears that the view of the Maliki and the Hanball is more preferable due to the fact 
that the final decision is vested with the guardian not the child himself 
Can a child take part in trading? 
According to the Hanari and the most preponderant view of the Hanbali a 
guardian is authorised to give pern-ýission to children under his custody to enter mto a 
contract of sale. This is based on the Qur'an (4: 6) which shows that the test of an orphan 
NN411 only be realised by permitting them to conclude a sale without guardian so that they 
will know whether they gain profit or otherwise. In addition, a discerning child is 
considered to be of interdicted sound mind person similar to a slave; thus his act should 
be valid with the consent of his guardian. 91lt is also argued that the interdiction 92 on a 
child is not due to the childhood itself, rather it is due to a lack of the capacity to make 
judgements or decisions. Hence, this lack can be rectified by assistance from the 
guardian. 
93 
On the other hand,, the Sh5fi'i and the Hanball in one view hold that the 
permission given by the guardian to a child is void; hence a contract issuing as a result of 
91 AWirghmanii, 'Al-i bin Aba Bakr, al-Hiddyah Sharý al-Bidgyah . al-Maktabat al-kl&nijyah, 
Beirut, n. d, vol 4, p. II 920n 
the meaning of interdiction, see chapter three 
93Ibid, al-Hawan, Muhammad 'Abd al-RabMW Babth flal-. Uajar wa Atharuhu fl, 971miyat al- 
Amw, V li MustabqqjhJ Flal-Sharlat al-Isl&niyyah, DAr al-Hud, ý Cairo, 1989, p. 89 
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that permission will also be void as what is established on void is also void. This is 
because according to the Shafil principle, a mixed contract is invalid and void without 
subjecting it to the consent of the guardian as the permission to carry out a trading will 
depend very much on selling and buying of which one pillar is the prudence of the 
contracting parties. 94 The meaning of the Qura'nic verse cited by opponents to this view 
should be in- the words of al-Kiya "that the testing (ibtilj) before puberty is not in the 
form of handing over a property... rather it is realised by testing in worldly and religious 
matters such as educating him to do good things and observing trading activities in order 
to grow up m good enviroru-nent i-7,95 It is submitted that the first view which gives the 
, guardian a role to consent a sale carried out by the child is preferable due to the strong ; p-- 
argUnlent based on the Qur'dn. 
2.3.6.2 The ECC 
Similar to Islamic law, minors in the ECC are of two categories; discerning and 
non-discerning A non-discerning cWld is legally incapable of carrying out any contract 
regardless of the kinds of contract whether beneficial or harmful. Thus, for instance the 
child is not fit to receive a gift or other donations. 96 Article 45 clearly states that "A 
person devoid of discernment owing to minority, insanity or imbecility is incapable of 
exercising his/her civil rights, whoever has not attained the age of seven is considered 
devoid of discernment". As a result, any contract issuing from a non-disceming child is 
absolutely void as evidenced from article I 10 which reads, "A non discerning child has 
no rights to dispose of his property, and all his disposition is void". It is noteworthy that " 
9' Al-SYrAj al- Wahh, #j, p. 173 
9'Ahk&n al-Qur', fn , vol 
2, pp. 113 -114 
96AI- Badrawi, al-NaMriyyat al-'Ammah li al-Iiltiz&ns, p. 120, Yahya, Duras fl Mabidi al- 
QAn Cv, p. 75, al- Sanhu-n, al- WayjtflSharP al-QAm &7 al-Madani-al-Jadid, vol 1, p 273 
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absolute void"" renders the acts of child as if they had never taken place and have no legal 
effect,, a matter which carries two important consequences. Firstly, the nullification of a 
contract does not rest solely on the child and his guardian; rather, everyone who has 
interest can apply for nullification from court. Secondly, there is no concept of 
ratification in a void contract which means the consent of the guardian will be of no 
effect whatsoever on the contract concluded. In other words, the law has never 
recognised the existence of a void contract and its effect. For instance, in a contract of 
sale, the subject matter will never transfer from the seller to the buyer. 97 
With regards to the contract and disposition of a discerning child, the law 
recognises that the child at this stage has some kind of discernment even though it is not 
complete as in a mature person. According to general principle, a contract of a discerning 
child is valid if its nature is purely beneficial such as accepting a gift and a bequest. 9' 
Likewise, his contract will be null and void if it involves a purely detrimental act such as 
giving a gift or becoming a guarantor. In both cases, the consent of the guardian plays no 
role in determining the validity of this kind of contract. To this effect, article III of the 
ECC states " In the case of a disceming child , all 
his financial disposals shall be valid if 
they are pure beneficial, and void if they are pure harmful " 
However,, as for contracts that may fluctuate between benefit and harm (such as 
sale and lease), these will be voidable (qdbil fial- ibtjl) in favour of the child. The 
, guardian and 
the court by virtue of law are authorised to ratify such contracts; in addition 7-- 
the child himself has the right of ratification after attairýg the age of puberty. 99 This 
9'Al-Fiq-l, DurasflNazariyyat al-IltizimS, P. 118 
98 Al-Sanhilri, al-Wayit, vol 1, pp. 275-276 
99 Arficle III of the ECC 
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means that once the contract is concluded the law recognises its existence and its effect 
unless there is repudiation from the child or his guardian. In the case of repudiation, the 
contract will be regarded as non- existent. Similarly if ratification is given whether by 
the guardian, court or the child himself upon reaching the age of puberty, this will be 
final,, meaning that no further repudiation is allowed. It should be noted that the right to 
repudiation would lapse three years after attaining the age of puberty. 100 
The contract will remain valid so long as no proceeding to nullify it has been 
taken for which a verdict from a judge must be obtained. Thus, it is not sufficient to 
nullify a contract carried out by a discerning child by a mere action from those 
possessing authority (a guardian, the family court or the child himself), instead, a court 
proceeding is inevitable. '01 Therefore, according to this requirement, a contract of a 
discerning child is not void by merely not obtaining ratification from the parties 
concerned since the nature of the contract is not suspendable pending the consent of the 
, guardian or the court; rather the contract 
itself is considered valid with all its effect until 
the nullification is obtained. Hence for instance, in a contract of sale, the contract will 
remain valid unless there is nullification,, a matter which is contradictory to Islamic law 
since the latter considers such a contract to be valid only if the consent of the guardian is 
obtained,, otherwise it would be void. 
102 
100 Article 141 
101 Al-Badrawi, al-NaMriyy-N, p. 129. Indeed, the Preliminary Draft of the Code reads " It is 
sufficient to nullify the contract due to incomplete capacity by the announcement of another 
contracting party officially stating the reason of nullification and its evidence. If this is done the 
contract is considered void since the time of issuing". However, the Civil Code Committee at the 
Senate level has omitted this provision in order to avoid the generalization of principle relating to 
" request for nullification" and to avoid any difficulties that may arise from the implementation 
of the proposed provision. See, Majmaat al-A'mg al-Taýfl, ýiyyah 1i al-Q, ýnCm al-Madani-, al- 
Hukrffnat al-Miýriyyah, Mabacah Dir al-KitAb al-'Arab " Cairo, n. d, vol 2, pp. 340 
1b2 Al-Badrawl, al-NaMtýy&. p. 128 
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It is a fact that in the case of a contract being nullified, the effect of this will be 
retrospective; this enables the child to redeem what he has already paid to the other 
contracting party, although only where a certain amount of benefit arises from the 
enforcement of the contract. 103 It should also be noted that the child or the guardian 
105 retains the right to nullify the contract even if no'04deception (ghubn) is inflIcted . In 
other words,. deception is not a pre-requisite to invalidate a contract. 
The preceding discussion is concerned with general rules imposed by the law on 
the contract of minors; however, there are some exceptions in which a child is assumed 
to possess full legal capacity. These exceptions are either by force of law or by power 
exerted by the guardian. As far as a discerning child is concerned these exceptions can be 
divided as follows. 
2.3.6.2. lStarting from the age of seven 
Article 61 of the Law of Guardianshýp Over Property of 1952 (LGP)states that "a 
discerning child has capacity to dispose of property placed under his custody for his 
maintenance according to the custom; his obligation is subjected to this property only". It 
thus clearly shows that a discerning child enjoys full legal capacity with regard to 
property given to him for his maintenance; He therefore has the right to dispose of it even 
if it involves a purely harmful act such as donation (tabarru) It seems that the purpose of 
this legislation as maintained by Ahmad Salamah is that " ... the 
legislator by providing 
, 03 See article 143 
104 Ghubn is a condition in which one of the exchange matters ( price and object) is not balanced 
to another such as the price of a sold item is lower or higher than the market value. The ghiibn 
may be in the side of the buyer or the seller, see: Anwar $ult5n, Mayidir al-Iltiz, *n f! aI-QAn dn al- 
Madani al-Urduni Dir&ah Muqgranah bi al-Fiqh al-Istftl, MansharN al-Jimi'at al- 
Urduniyyah, Amman, 1987, I't edition, p. 83 
'O'Al-Badrdw-i, al-Nazarijý)&, p. 130 
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this exception has fulfilled the demand of practical necessity in the sense that It is 
illogical to implement the general rules on every transactions carried out by the child 
even if they involve only buying sweets or giving donations of the amount of five 
piasters" 106 Furthermore this exception has its counterpart in Islamic law whereby some 
scholars (especially those of Hanbali) invalidate the contract of a child in trivial matters. 
In addition, it is also allowed by virtue of article 62 of the same law for a 
discerning child to conclude a labour contract; however the court upon request by the 
guardian has the jurisdiction to terminate such a contract to protect the child's interest or 
his future or any other apparent interest. 107 
2.3.6.2.2Starting from the age of sixteen 
When a child reaches the age of sixteen, he is fit to disposal including entering 
into a contract involving what he gains from his work. Undoubtedly, the legislator by this 
exception considered that by giving him full capacity as regards to these earnings a child 
who is able to gain income from his work would be morally supported. Tbus, he is 
allowed to carry out transactions as he wishes. 108 
2.3.6.2.3Starting from the age of eighteen 
An eighteen year old child is allowed to carry out trading activities ( including a 
contract of sale) provided that permission from court is obtained. The wisdom behind the 
106A]unad Salaniah, al-Madkhal li Dir&at al-QjnCm, p. 51 
lo'Ibid 
108Ibid, p. 52 
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need to seek this permission is due to the risk of trading activities that may cause loss of 
property of the child. '09 Similarly, a discerning child having attained the age of eighteen 
may be permitted to manage and administer Iýs property (amM id4rah). Such permission ýv 
must issue either from his guardian in the presence of notary( muwaththiq) and be made 
public, or from the court on safisý4ig itself as to the child's justification, however, in the 
event of permission being denied by the court , the child must wait for a period of one 
year before re-applying. 110 The EgCC has ruled that once the consent of the guardian has 
been obtained, the child is considered to be having full capacity within the lirnit of this 
conse . 
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A child is also entitled to execute a bequest after obtaining permission from the 
court; nevertheless, some jurists argue that by allowing such an act, the interests of the 
child are put at risk due to the fact that bequest is considered as a purely detrimental 
contract. However, in my view, the bequest can still be justified -as similar to Islamic 
law-because it will take effect after the death of testator, and hence no injury is inflicted 
on the child's property 
112 
2.4 Summary 
From the foregoing discussions, it can be concluded that there are more 
similarities than differences between Islamic law and the ECC with regards to contract of 
minors. Both systems agree for example that a non discerning child is not legally allowed 
to enter into a contract, however, there is a view in Islamic law which permits a non 
'09 AI-Fiqll, Dur i7sfi Nazariyyat al-Iltizkn, p. 120 
"Okid, al-Sanhilnii, al-Wasý4 vol 1, p. 276 
... EgCC dated 4/3/1980 
112 AI-Suddah, Mayidir al-Iltiztn, p. 173 
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discerning child to enter into a contract of sale if the property mvolved is trivial, a 
principal that should be adopted by the ECC. As for the discerning child it seems that the 
ECC has adopted the Hanafi view in classiýýg the acts of the child; however, the ECC 
differs from Islamic law in determining the age of prudence at twenty one whereas in 
Islamic law it is determined by two means, physical and assumptive signs. Likewise the 
contract of a discerning child, which involves benefit and harm such as sale, is not held 
to be valid until the consent of the guardian is obtained whereas in the ECC the law 
presume such a contract valid unless there is nullification from the guardian or from the 
child himself after he attains the age of maturity. In short in many aspects the ECC does 
not contravene Islamic law. 
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CHAPTER THREE: INSANITY(JUNCflV) AND IMBECILITY 
(CA TAH)AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONTRACT 
3.1 Introduction 
We have seen in chapter one that jurists are unanimously agreed on considering 
ýreason' (aqO as a basis for legal capacity. When 'reason' 's defective a person is no 
longer said to possess such capacity. This defect, - generally known as 'insanity'- has 
been unanimously recognized by jurists as one of the impediments on legal capacity. In 
other words, the inclusion of insanity under 'impediment to legal capacity' (awgrid al- 
ahliyyah) is not disputable even by those jurists' who narrow down the scope of 
impediment. Similarly, the ECC has recognized insanity as an impediment, the presence 
of which will affect a person's fitness to enter into a contract. In this chapter, the study 
vAll thus involve the concept of insanity, its classification and consequences on contract. 
In addition the concept of imbecility and its relation to insanity will also be discussed. 
3.2 The meaning of insanity 
The attempt to determine the concept of insanity is regarded as one of the most 
complicated problems. Questions such as where and when 'reason' stops and when 
'insanity' begins are the indicators of the difficulties of defining 'insanity' with accuracy, 
as Lord Blackburn has concluded: "I have read every definition which I could meet with 
and never was satisfied with one of them and I have endeavoured in vain to make one 
satisfactory to myself I verily belief that is not in human power to do it,, 2 Although there 
might be some exaggeration in his statement, it is indisputable that there is no single 
Such as Husayn al-Nu-n-* and al-Zarqd', see chapter one, pp-33-34 
2 Cook-, William G. H, Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal ResponsIbIlIty, A 
Study in Psychological Jurisprudence, George Routledge & sons, London, 192 1. p. I 
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definition of insanity which satisfies all branches of knowledge. Apart from being a 
question of what is set out in the ECC and Islamic law, insanity has also to be looked at 
from a medical point of view since it involves medical concepts in the first instance. 
However, the law is not necessarily bound by medical definition alone as it also cannot 
overlook the role of medical interpretation pertaining to insanity. For this reason, the 
meaning of 'insanity' will be examined from these three perspectives: Islamic law, the 
ECC and medical opinion. 
3.2.1 Islamic law 
It is an undisputed fact that jurists are not agreed on the exact meaning of 
insanity; this is despite the appearance of the term junCm (insanity) and its derivatives in a 
number of instances in both the Qur'an and the ffadih. As such, various definitions of 
insanity can be found in their work; nevertheless there is a common meaning -as will be 
seen later- shared by the jurists. It is noteworthy that jurists in discussing the meaning of 
insanity have en passant touched upon its antonym, i. e. 'reason'. For instance al-Bukhari 
has discussed in detail the concept of 'reason' upon which the meaning of insanity is 
built. According to this juristic definition, a person possessed of reason is - in an abstract 
sense - able to demonstrate an unseen phenomenon from a seen one, is able to predict the 
outcome of a specific matter and distinguish between good and bad. 3 Thus, in the 
absence of such capacity the state of 'insanity' is said to exist. 
3Kashf al-Asrjr, vol 4. P. 263 
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4 Lexically, the word jun Fm- is derived from the root word janna, which means 'to 
7 
cover or to conceal'; thus an embryo is called janff? because it is 'concealed' in the 
womb. Some lexicographers suggest the word janna also bears the meaning of darkness 
such as janna al layl (the night has CoMe). 5 These literal meanings suggest that there is a 
correlation between them and majnCm( an insane person) in that a person becomes insane 
when his reason is concealed and 'in a state of darkness', so that it can no longer 
function. 
Technically, there are a number of definitions with regard to 'insanity'. To 
mention but a few,, Ibn Malik, one of the Hanari scholars defmes insanity as aý pest' m* a 
person's brain -physically normal-causing him to act against 'reason'. 
6 According to Ibn 
Amir insanity is a mental derangement that-except in rare situations- prevents the issuing 
7 
of deeds and utterances in the normal manner as they issue forth in sanity, while 
Tiftazani sees it as a derangement of the ability to distinguish between 'good' things and 
'bad' things, as well as the inability to know the outcome of something. ' 
From the above definitions,, it seems that in spite of their differences in wording, 
their meaning is almost identical, in that all these definitions concur that insanity is a 
kind of mental disorder which prevents the brain from functioning normally. Thus, the 
existence of insanity will negate the ability to discern (idrik) where a person affected 
with insanity (insane) is not aware of consequences that may arise from his acts, even if 
his act appears to be 'good'. It is to be noted that insanity results only from 'mental' not 
' Tank Mukhtir al-$po, pp. 151-152 
5 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modem Written Arabic, edited by J Milton Cowan, Macdonal & 
Evans Ltd, London, Librairie Du Liban, Beirut, 1980,3dedition, p. 138 
6 Ibn Malik, Sharp al-Manjrfluyal al-Fiqh, Maffiaah 'Uthmjniyyah, n. p, 1314 H, p. 340 
' Al-Taqrir wa al-Tafiýir, vol 2,231, Ahmad Hassan, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
p. 309 
8 Sharp al-Talwiý 'Ali al-TawO, vol 2, p, 167 
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'physical' disorder. In other words, a person might be normal in terms of physical 
structure but his mental capacity is defective, as can be seen clearly from Ibn Malik's 
definition. Another important point to note is that, jurists in their definitions seem to 
have emphasized the effect of insanity on the insane themselves, as well as upon others. 
They were not however, concerned with the methods to cure insanity as this is left to 
medical practitioners. 
Having said this, it should be noted that- as mentioned earlier- the word jun Fm has 
been used in the Qur'an and Hadih as well as in the works of jurists. However, the 
question arises as to whether the concept of insanity as prevalent during the Prophet's 
time is similar to that discussed by the jurists. In other words, when the Prophet PBUH 
said " The pen has been lifted (liability is exempted )for three persons... an insane person 
until he recovers"'9, was he referring to a specific mental illness of his time, meaning that 
insanity is a static concept which cannot be developed beyond this context? To address 
this problem, it must be looked at from different aspects. Firstly -having admitted that the 
Prophet PBUH was able to cure some diseases -the main purpose of Islamic teaching is 
to guide mankind to the true path; thus it was not the prophetic task to explain in detail 
types of illness and their cures. Rather, the task from the point of view of Shadah is to 
disseminate Allah's commands and prohibitions through the Qur'dn and the Sunnah . 
Secondly, with special reference to the ffadih cited above, its purpose is to judge the 
effects of a deed carried out by an insane person, not its cause. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the meaning of insanity in the ffad1h is the lack of reason; this meaning- 
in my opinion-is immutable until the present day albeit different nomenclature. 
Part ofHadith narTated by Abil Ddwfid, Kitg al-, UudW,, Uadkh no 4403 
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3.2.2 The ECC 
A survey of Egyptian law pertaining to the meaning of insanity should include 
how the legislature (the legal provision) and jurisprudence as well as judicial rulings 
mterpret msanity m accordance with the way Egyptian law is generally studied. With 
regard to the legal provision embodied in the ECC, it is important to note that, unlike 
some other countries which prefer to fix the definition of insanity in their Code, the ECC 
has taken an opposite stance in not determining precisely what 'insanity' is. Although 
article 45/1 of the Code is meant to deal with 'legal incapacity' including that of insanity, 
the exact meaning of insanity remains unaddressed. Notwithstanding whether the 
legislator -as in most cases - has purposely ignored the need for legal definition or not, 
this tendency is in fact thought to be both plausible and laudable by a large number of 
jurists. For the creation of a legislated definition to be incorporated in statute form for 
any concept such as insanity may carry negative implications, aside from the 
impossibility of determining a comprehensive definition to cover everything regarding 
insanity. In other words,, if a certain meaning of 'insanity' is fixed, the implication is that 
fis is sufficient to incorporate all known mental illnesses at the time of legislating; 
however, this is not to say that other mental diseases may not be discovered in the future. 
As a result, the insane will be in jeopardy and society itself will not be protected from 
those newly judged as insane. 10 
Moreover, such a meaning is of no use in the case of a mental patient if that 
specific meaning does not cover his particular state of insanity. If this happens to be the 
"' Ibrähün, al-Mas'i7liyyat al-Madaniyyah li 'Adýnj*al-Tamy., rý, p. 66 
89 
case,, there will be a conflict between "reality" and "definition", regardless of that 
ýreality', raising the question of whether we are bound by that definition at the expense of 
reality or vice versa. Thus, since 'reality' cannot be neglected, there is no significance in 
giving definition to insanity. In addition, as maintained by Jalal Muhammad, to legislate 
for any concept such as 'insanity' would be extremely difficult due to the fact that 
medicine as a branch of knowledge by its very nature has the potential to develop and 
confinue,, whereas this is not the case for law as legal texts represent stability. As such, 
any attempt to legislate for the concept of 'insanity' will have to combine two 
contradictory elements, a task that is very difficult to achieve if not impossible. " 
Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that legislation may not play any role in 
dealing with the clarification of insanity; rather, its role is required to put a general 
framework to the concept, leaving the details to be treated by jurisprudence and the 
judiciary. 
The Jurisprudential view of insanity 
Before further discussion,, it is noteworthy that the aspect on which jurists have 
focused to define 'insanity' is different from that looked at by medical experts, in the 
sense that the former have taken into account both the concept of relating the legal act to 
the person (isnid al-taXrruf al-q5ndpd) who has committed it, and the extent to which 
that relationship is appropriate to that act. In other words, the legal definition of insanity 
is based on interest, meaning that the jurists when attempting to put a definition to 
insanity are not concerned with medical perspective; rather, the interest of those mentally 
11 Ibid 
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affected and the other parties take priority. As such all the definitions given are based on 
this criterion. 12 For instance, 'Abd al-Bdqi defines insanity as a defect of a person's 
mind, resulting in removal of his discernment. 13 Nabil Ibrdhim has also offered a similar 
definition where he maintains that insanity is an 'illness' affecting a person's mind, that 
negates his 'discernment'; as such his acts and words are void. 14 
It can be observed from these definitions that jurists have focused more on the 
'interest' of those affected with insanity as well as on the interest of the other parties 
affected by the acts of the insane, be it civil or criminal. For instance, in Nabil's 
definition it is clearly stated that an 'act' or 'word' uttered by an insane person is 
considered void. In other words, the legal consequences of insanity are to be looked at 
first in order to give a correct definition, irrespective of the 'cause' of the insarýity itself. 
It is to be noted that, the definition of insanity is not to be found in judicial ruling, the 
court eing content with what has been given by the jurists in this matter. However, the 
court reserves the right to adapt the meaning of 'insanity'. In one ruling, for example, the 
EgCC held that a medical doctor has no authority to adapt the meaning of impediment 
a .) or 
the definition of 'insanity'; rather the task of giving a legal definition is left to 
the jurists, while the court has the right to adapt the meaning of impediment'5 
In my opinion, the implications of this ruling from the EgCC should be clearly 
comprehended. This is because the role of medicine in determining insanity cannot be 
ignored since - as Previously mentioned - insanity is a question of medical perspective in 
the first place. Perhaps the meaning of this ruling is that the medical view (in spite of its 
12 M-Sharafi, tlukm al-Tayarrufa-t al-Qa7w Cmiyyah li Fffqid al-Ahlijyah, p. 109 
Quoted from MadjAhliyyat al-$abi p. 172 
14 Saad, Nabil Ibrahim, al-Madkhalilff a1-Q&7cM, Munshaata1-Ma'&if, Alexandria, 2001 p. 177 
15 EgCC, cas. no 1290, dated 13/6/1979 
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importance) will not bind the judge in any decision he may take; thus the cooperation 
between the legal and medical role is demonstrated. Some jurists maintain that the role of 
the medical practitioner is confined to determining the existence of mental illness and its 
effect on 'a person', not to determine its effect on legal capacity which is the concern of 
the law not medicine. 16 On the other hand, there are jurists who see that the collaboration 
between judge and doctor is vital. In this respect Husayn states: 
"A number of jurists hold that there should be corroboration between judges 
and doctors in determining legal capacity; this corroboration has to take place 
at a very early stage... the judges should involve themselves in researching 
the conditions of mental illness in order for them to be rightly guided when 
delivering a verdict relating to the existence of legal capacity. They are not 
bound to follow medical views as this latter represents only advice not 
evidence... This corroboration between judges and doctors is vital in order to 
avoid confusion between them in matters relating to legal capacity" 17 
3.2.3 Medical Perspectives 
At the outset it should be noted that it is not the purpose here to give a detailed 
account of the subject of insanity as it is studied within the ambit of medical science, as 
to do so a special knowledge of medical science is essential. Rather, the following 
discussion is designed and intended to give a very brief account regarding insanity, 
inasmuch as it differs from the previous two meanings of the concept; from ECC and 
Islamic perspectives. In other words, the purpose of including a discussion of the concept 
of insanity here, is to explore what the differences exist between the three views (Islamic, 
legal and medical). This is because - as previously mentioned - jurists and medical 
experts each approach the subject from a different point of view; for this reason the jurist 
16 r Ridd Husayn Tawflq, Ahliyyat al-'Uqabah Fj al-Sharfat al-Isl&niyyah wa al-QJMn al- 
Muq&an, Matjbi',, Dn Cm, Cairo, 2000,2'1 edition, p. 172 
" lbidp. 173 
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is no more entitled to assert that the medical test of insanity is impracticable than the 
medical men is justified in stating that the legal test is inadequate. 18 
3.2.3.1 Medical Definition of insanity 
In fact, 'insanity' is not the single term used to denote illness arising from mental 
problem as it may be interchangeably used "ith other terminologies such as 'madness', 
'lunacy', 'craziness' etc. Even as an umbrella term for mental illness interpretation are 
numerous as sometimes this refers to 'mental disorder' and in other occasions it refers to 
cmental deficiency'. According to Tony Whitehead there is another term called 'mental 
handicap' now used to describe what used to be referred to as mental sub normality and 
before that to mental deficiency 19. However, his view seems to be challenged by another 
scholar; in this regards Bemard Ineichen states: 
"It is necessary to distinguish mental illness from mental handicap. Mental illness 
can be treated and often cured; sometime the symptoms simply disappear in time. 
Mental handicap (or its old name, mental deficiency) refers to the inability do 
develop intellectually beyond certain limits, and is usually characterized by brain 
defect or injury. In many cases mental handicap is present from birth; it often 
accompanied certain physical condition such as spasticity or hydrocephalus, 
though those suffering from such conditions are not necessarily mentally 
handicapped , ý20 
If anything can be concluded from these two scholarly statements, it is the 
difficulty in determining mental illness - including insanity - even among medical 
experts; as in the words of Agnes Mile, there is no consensus opinion on the subject, in 
spite of voluminous literature. 21 
'8 William, Insanity and Mental Deficiency, pp. 1 -2 
19 Tony Whitehead, Mental Illness and the Law, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, V edition, p. 5 
201neichen, Bernard, Mental Illness, Longman, London and New York, 1979, V edition, p. 2 
21 The Mentally III in Contemporary Society, A Sociological Introduction, Oxford Robertson, 
1981 p. I 
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In spite of this, some medical experts have attempted to put a definition to 
insanity as for example has Henry Maudley, who states that "insanity is disorder of brain 
producing disorder of mind"; in other words it is a disorder of the supreme nerve centre 
of the brain producmg derangement of thought, feeling and action, together or separately, 
of such degree or kind as to incapacitate the individual for the relation of live. 22 
Having said this, there are different categories of insanity known to medical 
practitioners, while in some of these categories the mind is completely and permanently 
disordered, in others the mind is only partially or intermittently disordered. 23 According 
to one classification insanity is divided according to it causes in which it is in turn 
divided into two; organic insanity and functional insanity. The former concerns kinds of 
insanity arising from physical illness such as congenital insanity and delirium tremens, 
whereas the latter involves no physical illnesses. This latter can be further divided into 
several categories as follows; 
I -Amentia where there is absence or weakness of mind; falling within this category are; 
a. Idiocy: a defect of mind which is either congenital, or due to causes operating 
during the first few years of life before there has been a development of the 
mental faculties. Idiots are not only incapable of earning their own living but 
they are also incapable of preserving themselves from the risk of the physical 
harm which is present in their ordinary physical environment. 24 
Imbecility: this exists where the defect of mind is so great that the sufferer is 
unable to own his living. Imbecile are unable, without assistance to adapt 
22hisanity and Mental Deficiency, p. 2 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibidp. 3 
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themselves to their general environment because their intellectual powers are 
not sufficiently developed 
Morons: They are the highest grade of feebleminded person as they are 
mentally defective adults whose intelligence is equal to that of a normal child 
between the ages of seven and twelve years. 25 
2- Dementia, where the mind which once was normal becomes deranged; falling within 
this category are: 
a-Ideational insanity: This comprises cases in which there is insanity of thought 
or insanity with delusion 
bAffective insanity-This comprises cases in which without delusion or 
incoherence there is derangement of feeling or of the emotion. 
c- Insanity of the Will: This comprises cases in which there is derangement of 
the will. 26 
In fact,, these divisions are further subdivided, however it is not the intention here 
to explain in detail the medical perspective on insanity due to the fact that these 
classifications do not greatly concern jurists. This is because as far as jurists are 
concerned - as previously mentioned - their perception on 
insanity is limited only to how 
the existence of such insanity will affect the ability of the person affected in such a 
manner that the condition will be taken into account by the law in order to relate acts 
issuing from that person in the sense that if a person's ability is removed, then the law 
will consider him as insane even if his health condition does not 
fall within any of the 
abovementioned medical classifications. Medical experts, on the other 
hand have 
attributed insanity to these classifications for the purpose of seeking treatment, which 
" Ibid 
26 Ibidp. 6 
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varies from one situation to another. In other words, the medical experts have looked at 
insanity as 'illnessi., as such; they have attempted to diagnose this illness and tried to find 
the causes in order to ascertain a cure. 
This has led some jurists to conclude that in order to determine a legal meaning of 
insanity, its medical meaning should not be heavily relied upon, or as put by Palero :" It 
is hard to deduce from medical terminologies any element which may suit the definition 
of insanity". This said, despite the fact that medicine has shed light on the concept of 
insarnty, it has not made an effective contribution towards determining the legal meaning 
of such concept, a matter which should be referred to the law itself for definition. 27 
3.3 Classification of Insanity 
3.3.1 Islamic law 
According to Islamic law, insanity can be classified into several categories as follows; 
3.3.1.1 Regular insanity(jitit Cm ayli) and_irregular insanity(jun i7n tiri') 
Regular insanity is associated with a person from his birth until he attains the age 
of majority. The cause of this insanity is a defective physical condition of the brain 
resulting in unfitness to receive what it is intended to receive. Thus,, although the brain is 
physically existent it cannot function, as in the case of a blind person or a mute whereby 
both are not able to see or speak respectively in spite of the physical existence of eye and 
tongue. 28 This kind of insanity cannot be cured and any attempt to do so would be 
meaningless. Irregular insanity on the other hand appears after a person 
has attained 
" Al-Mas'aliyyat al-Madaniyyah, pp. 60-61 
28 Sharh al-Talwjrh 'Alff al-Tawo, vol 2, p. 167, Kashfal-Asrffr, vol 4, p. 264 
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majority and sanity with mature understanding. According to the jurists, irregular 
insanity is of two kinds, the first of which occurs when the function of the brain is 
interrupted, and as a result cannot work properly. Nevertheless,, there is hope that this 
type of insanity can be cured. 29The second type occurs as a result of the 'Devil's control' 
over human beings, whereby Satan would affect a person's mind in such a manner that 
he would imagine something unreal. In this situation such a person's mind is abnormal, 
in spite of the normality of his physical brain condition. This kind of insanity, which is 
also known as "the satanic touch", can be cured through some kind of prayer in the eyes 
of the Shadah. 
30 
Looking at these classifications some observations should be made. Firstly, in 
regard to regular insanity, it seems that the jurists have presumed that its existence starts 
at the time of birth, and that this will continue until a person reaches the age of majority. 
However, such a definition implies that there is no possibility for a child to be affected 
by insanity after birth, and before the age of majority. In other words, if the period 
between birth and the age of majority is fifteen years, for example, then there will be no 
possibility that a child is bom sane, but becomes insane before attaining majority. The 
jurists do not address this question, as can be understood from their definition of regular 
insanity. In my view, this is because - as previously stated - the purpose of classifying 
insanity is to look at the legal consequences of an act carried out by the insane. Thus, if 
an act carried out by an insane person is void, the same is true vAth regard to that of a 
child. 31 Secondly, the distinction between 'regular' and 'irregular' insanity is only 
29 AI-Taqr, tý wa-al-Tafibir, vol 2, p. 23 1, Shar, ý al-Tal wih, vol 2,167, 
30 Ibid 
31 Since both insanity (fun týi)and minority (9ghar) are impediments to legal capacity the 
existence of one of them is sufficient to annul legal acts carried out. However there could be a 
possibility that a person is affected with more than one impediment such as in the case of an 
insane child. 
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significant in matters involving worship ('ibjdah), wl-ffle within the ambit of a ciN7il 
tTansaction it has no significance. 32 The effect of a contract carried out by an insane 
person for instance, is the same whether his insanity is classified as 'regular' or 
otherwise. On the other hand, in worship, such as fasting, its outcomes will depend on 
the types of insanity; regular or irregular. 
3.3.1.2Full insanity9(junCm kulli) and'partial insanity' (fitz li) 
In respect of 'partial insanity', those affected are lacking in 'discernment' and 
4reason' in certain issues,, but they remain sane and of sound mind in other matters, as in 
a person whose brain does function in certain topics, but not in every area. In contrast, in 
the case of 'full insanity' a person affected fully lacks reason and the ability to use his 
brain. 
3.3.1.3 Continuous insanity (jundn tnutbiq) and intermittent insanity(juni7n ghayr 
mittbiq) 
'Continuous insanity' occurs when there is no intervening period of sanity. In 
other words, a person affected with this kind of insanity will fully lose his reason, 
regardless of time factors, but if he recovers, he will fully gain his reason. As for 
'intermittent insanity', this is a situation in which an insane person will regain his 
capacity to reason from time to time, meaning that the period of insanity will be 
interrupted by a period of sanity. For instance, there rnight be a person who is 'saneý in 
the morning but becomes insane in the afternoon. It should be noted that the period of 
'insanity' after which a person becomes a continuous insane is not agreed upon by the 
32 Al-Mas'i7liyyat al-Madaniyyah, p. 120, Kashfal-Asriqr, vol 4, pp. 265-266 
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jurists. According to Ab5 Yus5f, continuous insanity occurs when the period roughly 
approximates one year while Muhammad bin Hasan is of the opinion that a complete r 
year is a pre-condition for classification as continuous insanity. Meanwhile, Abu 
Hanifah, whose opinion is preferred by his followers, seems to have shortened the period 
33 
to only one month . It 
is not qiiite clear on what basis these jurists have based their 
argument, after having admitted that there is no evidence in the Qur'a-n or the Hadih to 
support their views. The only possible argument is perhaps by resorting to custom, smce 
this is regarded as a source by which to establish legal rules in Islamic law. If this is the 
case, this means these jurists could have experienced different customs resulting in 
differences of opinion. At the same time, the question still arises as to how custom could 
differ greatly since the jurists concerned were contemporaries. Wbile it is not the purpose 
here to enter into a detailed discussion of custom, it does seem that these jurists may have 
given their views under specific circumstances which differ from one to another. 
Regardless of these juristic discrepancies, the fact remains that in determining the period 
of 'insanity', no conclusive evidence can be found, therefore it is accepted that this 
matter may vary from time to time and should thus be referred to those concerried, i. e., 
judge and medical experts. 
3.3.2 The ECC 
Unlike Islarnic law, the ECC does not provide any classification for insanity; thus 
terms such as regular insanity, irregular insanity and the like are absent in legislature as 
well as in the works of jurists. Indeed the Preliminary Draft of the Code 
has even 
preferred not to use the term insanity; instead the term mental illness 
(Ahat al-'aqO is 
33 Sharp Fatý al-Qadtirr, vol 3, p. 285, Ibn Nujaym, Zayn bin Ibrdlým, al-Ba, (r al-Rj'iq 
Sharp 
Kanz al-Daqj'iq, Dffr al-Marifah, Beirut, n. d, vol 3, p. 132 
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used. However, this stance of the Code in not classifying insanity is acceptable if there is 
no significance therein, since the Code is concerned only with the legal effect of an act 
carried out by the insane person irrespective of the actual kind of insanity. 
3.4 The Effect of Insanity on Contract 
3.4.1 Islamic law 
By and large, the legal capacity of an insane person is held to be defective, so that 
he is not capable of entering into any contract of whatever kind as is agreed upon by the 
jurists. 34 TNs view is understood as reasonable if a contract is concluded when a state of 
insanity exists, since it is hard to imagine how such a person may conclude a contract if 
he is unaware of what he is doing. It thus seems that legal opinion in this matter is more 
theoretical than practical. However, if one of the contracting parties suffered from 
mtermittent msanity, what then would be the situation? In other words,, would the effect 
of the contract of the insane party be sirnIlar to that of the sane if concluded during a 
period of intermittence? Similarly, while admitting that the insane person is legally 
incapacitated, a few questions must be addressed such as procedures that should be taken 
in order to prevent the insane person from entering into a contract, and who is 
responsible for him in terms of contractual obligations. As such, the follovring 
discussions will examine certain rules which apply to insanity, such as the rules of 
interdiction (hajr)and guardianship( wiljyah - 
34 B5z, Salim Rustum, Sharp al-Majallah, Affr al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, n. d, p. 549, al- 
Ran-di, Mubammad bin Abu al-'Abbas, Nih. Wyat al-Muht. Wj IIJ sharp al-Minhffj, Dffr al-Kutub al- 
'Ilmiyyah, n. p, 1993, vol 3, p. 385, Ibn Juzay, al-QawAnh al-Fiqhiyyah, n. p, n. d, vol 
1, p. 163 , 
Ibn I)dwiyan, Thrahim bin Mubammad, edited by, %am al-Qal'aji, Mandr al-Sabi7, Maktabat al- 
Ma c ffrif, Riyad, 1405 H, 2nd edition, vol 1, p. 288 
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3.4.1.1 Interdiction (bajr) on an insane person 
3.4.1.1.1 Definition 
The Arabic term ývjr from a literal point of view -as suggested by 
lexicographers- carries more than one meaning which inter alia is 'preventlon'(maný, it 
is said for example, hajara al- qjd! alayh meaning that the judge has prevented a person 
from dealing with his property. 35 Reason is also called ýqjr as appears in the Qur'an 
(89: 5) which reads: "Is there not in these adjuration for those who have reason" because 
its existence will prevent its owner from committing wrong actions. 36 The word also 
connotes something unlawful as in the Qur'dn (25: 22) wherein Allah says; "They 
(angels) will say this is a barrier forbidden to you". 
Inasmuch as there are a variety of literal meanings of the word bjjý-, its juristic 
meaning is also a matter for disagreement among jurists, as every school of legal thought 
tends to ascribe to it differing meanings. It is thus useful to explore all the definitions and 
to analyse them accordingly, so that we can reach a single definition which befits the 
C- 
present study. To begin with,, Hanafi scholars such as al-Zayla i defme interdiction as a 
37 
prevention of verbal disposal (taýurrqf qawli) due to minority, slavery or insanity. In 
this definition the key word verbal (qawli) is purposely used to indicate that actual 
disposal (taýaruffili) is not subject to interdiction as a deed is 'unpreventable' after it has 
taken place. However this definition has been criticized because the actual causes of 
interdiction are specified, which in turn raises doubt as to whether there other causes 
" Tartib MukhtAr al-$ifiaA p. 163 
36 
37 al-Qknas al-Muhýt, pp. 
370-371 
nd A]-Zaylaci, Taby. #'l al-Haqj7q, DAr al-Marifah, Beirut 1315 H, 2 edition, vol 5, p. 190 
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which remain unstated. Tbs realization has perhaps led Ibn 'Abid-in another Hanafli 
scholar to propose that interdiction is the prevention of verbal disposal from being 
enforced (without specifying) the causes of interdiction. 
As for the Mdliki , 
it seems that while various meanings of interdiction can be 
found in their work,, the most prevalent one (as quoted by Ibn 'Arafah )Is -a legal 
characteristic that prevents the dealings of the characterized individual from being 
executed beyond obtaining sustenance, or that prevents him from giving his property in 
charity beyond the first one third. , 
38 
With regard to the Shafii and the Hanbali, their definitions of interdiction are 
almost identical. For instance,, al-Sharbin-i defines interdiction as prevention from 
conin-fitting pecuniary dispoSa139 a definition which is virtually the same as that of the 
Hanball4o 
This said,, deeper analysis of the above definition raises the following points. 
I -The Hanafl have confined "prevention" to verbal (tasarruf qawli) only where the other 
definitions cover both 'action' and 'word' in spite of their limitations on pecuniary 
is, (as in Zaylai's definition) prefer to state disposal (tasarrutf mg1j) . Moreover, the 
Hanaf 
the cause of interdiction; other jurists did not adopt this. 
38 Al-Dusfa-qi, Muhanunad 'Arafah, Hdshiyat al-Dusi7ql' 'Alff al-Sharb al-Kabi'r, Diir al-Fikr, 
Beirut, n. d, vol 3, p. 292, al-ga! o, MawOib al-JaM, vol 5, p. 57 
" Mughnlal-Muýhý, vol 2, p. 165, al-Bujayrimi, Sulayman bin 'Umar, H&hiyat al-Bujayrim', 
Maktabah Islkniyyah, Turkey, n. d, vol 2, p. 430 
40 Kashshgf al-Qinff ', vol 3, p. 416 al-Buhiiti, al-RawO al-Murbi' , Maktabat al-Riyffa al- 
gadihah, Riyad, 1390 H, vol 2, p. 214 note that the Shafici9s definition in Arabic is 
and the Hanball's 
is (, kL ýp ýjLý71 ýý) 
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2-All definitions have taken into account the literal meaning of interdiction as jurists 
aggree that interdiction is some kind of prevention. This can be seen clearly in the 
defmitions of the three schools (with the exception of the Malik-i) in starting their 
definition with the word prevention (man) However this latter's definýition is distinct in 
stating what an interdicted person (mabj&) is allowed to do. 
3-None of the definitions is sufficiently comprehensive to depict the definition of 
interdiction, as each of them has weaknesses which might be open to criticism, which in 
tum might be used as a loophole in legal dispute. Thus, it is suggested that these 
meanings be combined to give an accurate definition. Therefore interdiction should be 
defiried as prevention from carrying out verbal disposal or prevention from being 
enforced in certain matters relating to finance due to lawful reasons in the interest of the 
parties concerned . 
41 This definition is preferred due to the fact that it covers only one 
kind of verbal disposal and directs that interdiction may carry legal effect, whereas this is 
not the case as regards 'actual disposal' ; that is to say, a deed such as causing damage to 
other's property cannot be prevented after that action has taken place. Moreover, not 
every kind of verbal act should be prevented, as implied in the key word 'certain 
matters'. In addition, the purpose of interdiction must be lawful and in the interest of 
either the interdicted person or the other parties. 
4' AN! al- Rish, lsmA'-ll , al-kIajr wa Asbguhu 
fi al-Fiqh al-Isl&nj -, Ma. lbaat al- AmPiah. 
Cairo, n. d, p. 18 
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3.4.1.1.2 The legality of interdiction 
Generally speaking, there is a considerable amount of textual evidence frequently 
quoted by jurists to establish the legality of interdiction. Perhaps the most reliable proof 
lies In the following verses; 
I -"To those weak of understanding, make not over your property which Allah has made 
a means of support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and speak- to them words 
of kindness and justice" (4: 5) It is thus clear that the Qur'dn forbade guardians from 
allowing mentally incompetent individuals to take control of their properties, to prevent 
them from squandering such properties. 
2-"Make trial of orphans until they reach puberty, if then you find them of sound 
judgment, release their properties to them" (4: 6) In this verse the Qur'an has ordered the 
,, guardian to test the orphan's abilities 
in dealing with property; thus if the orphan is found 
to be capable of such a task, he may be given control over his property. This implies that 
before their capability is proven the orphans are to be put under interdiction. 
3-" If the liable party is mentally deficient or weak, or unable to dictate himself, let his 
guardian dictate himself, let his guardian dictate faithfully" ( 2: 282). According to al- 
Sha-fici the 'mentally deficient" refers to the spendthrift, the weak refers to children and 
the one who cannot dictate refers to the insane 42 
It is to be noted that in the above verses the word bajr per se does not appear, neither 
does it appear in the remaining verses of the Qur'dn; nonetheless, the meaning of these 
42 T AI-Zuhayli, Wahbah, a/- FYqh al-Isl&nj , English edition, translated 
by Mahmoud A. El- 
Gamal, Dar al-Fikr, Damascus, 2003,1 " edition, vol 2 p. 347 
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verses as interpreted by commentators such as al 
'743 
-Qurtubi and al-Tabar-i 44quite clearly 
refers to the general doctrine of interdiction. However, the term interdiction is clearly 
employed in a Ijadith narrated from Kaab bin Malik, where the Prophet had PBUH 
mterdicted Mu'az and forced him to sell his property to repay his debt. 45 It is also 
reported that 'Uthman the Caliph had interdicted Abdullah Ibn Jafar for overspending 46 
3.4.1.1.3 Insanity as a cause for interdiction 
It is worth noting that the causes for interdiction in Islamic law are disputed 
amongst the jurists to the extent that some such as al- Ansari, have collected more than 
seventy causes for interdiction. It is not the purpose of this study to examine in detail all 
these causes, however; as far as insanity is concerned there is no dispute that this is 
considered by all jurists as a cause for interdiction. 47 This is based on a ýadih in wWch 
the Prophet PBUH was reported to have said: ' the pen is lifted for three persons; a 
sleeping person until he wakes up, a minor until he reaches puberty and an insane person 
until he recovers'. Commenting on the ffidih al- Hawari argues that the meaning of 
liffing the pen is to withhold taklif(imposing injunction) on the insane person; as such, all 
43AI-J&ni' 
-Ii 
Apk&n al-Qur'Aý7, vol 5, p. 28 
44 Al-Tabari, MOammad bin Jarir, Tafsh- al- Tabari, Dir al-Fikr, Beirut, 1405 H, vol 4, p. 246 
45 Narrated by DAr al- Qutnj' in his Sunan 
46Nan-ated by al-Shafi in his Musnad 
47 See BadY7'aI-$anJY, vol 7, p. 169, a12Abdari, Mubammad bin YUsuf, al-T-9 wa al-IW7, Dar 
al-Fikr, Beirut, 1398 H, 2nd edition, vol 5, p. 57, Mughn] al-Muhtg, vol 2, p. 165, al-Mughni'vol 
4, p. 295. Besides insanity the jurists are agreed on the inclusion of infancy as a cause for 
interdiction. As for other causes according to the majority of jurist like Maliki, Shafii and 
Hanball the_ causes are: prodigality, bankruptcy, sickness, marital ties, and pledge. The Hanbali 
and Shafi ci have also considered apostasy as a cause for interdiction and the Hanbafi alone 
regarded ageing as a cause for interdiction. SeeAbu Rih, al-ýIqjr AsbAbuhu, pp. 24-25 
105 
his actions including contract will be of no legal effect, which is achieved through 
mterdiction. 
48 
Interdiction on the insane signifies that they no longer posses active legal 
capacity, as *reason' which is the basis of such capacity, is absent in the case of insanity. 
Consequently, any acts including contract issuing from an insane person are considered 
null and void according to juristic consensus be they purely beneficial, purely harmful or 
a mixture of these two. Some jurists liken the act carried out by the insane to that issuing 
from a discerning child in that both carry no effect whatsoever, To this effect the 
Majallah states that 'the legal rules relating to the disposal of a continuous insane are 
similar to that of a non discerning child and for the intermittent insane his disposal during 
the period of recovery is considered valid -)49 . This 
is despite the fact that a non-disceming 
child is in better condition than the insane since the former still enjoys some sort of 
reason whereas this is not the case in the latter. 
Having said this, it should be noted that, according to the majority of jurists, the 
interdiction on insanity is automatic (by force of law) in nature. This means that an 
insane person is automatically interdicted without having to secure a judicial order. In 
other words,, the permission of the Shari 7 'ah alone as embodied in its principles is 
sufficient to nullify a contract entered into by the insane person. However, the Malikiso 
are of the opinion that any interdiction on the insane person must be consented to by his 
father, his guardian or a judge. This rule applies to all kind of insanity, be it continuous 
or intermittent provided that in the case of the latter the state of insanity does in fact 
" Bahthfi al-. Uajrflal-Sharlat al-Isl&niyyah, p. 134 
Arücle 979,980 
Hishiyah al-Dus üql', vol 3, p. 292 
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exist. During the period of recovery- in the case of intermittent insanity- such a person 
enjoys full legal capacity, meaning that his contracts will be legally valid. Similar to its 
imposition, the interdiction will be lifted on recovery vAthout having to request a court 
order. 51 1n Quddmah has pointed out to this effect that: 
" the interdiction is removed once its cause no longer exists; when an insane 
person regains his reason in the consensus of the jurists the interdiction is lifted 
without depending on a judge's order. The same is true with regard to the infant 
when he reaches puberty. This is because such interdiction does not require a 
judicial order; neither does it require one for its termination', 52 
3.4.1.2 Guardianship over the insane 
As previously stated,, the insane person has no legal capacity whatsoever to 
enable him to enter into a contract and he is therefore placed under legal interdiction to 
protect his property. The question of how an insane person could have a property should 
not be raised due to the fact that his receptive legal capacity is not affected by the 
presence of insanity. Possessing this kind of capacity alone renders the person fit to 
receive certain rights such as inheritance. If we suppose that an insane person is an heir to 
a deceased person, then he is legally entitled to inherit the property left to him according 
to his portion. However, with regard to other matters an insane person will require a 
guardian to take care of his affairs,, be they financial or personal. 
Jurists are of different opinions as to what order guardianship of the insane person 
f 11OW53 should 0- According to the majority the guardian shall be the insane's father 
provided that he is of a good character, while m the absence of the father the grandfather 
will take over. In a case where both the father and grandfather are not living then the 
51 Bahth fi al-. ýIqjr, p. 153 52Al-m 
53 
ýghnh vol 4, p. 295 
See pp. 27-28 of chapter one for the meaning of guardianship 
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4 guardianship will move to their curator (Was]. ) The Mdliki, concurring with the majority 
in considering the father as a guardian, differ however in giving priority to his curator 
before the grandfather. They further maintain that in a case where the insanity occurs 
after the age of puberty the guardianship will rest on ajudge. 54 
3.4.2 The ECC 
The Code provides in article 45/1 that "a person devoid of discretion owing to 
youth... or insanity is incapable of exercising his civil rights". This article clearly spells 
out that the insane person is therefore not entitled to exercise these rights including 
entering into a contract. However, the question then arises as to whether or not the 
existence of insanity renders a contract automatically null and void. In other words, is 
there any condition for an invalidation of contract by reason of insanity to take effect? 
Article 114 of the Code here states that "a disposal by the insane and the imbecile shall 
be invalid,, if such disposal takes place after registration of the interdiction ruling; 
however if such disposal takes place before registration of the interdiction ruling, it shall 
not be invalid unless the status of insanity or imbecility is commonly known while 
concluding the contract or the other party is aware thereof'. Thus it can be seen that the 
Code has differentiated between two situations, the first of which is prior to the 
registration of interdiction ruling and the other is after registration. 
Article 114 thus impliedly recognizes the doctrine of interdiction 55 imposed on 
an insane person; although the Code does not clearly spell out the types of interdiction 
"H&hiyat a1-Dusaq-i*, voI, 3, p. 292,, Bahth fial-gajr, p. 150 
55 The treatment of Interdiction in the Code is almost identical to that of Islamic law, thus, there is 
no need to discuss it here unless there is significance in doing so. 
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falling within its jurisdiction, it can be inferred that there are two types; automatic and 
judicial. This is because in providing legal rules of a disposal carried out by a child the 
Code states merely states that "a minor under the age of discretion shall not have the 
ý56 thus, right to dispose of his property and all disposals thereby shall be null and void' 
since there is no reference here to the need to obtain a 'court order to obtain interdiction 
'then one conclude that this kind of interdiction is automatic in nature. On the other hand, 
article 113 concerning insanity reads: "a person who is insane, idiot, prodigal or weak 
minded shall be subject to a court interdiction according to the rules and provisions 
proscribed by the law" thus, clearly defining interdiction of a judicial type. In other 
words, in order to impose interdiction on an insane person a court order must first be 
sought; if this obtained the said ruling should be registered in accordance with article 65- 
57 
66 of the Law of Guardianship over Property of 1952 (LGP) . 
3.4.2.1 Effect of insanity prior to the registration of interdiction ruling 
According to some jurists (amongst them 'Abd al-Baqi and and Shanab), by 
virtue of article 114, prior to the registration of interdiction ruling an insane person is 
deemed to possess legal capacity, thus, all contracts issuing from him are valid unless 
the state of insanity is either widely known, or the other contracting party is aware of the 
existence of such insanity. To this effect Shanab asserts: " In the case of a contract being 
entered into before the registration of interdiction ruling, according to general principal, 
'6Article 110 
" Tulbah, Anwar, al-Ta clj-, q 'ala Nusl7S al-QffnCm al-Madanl* D& al-Ma. thdi. t 
Alexandria, n. d, vol 1, p. 96 
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such a contract is valid even if it is purely harmful. This is because an insane person is 
said to have possessed full legal capacity until the ruling is registered -)-)58 
On the other hand, there are jurists who maintain that article 114 does not by 
implication convey full legal capacity to the insane person prior to the registration; this is 
due to the absence of 'will' in an insane person which is in turn considered to be the basis 
of disposal . Therefore, once it is proven that a person entering into a contract is in a state 
of insanity, then Ns contract would be null and void irrespective of this insanity being 
registered or otherwise, even if his insanity is either not commonly known to the public 
at the time of concluding the contract or the other contracting party is not aware of such 
insanity. 59 The EgCC seems to have supported this view when it held that the absence of 
registration does not necessarily mean that the disposal carried out by the insane person 
or imbecile is valid; thus, that the other contracting party is aware of the existence of 
insanity or imbecility is sufficient to nullify a contract issuing before the registration. " 
It should be noted that according to those jurists who uphold the nullity of 
disposal, this is not based on the absence of legal capacity itself, rather it is due to the 
nT% absence of 'will'. Although they advance a number of arguments and justifications in 
distinguishing between the absence of legal capacity as against the absence of sound 
6will', it seems in the context of contract this differentiation is not significant since in 
either case the contract will be voided. 
5' Shanab, Labib, Nazariyyat al-Haq, p. 148 
59 Madd Ahliyyat al-$ab. L 177 
60 EgCC dated 16/1/1971 
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In my opinion, the disagreement among jurists on this issue would not have arisen 
had the Code adopted the same approach as Islamic law in categorizing insanity into 
continuous and intermittent. This is because those who validate a contract made by an 
insane person perhaps refer it to a contract concluded while the insane regains his 
reason, otherwise it is not conceivable for an insane person to enter into a contract while 
he is not aware of it, as suggested by Ahmad Salamah: 
ý(. ,- the 
insane person lacks 'will' whether from a legal point of view or reality; 
however, is it possible to abandon this principle so that we can depend on the 
apparent wording of article 114? We are inclined to reject this interpretation.... It 
can be said that when spelling out that if such disposal takes place before 
registration of the interdiction ruling, the second paragraph of article 114 states 
that a contract shall not be invalid unless the status of insanity or imbecility is 
commonly known at the time of concluding the contract or the other party is 
aware thereof' intended disposal out at the time of consciousness. This means 
that this article is taken from Islamic law which is considered as its historical 
source. Therefore the article should be explained as follows: If the interdiction 
ruling is registered, it is commonly assumed that an insane person is lacking in 
both legal capacity and 'will' rendering all his disposal null and void.... 61 
In addition,, the stance of the Code has led to criticism in that it validates a 
disposal made by the insane person-other than these two conditions- before the ruling is 
registered. It seems therefore that the Code has made a link between the completeness of 
legal capacity and what is procedural in nature; namely the registration of interdiction 
ruling. Thus, since the basis for legal capacity is 'discernment', it is more reasonable to 
link legal capacity and its basis in the sense that any disposal issuing from a person is 
valid if he is discerning or vice versa irrespective of whether an interdiction ruling has 
been registered or not. 
62 Perhaps, this linkage was established in order to provide 
stability of transaction where a bonafide person could possibly enter into a contract with 
an insane person without being aware of such insanity, and thence be surprised to learn 
that the said contract is null and void owing to insanity. This would undoubtedly cause 
" Ahmad Salamali, al-Madkhalp. 63 
62 Ibid, p. 62 
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chaos and uncertainty, which the law would wish to avoid. By the same token it can be 
argued that in the case of the insanity being unknown to the bona fide party, according to 
article 114 his contract will remain valid,, which contradicts the main principle that 
invalidates a contract issuing from a non discerning person. Furthermore, the perception 
of validating a contract made by an insane person contains the element of penalty for 
which an insane person is not liable. 63 
3.4.2.2 After the registration of the interdiction ruling 
An insane person is legaHy interdicted after the registration has been approved 
with immediate effect after which the court will have to appoint an assistant for him. 
Upon registration, the insane person will be considered as lacking legal capacity, thus all 
his disposal including contract would be null and void even if purely beneficial such as 
accepting a gift. It is worth noting that the period of recovery (in the case of intermittent 
insanity) makes no difference after the ruling has been registered meaning that even if a 
contract issues during a period of sanity, it is still deemed to be null and void as 
understood from article 114/1 of the ECC. 64 
It is observed that a contract made by an insane person after registration of the 
ruling is absolutely void whether the insanity is widely known or not because the 
registration alone is sufficient in itself to invalidate such a contract. Therefore, the 
interdiction ruling legally presumes the absence of legal capacity in an insane person, and 
by registering that ruling the other contracting party is legally presumed to have been 
63 Ibid, 62 
'54Mad. ff Ahliyyat al- ý2b - p. 180 . 11 
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aware of the existence of such a ruling. However, the question arises as to whether this 
legal presumption is conclusive or not. Some jurists are of the opinion that the 
presumption in this case is conclusive and as such it is not rebuttable whereas others 
assert that the presumption is not conclusive, in which case the other party is allowed to 
rebut this presumption on the basis that the contract is made during a state of recovery (in 
mtermittent msaruty). It seems that this last view is preferable due to the fact that legal 
capacity in nature is regarded as a public order which cannot be established through 
legal process. 
65 
This said,, important to note that in dealing with disposal by an insane person , the 
ECC has taken into account two kinds of interest; the insane himself and the bona fide 
contracting party. In other words the Code attempts to balance both kinds of interest. 
With regard to the insane, his contract is considered valid as long as no interdiction 
ruling is imposed. Similarly, the bonafide person is protected by validating a contract 
entered into by him if the state of insanity is not common and he is not aware of the 
existence of such insanity. 
65 lbid 
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3.5 The effects of imbecility ('atah) on contract 
3.5.1 Islamic law 
3.5.1.1 Definition 
Apart from insanity there is another closely related impediment to it known as 
imbecility( 'atah). In fact, juristic discussion on imbecility (especially that of classical 
jurists) is somewhat confusing, as some refer to imbecility as insanity itself Some 
authors such as al-Hawar-i and Khallaf claim that jurists are too inconsistent and 
disorganized in their attempts to address the concept of imbecility Tor instance, the 
author of al-Bindyah clearly states that the imbecile is the one who sporadically loses and 
gains reason ( al-shakhs alladhi ; yajinnu wayufku). "This means that this scholar has 
equated imbecility and intermittent insanity. In order to get a clear picture of what has 
been said about imbecility, and to verify the above claim, it is useful to examine the 
various meanings of imbecility as suggested by the jurists. 
Literally, imbecility denotes the deficiency of reason (nuqýjn al-'aqoV ,a 
meaning which has a close connection to its legal term. 
Terminologically, jurists are divided in determining the precise meaning of 
imbecility or the imbecile (ma'tfih) According to al-Bazdawi imbecility is harmful 
affliction in a person, necessarily occasioning a defect in his intellect so that his speech 
sometimes resembles that of the intelligent person and sometimes that of the 
66AI-Bin, ayah ala- al-Nih, #yah , vol 8, pp. 214-215, cited 
from al-, Uajr wa Asbguhu, p. 72 
67 Tartib MukhtAr al-$iPAO, p. 5 01 
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possessed 68 Ibn Am-ir seems to agree with this definition; however he stipulates that such 
harm must be of essential origin, thus if it is affected by -for instance- taking drugs, then 
it cannot be considered as imbecility. 69 On the other hand, Ibn Nujaym has shortened 
Bazdawi's definition by stating that imbecility is a state when a person's speech 
sometime resembles that of the 'sound mind' and sometimes resembles that of 'the 
mad'. 70 In addition, there is another meaning of imbecility based on the personal 
character of the imbecile . In this respect, imbecile is defined as a person whose 
understanding and thought are defective; however, he does not attack and swear at others 
as is done by the insane. 
71 
Looking at these meanings, there are two issues that are quite important to 
address. Firstly, are these definitions satisfactory enough to depict the exact meaning of 
imbecility? In other words, is anyone of these definitions beyond criticism, so that it can 
be preferred to others? The second issue is, were these jurists really inconsistent in their 
treatment of this subject (imbecility) 
As far as the firsts issue is concerned, having studied the definitions given, it 
seems that none of them is beyond criticism and as such, cannot be totally relied upon. In 
Bazdawi's defirfition for instance,, the assertion that the speech of the imbecile resembles 
that of the insane and the sane intermittently will not prevent the insane from being 
included in this category as there might be an insane person whose speech sometime 
resembles that of a person of sound mind. Similarly, in the definition given by Ibn 
Nujaym, there might be a category of the insane whose characters are tranquil and do not 
6'Kashfal-Asr, ffr, vol 4, p. 274 
6' Al- Ta r" wa al- Tabbi-r, vol 2, p. 23 5 . qr 70 Sharh al-Man jr, p. 341, 
7' Al-Bahr al-Rff 'iq, vol 8, p. 89, al Mas'aliyyat al-Madaniyyah p. 122 
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create problem for others. The same is true for the remaining defmitions. In my view, the 
difficulty of giving a precise meaning to imbecility is no less -as previously discussed- 
than the difficulty in giving an accurate meaning to insanity itself However, if it is 
almost impossible to define imbecility or the imbecile accurately enough to render it 
beyond criticism, it is still possible to combine the various definitions in order to suggest 
a closer meaning to the concept of imbecility it self. Thus, as suggested by some, 
imbecility can be categorized as a mental disease inferior to insanity, which prevents a 
person from enjoying full discernment. 72 
With regard to the claim that jurists were unclear and inconsistent in interpreting 
imbecility, Khallaf comments on conflicting perceptions in the following analysis. 
"It appears that the distinction between a contract carried out by the insaneand the 
imbecile is valid if we can first distinguish between the two; however, the 
opinion of jurists in determining who the imbecile is, is confusing as some jurists 
opine that if a mentally ill person's condition is accompanied by physical 
disorder, then he is considered as insane, otherwise- where there is no physical 
disorder- he is imbecile. Nevertheless, according to some medical experts, there 
might be circumstances in which an insane person is not accompanied by physical 
disorder and a calm is not necessarily a sign of sanity. Some jurists hold that the 
imbecile is a person whose understanding and thinking is disordered. However 
these criteria could also apply to the insane. Some other jurists are of the opinion 
that the imbecile is a person who is not good at selling and buying... ý-)73 
Khallaf s statement thus seems to conclude that jurists are unclear due to the 
sheer variety of definitions of imbecility, since there is no agreement among them as to 
its actual meaning. However, his conclusion would only hold water if all the definitions 
issued from the same scholar, rather than issuing from differing subjective perceptions. 
Furthermore,, if this criterion (variety of definition) were to be taken as a reason for this 
confusion,, it will lead to the conclusion that jurists are confused by the abundance of 
72 Bahthfial-tlajrp. 154 
"Al-Ahliyyah wa-'AwAriOlhj, p. 37 
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juristic discussion as they are not agreed upon many more definitions other than those 
discussed here. 
In my view, the most that can be said is that aside from insanity, jurists have 
acknowledged another kind of mental illness,, the effect of which is less serious than that 
of insanity, and they have utilized all possible means to define that illness, although this 
may vary from one jurist to another. In this respect JaIdl Muhammad states; 
"In fact,, we believe that Muslim scholars like early Roman jurists, when they 
were not able to classify the many kinds of mental illnesses in a proper manner due to restricted development in medicine at their time, they resorted to 
classifying mental illness into two only; insanity and imbecility with the intention 
that the term insanity will cover insanity as it was widely known at their time. As for other mental diseases, the term imbecility is used to denote them', 74 
This said, regardless of this juristic debate, the fact remains that there is another 
mental illness other than that insanity called imbecility; however accepting that there is a 
difference between this condition and insanity in terms of meaning and definition, will 
imbecility have a different effect on legal capacity, and accordingly on a contract carried 
out by the imbecile ? 
3.5.1.2 The effects of imbecility on contract 
Before looking at the effects of imbecility on legal capacity and subsequently on 
a contract carried out by the imbecile, it is worth mentioning that such an impediment 
only belongs to one category in the view of the classical jurists. As such, they were not 
concemed to divide imbecility into further sub categories; however there are jurists" 
who tend to include imbecility under the sub-category of insanity where, it can no longer 
74 Al-Mas'aliyyat al-Madaniyyah, p. 124 7 5 H&hiyah Ibn 'Abid; i, vol 2, p. 527, MadjAhliyyat al-$abi', p. 188 
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in my view be termed as imbecility. On the other hand, some modem scholars such as 
Abu Zahrah have differed from the early jurists by classifying imbecility into two 
categories namely; the discerning imbecile (ma'tdh mumayyiz) and non -discemmg 
imbecile (ma'hih ghayr mumayyiz). 76 According to this view, the condition of the 
discerning imbecile in terms of legal capacity is similar to that of a discerning cl-ffld, 
meaning that such an imbecile person still enjoys incomplete legal capacity. As regards 
a non-disceming imbecile his situation is likened to an insane person; hence, he is 
deprived of legal capacity. 
Ths categorization-in my view-, in spite of its rationality with regard to the 
discerning imbecile appears to be of no use as far as the non- discerning imbecile is 
concerned due to the fact that it carries the same effect as insanity; as such, the need to 
give it a different nomenclature is not justifiable . In this respect Mirghindn-i stresses that 
"an imbecile person is he who mevitably, has the ability to discern without which he is 
considered to be insane". 
77 
Having said this, with regard to a contract entered into by the imbecile, jurists are 
not agreed on this particular issue. The majority of 
juriStS78 such as the Ma-liki, Shafi'i 
and Hanbali hold that such a contract is null and void, hence, equating it to that issuing 
from an insane person. The Hanafi on the other hand, relate a contract carried out by the 
imbecile to that issuing from a discerning child . 
79 Therefore, if the contract is purely 
beneficial it will be valid even without the consent of the guardian. Likewise, for purely 
harmful contracts such as giving a gift, such contracts are considered void regardless of 
76 Al-Milkiyyah wa Nazariyyat al-'Aqd, p. 276 
" Al-Hidjyah Sharh Bidgyat al-Mubtadl, vol 3, p. 280, 
'8AI-Sharfi al-Kabirr, vol 3. p. 292, Mughnlal-Muht, @ý, vol 2. p. 166 
'9 Kashfal-Asrffr, vol 4, pp. 274-275 
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the consent of the guardian. If the contract has potential to be both beneficial and 
harmful,. then its validity will depend on the ratification of the guardian. From the 
foregoing discussion regarding the classification of the imbecile, I am inclined to prefer 
the view of the Hanafi jurists for the very reason given when refuting the kind of the non 
discerning imbecile) Otherwise, it would be unfair to differentiate between the imbecile 
and the insane in terms of nomenclature but give the same rules for their action because 
such a differentiation will be of no significance in any juristic discussion. 
3.5.2 The ECC 
The treatment of imbecility in the ECC is not substantially different in term of its 
meaning and effect on legal capacity from its counterpart in Islamic law. Jurists are to a 
great extent influenced by their counterpart in Islamic law in the sense that inasmuch as 
there are differences of opinion among Muslim jurists, the same is true with regard to 
those of the Civil Code. It should be pointed out that the Code itself is silent pertaining to 
the legal meaning of imbecility, leaving the matter to be dealt with by the jurists. 
According to al- Badrawi8o imbecility is the incompleteness of reason-not the 
disappearance- which make one person's speech resembles those of sound mind and 
some others resemble that of the insane, a definition that is clearly copied from Islamic 
- 
'81 ollow modem 
jurists by dividing imbecility law. AI-Sanhiiri in addition, has opted to f 
into discerning and non discerning. These are examples of the meaning of imbecility as 
given by the jurist; the remaining definitions of this term are almost identical to those just 
discussed. 
80 Al-Na,? ariyyN al2Ammah li al-Iltiz&n&, 142, Madi Ahliyyat al-Sabi,, 
-* p. 193 
81 Al-Wasi, vol I, p. 300 
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This said, as far as legal rules relating to the contract of imbecility are concerned, 
it seems that the Code prefers to adopt the view of the majority of Muslim Jurists. This 
means that a contract carried out by the imbecile is similar to that carried out by the 
insane as clearly spelt out in article 114/1 which reads: "a disposal by the insane and the 
imbecile shall be invalid, if such disposal takes place after registration of the interdiction 
ruling" 
This stance taken by the Code has been criticized by a number of jurists due to 
the fact that it would be meaningless to give the same rule for two different things, which 
led some jurists to avoid using the terms insanity and imbecility separately; instead, the 
term mental illness is preferred. To this effect Abu al-Khair further argues: 
I have preferred to use the term mental illnesses instead of al insanity and 
imbecility because of the similarities of their legal effect, in the sense that being 
affected by either of them will remove a person's the ability to discern. On top of 
this, those affected are to be interdicted resulting in the voidance of their legal 
acts after such interdiction has been registered". 82 
In fact the Preliminary Draft of the Code had opted to use the same terrmnology 
before being changed during Senate discussion without any valid reason 83 Article 76 of 
the Draft stipulates that a person devoid of legal capacity due to infancy or mental illness 
is not fit to exercise his civil rights. Perhaps what prompted the review committee to 
amend the wording -as in the existing code- is because they were influenced by Islamic 
law; yet the motive remains questionable since Muslim jurists (especially those of the 
Hanafi), apart from distinguishing between insanity and imbecility in terms of their 
meaning have also given different legal rules to both, whereas this is not the case m the 
AN! al-Khayr, al-Ta 'wid 'an Varar al-Fi'li al-Shakh _'li 'Adin al-Ta k, DAr al-Nahaat al- my-E 
'Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1994, p. 5 
, yah 
li al-Qqn Cm al-Madam, vol 1, p357. See Majm aat al-A 'mg al-TaWky 
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approach of the ECC. It seems that the Review Committee has adopted the view of the 
majority, which is not practical enough to address matters arising from the state of 
imbecility. 
This said, having adrnitted that the Code does not differentiate between insanity 
and imbecility concerning their legal effect, needless to say the effect of a contract 
carried out by the imbecile would be similar to that of the insane; thus, what applies to 
insanity will also apply to imbecility. 
84 In the light of the present discussion, it is 
suggested that article of 114/1 be amended and that the Code should adopt the view of 
Islamic law or to be exact,, the Hanafi'ý view in order to make the ruling both more 
practical and enforceable and the view of medical experts should at the same time be 
consulted for this purpose. 
3.6 Summary 
Although insanity is considered to be one of the impediments to legal capacity, 
the concept is not definite as it is treated differently from three perspectives: Islamic law, 
the ECC and medicine. Islamic law recognizes several kinds of insanity namely; regular, 
irregular, and continuous as well as intermittent insanity. Jurists are unanimously agreed 
that the existence of continuous insanity will remove a person's legal capacity and 
consequently all his disposal will be interdicted. However in the case of intermittent 
insanity, if a contract is concluded during a period of recovery it will be valid as if it 
issued from a sane person. In the ECC, apart from similarities to Islamic law there are 
also differences between the two in that the Code does not divide insanity into categories, 
which has led to confusion in giving legal rules of an act carried out by the insane. in 
84 See pp. 108-113 
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addition, the Code is more concerned with procedures to determine whether a person 
should be considered insane or not. Imbecility, another impediment is treated along with 
insanity; however, the effect of it existence is sirrUlar to that of insanity in the ý! Iew of 
Muslim jurists with the exception of the Hanari. . The ECC, on the other hand, has 
differentiated between insanity and imbecility in terms of terminology but has 
un ustifiably given the same rules to both of them. i 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONCEPT OF PRODIGALITY( SAFAH) 
AND ITS EFFECTS ON CONTRACT 
4.1 Introduction 
Much space has been devoted to differing legal perspectives as to the concept of 
prodigality( safah)'; while prodigality itself is generally regarded as one of the 
impediments to legal capacity, there are certain aspects involving 'human rights' to be 
considered. In the same way, scholars in elaborating this concept of prodigality have 
frequently related it to the doctrine of 'preserving property' in Islamic laW2. In addition, 
although the word sufahj' (plr safih) is clearly mentioned in the Qur'dn as m (2: 5) 
whereby Allah says: "To the sufaha'(the prodigals), make not over your property which 
God hath made a means of support for you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and 
speak to them words of kindness and justice", the exact meaning of the word remains 
disputable. Therefore, questions such as interdiction on the prodigal especially in 
financial affairs are considered to be the crux and core of the present study. This chapter 
is thus devoted to the thorough examination of this concept from both Islamic law and 
the ECC perspectives. In so doing, the investigation will centre on every aspect of the 
1 It is important to note that as far as financial matters are concerned the nearest English 
equivalent to the Arabic word safah is prodigality which is literally defined by Oxford Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary as spending money or resources too freely. p. 923, However, since the word 
safah from literal point of view does not necessarily mean prodigality, for the purpose of 
linguistic discussion the Arabic term safah and its derivatives will be maintained in this chapter. 
The English equivalent 'prodigality' and it derivatives will be used when no literal discussion is 
involved. 
2 Needless to say that the rules relating to ' property' in Islamic law are so important that the 
Qur'An and the Sunnah as well as the work of jurists have emphasized how property should be 
administered. Among others Islamic law has classified property into several categories such as 
movable property and immovable property, public property and private property an so on. The 
relationship between human beings and wealth has been the concern of Islamic law in the sense 
that it provides modes by which property is acquired. These modes of acquisition include -. I- 
claiming commonly accessible property ii-contracts iii-succession iv- derivation from owned 
property. Similarly, Islamic law has governed the means by which a person can legally dispose 
of his property. For detail see, AN! Zahrah, al-Milkiyyah, p 47 onwards, Al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al- 
Islkni (English edition) vol 2, p. 433 onwards. 
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concept; issues will then be extracted as worthy of discussion. The notion of prodigality 
will be examined together with its effect on legal capacity and consequently on contract, 
but above all, the concept of interdiction on spendthrift will be fully analysed. 
4.2 The notion of prodigality 
4.2.1 Definition 
4.2.1.1 Islamic law 
Unlike other impediments, in terms of literal meaning, the Arabic word safah 
requires quite lengthy elucidation, for its legal meaning depends very much on how the 
word is linguistically understood. As will be seen later, this linguistic unease has 
contributed to the disagreement among jurists in interpreting the term safA (prodigal) 
This is evident from Oussama's statement when he insists that " examination of the 
Qur'dn served to correct my initial surprise at the sharp difference between the meaning 
of the term safA in its traditional Arabic and technical legal contexts -)ý3 
Lexically, the word safah which has a primarily moral and spiritual connotation is 
used in the Arabic language with various meanings; inter alia it means shallowness 
(khiffah), motion (ýarakah) ignorance 6aho and lack of deep understanding4. It is said 
for example, safaha al-rlh al ghum (the wind put the branches in motion) 5 According to 
some lexicographers the word has also the apparent meaning of improper language 
' Oussama Arabi, Studies in Modem Islamic law and Jurisprudence, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague/ London/ Newyork, 2001 p. 10 1 
4 Al-Qtn Cu al-MuPit, p. 1247, DsAn al-'Arab, vol 6, p. 87 
5 Lane, Edward William, Arabic English Lexicon, William and Norgate, London/ Edinburgh, 
1863, p. 13 76 
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(badhj'ah) and infidelity (kufr). All these meanings indicate that sqfah is a common 
word used for -jahl, khiffah and naqy (incompleteness) 
When it comes to legal meaning it seems that the vast majority of jurists have not 
related these literal meanings to their own definitions,, rather for them the term safah 
seems to be more related to wastefulness (Ysrq)ý and extravagance( tabdhr). In other 
words as put by Oussama , 
it was this sense of the word that came to prevail in 
mainstream classical Sunni jurisprudence, where a semantic equivalent was established 
between the safjh and the mubadhdhir (wastrel)6 . To verify how these two become 
synonymous, it is worth looking at the literal meaning of safah and safih so that we may 
find whether there is justification in relating safah to extravagance. 
Broadly speaking safah is 'shallowness' in human beings causing them to act 
against reason in spite of its existence. This implies that all unlawful deeds, be they in 
religious or worldly matters are considered as safah because they are against reason, 
based on the maxim that all legal rules in Islamic law are in line with reason. The 
relationship between the literal meaning of safah and the above mentioned is quite clear 
7 in the sense that there is shallowness (khiffah) in the mind of the safA . Thus, according 
to this meaning, those who commit adultery, drink alcohol and squander wealth can be 
termed as safjh. 
Nonetheless,, the meaning of safah from a jurisprudential point of view has later 
been narrowed down to cover only financial aspects as can be seen from the following 
6 Studies in Modem Islamic law and Jurisprudence, p. 10 1 
' $5lih, Sudd Ibnah-un, Ahk&n Taýarrqf& al-Safih f! al-Sharlat a1-Is1&niyyah, Tih&nah, Jeddah, 
1984,1' edition,, p. 19 
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definitions. Al- Zayla'i of the Ijanafi for example defines 'prodigal' as a person who is 
extravagant and spendthrift in spending, disposes of property aimlessly, and is unable to 
.8a manage trading The same meaning can be found in the M jallah where it is stated that 
the prodigal is a person who spends his wealth on what he is not supposed to, and is 
extravagant in spending and wasteful in property; those who are easily cheated and 
exploited in their buying and selling in such a way as to demonstrate that they do not 
have sufficient knowledge In trading due to their shallowness are also considered as 
s ufa h S'. 9 The ShWilo define prodigal as he who wastes his wealth while the Malikill 
put it as non-protection of wealth, together with and spending on unlawful things, while 
the Hanbali 12 have pinpointed the act of extravagance itself as their specific definition. 
Having agreed that safah is only confined to financial matters which are based on 
the Qur'dn (4: 5) which reads; "To those who are weak of understanding make not over 
your property which Allah hath made a means of support for you" in which the word 
amwil(property) is clearly stated, jurists still differ in determining who exactly is meant 
by the word safl, as some attribute this term to the insane and the minor and some others 
to prodigal adults and women as well as the orphan. While (4: 5) of the Qur'dn is 
conclusive in forbidding the handover of property to the safih, the term safh itself as 
used in this verse is not conclusive; attempts to interpret it have thus given risen to a 
diversity of views. The majority of jurists hold that safih is a weak minded adult whereas 
AH Hanifah maintains that saf1h is in fact a minor. Thus, failing an exact definition, 
' Cited from Afik&n Tayarruffft al-Safh, p. 21 
9 Art 946 
loMughnial-Mupti! ý, vol 2, p. 165 
" Mawahib al-Jall, vol 5, p. 64 
12 Al-Mughni vol 4 p. 295 
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in order to reach the nearest meaning of the word, reference should be made to a number 
of sources in which the word appears. Referring to the Qur'dn, the word safah and its 
derivatives appear in eleven places, nine of which concern 'aqilah (beliefs) carrying the 
connotation of stupidity, ignorance and shallowness of mind such as in (2: 13) where 
Allah says: " Nay of surety they are the fools (sufahj') but they do not know". As for 
worldly matters these are referred to in the Qur'dn (2: 282) wherein Allah says: " If the 
party liable is mentally deficient (saf1han) or weak or unable to dictate, let his guardian 
dictate faithfully", here exegesis have differed in expositions of the intended meaning, as 
some refer to the term safih as signibýing a minor. Al- Qurtub-i however, states that such 
an interpretation is incorrect since the safjh could be an adult. He further argues that 
minority is not possible here due to the fact that safah is kind of reprimand to which a 
minor would not be exposed. 13 This is also the case in (4: 5) where exegesis as reported 
by al-Ja§ýaý differ as regard the safjh; some take this term to refer to women while others 
take it to denote orphans 
14 
Al-Jagas on the other hand,, has attempted to reconcile these differing meanings 
by reverting to the literal sense of this term. He argues that "the Quran uses the word 
safah in several places some of which relate to religious matters while others relate to 
worldly matters[... ] however, all usage of safah encompasses ignorance, for example a 
safih in religious matters is he who is ignorant of such matters, Likewise safiz in property 
(amwil) is he who is ignorant of how to protect his property"15 
13 Tafsir al-Qur ' 
tubj, vol 5, p3O 
AI-Jaý§dý, Abmad bin ' Afi, edited by Mubanunad $Rdiq Qambdwi, Aýkft al-Qur', 7m . Ddr 
lhya' al-Turdth a12Ambi, Beirut, 1405 H, vol 2, p. 213 
'5 Ahk&n al-Qur', fn, vol 2, p. 214 
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In other words, al-Ja! ýýds suggests that among the various literal meanings of 
safa , ignorance 6ahl)is commonly shared by the Qur'an. Nevertheless, his theory can 
still be rebutted if we accept that the word SafA is also used for the infidel due to a 
quality of stubbornness rather than ignorance. Another jurist, Ibn liazm has offered 
another solution for this semantic problem whereby he holds that safah in Arab usage 
has only three meanings, not four, as follows: the user of bad language, the obstinate 
infidel, and the minor or insane. 16 According to him the word safah in terms of financial 
matters will be always referred to the minor or insane. Nevertheless, a further 
examination of Ibn Ijazm's view has shown his arguments to be untenable for his claim 
that there is consensus that the meaning of safih in the Qur'an (4: 5) is the insane and the 
minor seems to be invalid. This is because, the companions and the early exegeses were 
not agreed on this matter. Furthermore the claim that the word safah is only confimed to 
the three meanings stated appears to be weak since lexicographers have also given other 
meanings to safah such as ignorance 6aho and decepfion(inkhidi 17 
Moving to the usage of the word safah in the Sunnah, there is no doubt that the 
word has been used to denote different meanings. For instance, the Prophet PBUH was 
reported to have said "walgin al-kibr man safta al-ýaqq ", where the word is used here 
to denote ignorance 18 In addition , when the 
Prophet PBUH died, 'Aishah was reported 
as saying Because of my safah and my age, I inflicted damage on my 
face.. " 19Undoubtedly what is meant by safah here is not a state of minority, because this 
6 In Uazm, 'All- bin Aýmad, al-MupallgDgr al-Afffq al-Jadidah, Beirut, n. d, vol 8, p. 287 
17 Al-Qkn as al-Mubj4 p. 1247 
"Mabda'al-Rifig, vol I, p. 336 
'9 Musnad Ahmadedited by Atimad. Muhammad Sh5kir, Dgr al-Ma'. ffrif li al-Nashr wa al- 
Tibdah, 1949 3dedition, vol 6, p. 274 
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latter term was used together with safah in this Hadjh. Moreover, 'A'Ishah was no 
longer a child at the time of the death Prophet's PBUH death. 
From the preceding discussion, it can be concluded that as far as the Quranic 
verse (4: 5) is concerned, the word safih is used to denote he who has shallowness of 
reason ( khqfýal-aql), that is to say 'a prodigal adult' as is the view held by the majority 
of jurists. Although, it may be argued that a minor is also categorised as possessed of 
incomplete reason (njqiy al 'aql), the rules relating to others who lack of reason such as 
the minor and the insane are mentioned elsewhere in the Qur'dn and Sunnah and also in 
the work of jurists including those who maintain that safih carries the meaning of minor. 
As such,, to provide another rule would be redundant and meaningless. In spite of this, 
there are scholars such as al-Razi who seem to reconcile the different meanings of sajbh. 
According to him, the safjh is a prodigal person; hence any one who is not good at 
07 includes women, children, orphans and preserving wealth is considered to be sa This 
the like. 20 Nevertheless, this suggestion is still somewhat unconvincing as it only gives 
the criteria of safah, i. e overspending not the saf; 2 himself 
This said, in the light of the above discussion safah may be safely defined as 
shallowness of reason (khiffah) causing a person to dispose of his property in 
unreasonable manner; this definition indicates that safah is shallowness rather than defect 
of reason, and as such both the insane and the minor are excluded. Similarly, safah is 
confined to dealing with property, hence, other matters cannot be legally considered as 
safjh from a jurisprudential point of view although from a literal point of view the term 
20 Tafs., ý al-R&-i, vol 9, p. 185 
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safah is used for both financial and non financial matters. Furthermore, the disposal of 
property must be against reason, otherwise it cannot be regarded as the act of safah. 
4.2.1.2 The ECC 
While there is no provision in the ECC for defining the meaning of safah, , 
it can 
however be found in the work of jurists and judicial rulings. In their attempt to put a legal 
definition to the term the Civil law jurists seem to follow what has been done by their 
counterparts in Islamic law, although unlike Islamic law the concept in the ECC is only 
concerned with financial affairs. Albeit there are a variety of definitions advanced by the 
juriStS, 21 there is nevertheless a common sense that the prodigal (safiz) is a person who 
wastes his wealth again reason, whether such waste is on good or bad thingS22 Apart from 
the ECC,, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Law of Guardianship Over Property of 
1952 has defined safah as shallowness in a person which causes him to do something 
again reason and law, 23a definition which is in toto copied from Bazdaw-l's definition. In 
addition the EgCC has given a slightly different meaning to safah when it held that safah 
is a condition causing a person to squander his property and destroy it in a manner 
" For instance, Ahmad Salamah defines prodigality as squandering property in unreasonable 
manner, see al-Madkhal p. 65, Jamil Sharqawi defines it as an ignorance of how to protect and 
manage one's property which leads to squandering and wasting against reason, Durdsfl Osal al- 
Qjnan, p. 337, Hukm al-tasarrufa-t aI-Qdm7niyyah, p. l23, Abd Wadfld defines it as a person who 
wastes his wealth in unacceptable manner according to reason and law even in good things, 
Mabddi al-Qdnfin, p. 272 
22 Abd al-Bdql-, Nazariyyat al-Haqq, p. 119, al-Safah wa al-ghaflah, p. 92. The Memoranduni 
fiu-ffier elaborates " The concept of prodigality is not systematic (mundabitah) , rather 
it depends 
on a certain approach (mi 'yari) which is judged by societal experiment and the custom of the 
people. This concept is generally based on abuse of rights; prodigality may be a result of a 
person's act contradicting the Sharlah such as gambling, as it may also result from desires ( 
hawd) even in a lawful way such as overspending in donation, see, Madi Ahliyyatt al-Sabil p. 
273 
2' As quoted from Marqus, al-Madkhal Ii al-WIFffn al-Qan aniyyjfi, p. 5 72 
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24 wainst reason and law(Sharý This is reinforced in a later ruling when the Court 
maintains that Prodigal is a person who wastes his wealth aimlessly in the opinion of the 
expe 
25 
Despite the clarity of the above defmition, the word Shar' as appears thereM does 
not refer specifically to Islamic law or Civil law or indeed to either. However, I am 
inclined to interpret Shar' in these definitions as referring to Islamic law (Shari A 
Isldmiyyah), the reason being that if the Civil law is meant, then the jurists tend to use the 
term law ( qzlnfin) instead of the word Shar'. 26 This leads in turn to the conclusion that 
the treatment of the ECC regarding the meaning of prodigality is taken completely from 
that of Islamic law with slight modification of the wording. 27 It can also be concluded 
that prodigality does not affect a person's mind in a manner comparable with insaruty, 
but its existence will affect that person's judgment in managing and administering his 
weal . 
28 
" EgCC, cas. no 2, dated 7/4/1955 
25EgCC cas. no. 2, dated 20/6/1957. It is to be noted that in this later ruling the criterion by which 
a person is judged to be prodigal depends on the perception of experts, there is no contradiction 
to the earlier ruling in which the criteria depends on reason and law, as expert opinions (ahl al- 
dir, ffyah) are always supposed to follow these two (reason and shar) 
26 Although it may be argued that the term reason ( aql) impliedly includes shar' since there 
should be no contradiction between two, thus, the word shar' is needless, the same is true if we 
interpret that shar' is the law as it also should not be a contradiction between reason and law. 
27 Perhaps the only difference is the concept of safah in Islamic law also covers non financial 
matters such as safah in religion whereas in the Civil Code the terin is only confined to matters 
relating to property and finance. 
2'Ahmad Salamah, al-Madkhal, p. 66 
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4.2.2 Phenomena of prodigality 
4.2.2.1 Islamic law 
Tluoughout evidence from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, jurists have concluded that 
there exist certain criteria which when applied A411 determine whether a person may be 
deemed to be prodigal. These criteria are also known as phenomena of prodigality( 
ma. Ohir al-safah), encompass three aspects namely; wastefulness (tabdhk), favouritism 
(muffibA), and sinftdness (fisq) 
4.2.2.1.1. Wastefulness ftabdhiý) 
7 
Tabdhr and isrdf in normal usage are interchangeable terms; the former means 
transgressing the limit in every human act especially when that act involves spending as 
in the Qur'dn( 17: 26) " But squander not your wealth in the manner of a spendthrift". 
while isrif refers to the distribution of wealth unwisely as in(25: 67) which reads: "Those 
who when they spend are not extravagant and not niggardly but hold a just balance 
between those extremes". Technically, ignorance of the place of rights and ignorance of 
quantity of right refer to tabdhir and isrif respectively. In this respect al-Mdwardi 
explains "tabdhir is spending unwisely where it is not merited, while isrAf is spending 
excessively i. e more that necessary', 29 
Jurists are not agreed on the kind and degree of spending by which a person is 
regarded as wastrel (mubadhdhir)or extravagant (musrifi, and subsequently as prodigal. 
WI-ffle some such as the Hanafi and the Mdlik-i opine that every form of spending which 
goes against reason whether in permissible areas or not is wastefulness , thus causing 
29 Nihffyat al-MuPtg, vol 4, p. 361 
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the spender to be interdicted , others such as the Shaffli specify only spending on 
impermissible things in order for wastefulness to be demonstrated. For instance, 
spending money on gambling and drinking wine is wastefulness regardless of the amount 
spent, as al-Jamal of the Shdfi'i further elucidates: 
" the act of throwing property into the sea no matter how trivial that property may 
be,, or spending on unlawful things is considered to be act of prodigality, The 
same is true if a person borrows money to spend on permissible things in spite of 
his awareness that he will be unable to repay the debt. However, it is not 
considered prodigality if the spending involves lawful things such as buying 
clothes, food or presents even if such spending does not match one's status, this is 
because the purpose of wealth is to be utilised as long as this is in permissible 
areas. , 30 
From this statement, it appears that the fundamental criteria for judging whether 
wastefulness can be said to exist is when spending involves unlawful aspects. This view 
is also shared by Ibn Ijazm except where he adds that if spending on lawful items will 
lead to poverty then the state of prodigality exists. In this regard he states: 
" Every sale for the purpose of eating, clothing, and riding and every donation 
for the manumission of slaves is permissible provided that wealth is maintained, 
and every spending causing poverty is extravagance and wastefulness, as such it 
is void and illegal. The same rules apply to every act of spending involving things 
such as wine"31 
interestingly, each school has come up with textual evidence to support their 
views. The Shdfi'i jurists for example have quoted the Qur'dn ( 2: 261) which reads "the 
parable of those who spend their substance in the way of God is that of a grain of com; it 
growths seven ears and each ears hath a hundred grains" They argue that this 
Quranic 
verse has called for spending in the way of Allah and has encouraged people to give 
charity. 
30 H&hiyat al-Jamalvol 3, p. 339 quoted from al-Safah wa al-Ghaflah, p. 
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31 AI-Muýallg vol 8, p. 290 
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However, while accepting this argument, the verse neither implies nor states the 
quantity one should spend, nor does it indicate approval or refusal if spending in the Nvay 
of Allah should lead to poverty. The Hanafi who hold that the term prodigality 
encompasses all kind of extravagance including that which is permissible, even for 
example, for building a mosque have invoked several Quranic verses to support their 
view. inter alia, in ( 17: 29) the Qur'dn commands: " Make not your hand tied(like a 
niggard) to your neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach so that that you become 
blameworthy and destitute" while in (25: 67) the Qur'an says: " 'Mose who when they 
spend, are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just (balance) between those 
(extremes) 
It appears that the Hanafi view is preferable in this regard where every type of 
overspending is considered a kind of prodigality irrespective of the nature of such 
spending be it lawful or unlawful. The reason for preferring this view is that, the verse 
from which the Shafi'i argue is very general in contrast with the two very specific verses 
on which the Hanafi base their reasoning. Further weight is given to this latter argument 
Dy the narration from the prophet concerning Sdad bin Abi Waqqdý in which the Prophet 
PBUH said: it is better for you to leave your heirs in richness rather than poverty begging 
people to feed theM. 
32 
" Narrated by Mdlik in his Muwal. b', tbdih no. 73 5 
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4.2.2.1.2 Does favouritism(ntuýjbjh) constitute prodigality? 
The term means to prefer one person to another in financial dealing. This occurs 
in a sale for instance when a person sells his property to another at a price lower than the 
market price, or if such a person buys something from another at a price higher than that 
of the market. Here the jurists have concluded that such an act would not constitute 
prodigality provided that the seller (in the first example) or the buyer (in the second) is 
aware of the market price. The argument is that if such an act is considered act of 
prodigality, it is more worthy to give contracts such as gift (hibah) the rules of 
prodigality since they involve no exchanges of property. To this effect al-Jaý§a says: (( 
.... the same applies as regards a sale 
in a way of favouritism (muhihah) whereby no 
wastefulness is incurred. This is because if favourifism is considered as wastefulness 
such favouritism should be prohibited to everyone; similarly the same rule applies to 
gift,, 33 
However, in the event that the person who favours one to another (mubjbi) is 
ignorant of the market price , then there exists a state of 
deception (ghubn) a recurrence 
of which will constitute prodigality. It is thus clear from the aforesaid statement that the 
deciding factor as to whether prodigality exists or not is determined by the awareness of 
the contracting parties or to be precise the one who prefers one person to another. 
Nevertheless, in my view, since the purpose of conducting such a sale is to give 
preference to one buyer rather than another for whatever reason , the question of 
wastefulness and subsequently favouritism should not arise in tl-iis context regardless of 
the pricing factors. To put it differently, whether or not the muýjbj is aware of the market 
" Afik&n al-Qur'&7, vol, 2. p. 220 
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price makes no difference in determining the existence of prodigality. As such the sale by 
way of favouritism is not an element of prodigality, because if we allow a gift from the 
muhjbi, the same also should be allowed in the sale. 
4.2.2.1 . 3- Does miserliness (Shuhh), cupidity (buklil) and meanness (taqtir), 
constitute prodigality 
All these terms denote the opposite meaning of wastefulness; generally they mean 
to refrain from spending wealth, even though some jurists have made a distinction 
between bukhl and shubb in the sense that the latter is more mean as it is a quality which 
if it exists in a person would prevent him from spending even in his interest. This has 
been touched on by the Qur'dn in (25: 67 ). 
Commenting on this verse al-Zamakhshari states: 
"This is the likening (of two opposite attributes) between the restraint of the 
miserly and the spending of the extravagant. The Qur'dn has commanded the 
faithful to a take the rniddle way between extravagance and miserliness.... this is 
because in the case of the extravagant those in need ( but who did not receive of 
the proffigacy from the extravagant person) would complain by saying that this 
extravagant person gives to such and such but not to me... ý-ý34 
Having admitted that these are opposite qualifies from which a Muslim is 
prohibited the question arises as to whether the Sharlah has provided certain measures to 
be taken when dealing with the miser as it has with regard to the spendthrift. In other 
words, does miserly (shahk) consist of elements which may be regarded as prodigal and 
which are subject to interdiction? To answer this question, at first glance it may sound 
strange to label those who do not spend their wealth as prodigal, since-as previously 
defined- the words safah and its derivatives as far as financial matters are concerned are 
34 Al-Kashshif, vol 1, p. 663, from al-Safah wa al-Ghaflah, p. 131 
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more confined to a state of extravagance or overspending. However, interestingly fis 
issue has been a matter of disagreement among jurists. To be exact they have differed as 
to whether miserliness is to be treated equally with wastefulness in terms of imposing 
inter iction. Some jurists such as al-Jassa-s are of the opinion that no interdiction can be 
imposed on a miserly person; as such, according to him, if a person leaves his plant 
without water or leaves his house without maintenance the authorities have no right to 
force him to spend his wealth for that purpose. 35 Some Hanbali 36 on the other hand such 
as al-Azji opine that a miserly person should be interdicted , thus equating wastefulness 
to miserliness. However this view seems to have no convincing evidence as it contradicts 
the literal meaning of prodigality (safah) and interdiction themselves. 
4.2.2.1.4. Does sinfulness(fisq) in religion constitute prodigality and interdiction? 
If a person is sinful (fisiq), would that affect his financial disposal? In other 
words, will sinfulness in religion necessarily signify prodigality ? Al-Shirazi, a ShdfCi 
scholar, states that if a person attains puberty with good management of his wealth, but is 
demonstrating sinfulness (fisq) in his religion then interdiction shall continue until he 
shows good conduct in both finance and religion. 37 This in turn means that al-Shirazi has 
imposed a strict condition for the lifting of interdiction from the prodigal as can be 
deduced from his statement, although a person is good at dealing with his property in 
such a way that no extravagance is incurred, such a person still can be nevertheless 
considered as prodigal if his religious character is reprehensible. In my view, it appears 
that there is something of a contradiction in this judgment with regard to the purpose of 
35 Aýkft al-Qur', 7#7, vol 2, p. 220 
36AI- Murdawl, 'Ali bin Sulayman, al-Ingf, Ak Ihy, #'al-Tur&h al-Arabi, Beirut, n. d, vol 5, p. 
272 
" Al-Shi-ra-zi, IbrAhim bin 'Ali, al-Muhadhdhab, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, n. d, voll, p. 332 
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interdiction. On the one hand,, al-Shirazi implies that there are those who are good at 
managing their wealth irrespective of their religious status, while on the other he renders 
this of no account if fisq is present in religion. Perhaps realising this discrepancy, has led 
some other Shafi'i scholars to take a middle way in giving legal rules as regards a sinful 
person in religious matters, as for example, al-Ramli argues; "If a person should become 
sinful in religion but not in terms of property after he attains puberty he shall not be 
interdicted... This is because the companions were not reported doing this, however in 
the case of a person who attains puberty in a state of sinfulness the interdiction continues 
as if he has committed wastefulness... , 38 Nonetheless, Us differentiation is still not 
convincing except on the basis that the existence of sinfulness (fisq) in religious matters 
will eventually cause prodigality in financial areas which in turn means imposing 
precautionary legal rules. Nevertheless, although there are conditions in which legal rules 
(, ýukm) are based on precaution this doctrine does not apply here. Perhaps this therefore 
has led the majority of jurists to conclude that sinfulness in the matter of religion cannot 
be considered to be an element of prodigality as is evident from Sarakhsi's statement; " If 
he is sinfulness in religion.... but he protects his wealth no interdiction can be imposed 
because the purpose of interdiction is for property... 
4.2.2.2 The ECC 
So long as the ECC confines prodigality(safah) only to financial matters, the only 
criterion used to determine whether prodigality exists is how wealth is spent. Similar to 
Islamic law the ECC considers prodigality every act of overspending and extravagance 
whether it involves good things or bad tlýngs. In order to determine this, the matter 
3' Nihdyat al- Mubtf, vol 4, p. 365 
39AI-Mab, pZ4 vol 24, p. 183 
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should the be referred to societal experiences and people custom provided that such 
custom does not contravene either reason or SharP ah. 40 It is observed that the religious 
status of the prodigal carries no effect as to the state of prodigality, thus, if a person is 
good at managing his wealth but not good in other respects then the term prodigal does 
not apply to him. It thus seems that the Code has adopted the view of the majonty of 
Muslim jurists in not regarding bad characters in religious matter as a criterion for 
determining prodigality. 
It should be noted that the financial status of a person will have no effect on 
determining prodigality if his wealth is wasted in desires (shahawit), 41 meaning that if a 
rich person should spends a small portion of his wealth in desires, such an act is 
considered prodigality even though his financial status is not affected. This is what was 
held by the EgCC when it stressed that the purpose of interdiction is to protect the 
property of the prodigal. 42 In addition, the EgCC has also held that "a person who 
prefers his small children to his other children as well as one of his wives to the others, in 
terms of property, cannot be called prodigal, since this preference does not contravene 
either reason or Shar'.. (in this case) the disposal made by such a person is valid with or 
without exchange. This is because his act is based on his concern to guarantee the future 
of his small children and their mother, and not to waste his wealth; rather such an act is 
more seen to protect property... the Sharfib does not forbid a person from disposing of 
'OAI-Safah wa al Ghaflah, p. 98 
" The term shahawN means unbearable inclination toward something, this includes material 
desires and sexual desires. See al-Mundwi, Muhammad 'Abd al-Ra'ilf, al-Ta', ffrý, edited by 
Mubammad Ridwdn al-Ddyah, Ddr al-Fikr, Beirut, 1410 H, I 't edition, vol 1, p. 441 
" Madkiir, Maboith al-Hukm, p. 308, This is in accordance with the view of the majority of 
Muslim jurists whereas the Shdfici are of the opinion that the purpose of interdiction is to punish 
the prodigal. 
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his property either all or some , to one of his heirs for legal purposes even if this will 
lead to denying this property to another of his heirs. , 
43 
It appears that what was decided here to a great extent concurs with the doctrine 
of Muffibih in Islamic law which I have preferred not to count it as element of 
prodigality, although it is not recommendable to do this based on factors other than 
prodigality. As such this ruling from the EgCC in my view should not be widely 
interpreted as giving the green light to prefer some heirs to others; rather the ruling 
should only be looked at from prodigality point of view in that such disposition of 
property is not prodigality, since prodigality is one factor while preference is quite 
another. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the term prodigal applies orily to the prodigal adult, 
since the Code has separately governed rules relating to the minor and the insane. As 
such, a person under twenty one year old cannot be interdicted on the grounds of 
prodigality since this age has been fixed as the age of majority in the Code itself It 
seems that the Code has thus followed the majority of Muslim jurists in confming the 
meaning of prodigal as that of prodigal adult. 
" EgCC, cas. no. 2, dated 20/6/1957 
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4.3. Interdiction44on the prodigal (saf%) 
4.3-1. Islamic law 
Inasmuch as there are different views regarding the meaning of prodigality, the 
legal rules conceming whether the prodigal is subject to interdiction are also a matter of 
juristic debate between those who legalise interdiction and those who oppose it. The 
diversity of opinion in this is obvious even among jurists who belong to the same school 
of thought. When discussing matters relating to interdiction on the prodigal the jurists 
generally divide them into two categories; namely, prodigality accompanying puberty 
and prodigality occurring after the age of prudence details of which are in the following 
headings. 
4.3.1.1 Reaching puberty in a state of prodigality 
Before continuing any further, it is noteworthy that apart from elaborating aspects 
of interdiction on the prodigal, the jurists have also en passant touched on legal rules 
conceming the 'handover of property' to the prodigal which stems from their 
understanding of the Qur'dn (4: 5) which reads: " If then ye find sound judgment in them 
release their property to them". The relationsfiýp between interdiction and prevention of 
handing over property is so close that some jurists have combined their arguments in 
advancing both concepts as can be seen from the following discussion. 
To begin with, based on the Qur'an (4: 5), jurists are unanimously agreed that 
when a person attains the age of puberty in a state of prodigality, it is not permissible to 
" On the meaning of interdiction see chapter three, p. 10 1 onwards 
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hand over his wealth. However, differences of opinion arise as to when such a 
prohibition ends; or in other words, will the existence of prodigality prevent the property 
from being surrendered to the prodigal permanently as long as the state of prodigality 
remains? The affirmative answer to this question is held by the majority of juriStS45 . 
hence, according to them, a prodigal adult would not be allowed to take over his property 
until he becomes prudent (rashjý) irrespective of his age. Abu Hanifidi46 on the other 
hand,, has fixed upon a period after which the hanclover of property to the prodigal is 
permissible. In his opinion, when a person reaches the age of twenty five, he can no 
longer be prevented from taking over his property whether he is prudent or prodigal. It is 
not clear on what basis Abu Hanifah has fixed upon this age, except for the claim that in 
attaining the age of twenty five one would have reached the final stage of maturity and 
completeness. Furthermore, the following statement is attributed to 'Umar a person will 
attain maturity when he reaches twenty five years of his age. 47 
This said,, NNrith regard to the interdiction of the prodigal, jurists are divided 
inasmuch as differences of opinion on handing over property exist, thus- as stated 
elsewhere- some of the arguments which apply to the former will also apply to the latter. 
Having followed juristic discussion, we can conclude however that jurists are not agreed 
as regards the interdiction of the prodigal adult. According to some, interdiction is 
permissible on such a prodigal until he becomes prudent. Amongst the jurists who belong 
to this group are the Maliki, Sha-fii, Hanballi and most of the Hanari. 48 On the other 
hand, Abu Hanifah opines that no interdiction could be imposed on a prodigal adult; as 
" Ibn Rusd, Mubammad bin Aýmad, Bidffyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihffyat al-Muqtagd, Dffr al-Fikr 
, Beirut, n. d, vol 2, p. 210 46Bad, ff 'I al-$ang'i, vol 7, p. 171 
"Mabda'al-Riý(, §, vol 1, p. 320 
48 H&hiyat al-Dusi7ql - vol 3, p. 292, Mughnj-'al-MuhtN, vol 2 Ip. 
166, al-Mughni, vol 4, pp. 295 -296 
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such he is free to dispose of his property. The same view is reported from jurists such as 
Ibn Sirin and lbrdWim al-Nakha c 1.49 
In asserting their views each group have invoked a number of arguments from the 
Qur'dn and the Sunnah as well as reason. The majority of jurists for their part have cited 
the fbHowing evidence to support their view; 
I- The Qur'an (2: 282) says: " If the party liable is mentally deficient, or weak or 
unable to dictate, let his guardian dictate faithfully" The verse thus indicates that 
Allah has imposed a kind of guardianship over the prodigal and the weak who 
are not able to dictate; the legality of guardianship connotes that the prodigal is 
interdicted and not free in his acts including contract, otherwise, the imposition of 
miardianship would be senseless. However, Abu Hanifah and his likes did not Gý-- 
accept the interpretation of prodigal advanced by his opponent, as according to 
him the term prodigal that appears in this verse should refer either to the minor or 
the insane. Moreover, invoking the sarne verse, Abu Han-ifah argued that the 
beginning of verse which reads "0 ye who believe, when ye deal with each other, 
in transaction involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them 
to writing" clearly indicates that the prodigal is allowed to enter into transactions 
without any interdiction and at the same time the claim that the word guardian 
refers to " guardian of the prodigal" (wali ; al-safih) was also refuted ; as it should 
be referred to "guardian of rights" (wali ; al-haqq), or in the context of this verse 
creditors (wali al-dayn) -" 
49 Badj'fal-$anjY, vol 7, pp. 171-172 
50 Afikkn al-Qur'An, vol 2, p. 213 
143 
In response to Abu Han-ifah , the majority of jurists have concluded that he 
has mistakenly interpreted the verse on two points. Firstly, his interpretation of 
the word prodigal (safih) as the insane or the minor is not pertinent in the context 
of the verse due to the fact that these two groups of people have been covered In 
the word 4a'iý (the weak). Furthennore, as argued by al- Khattdb-l, " the Nvord 
safah connotes the meaning of blame and rebuke for which the minor is not 
liable because he has not yet attained puberty, at which point a person is 
responsible for his acts. As such, the word prodigal should more pertinently cover 
the prodigal adult. Secondly, with regard to Abu Hanifah preference's of the 
meming of wali ; al-haq (creditors) rather than wali 7. al-safiz( guardian), it has 
been rebut that such a usage is not common in the Arabic language. To this effect 
Ibn 'Arabi stresses " It can be constructed wall al-safih or wali al-gb'#- , not 
walial-haqq, instead we say sAhib al-haqq , 52 
2-Another Quranic verse relating to interdiction on the prodigal can also be 
found in (4: 5). The Qur'an reads " To those who are weak of understanding make 
not over your property which God hath made a means of support for you, but feed 
and clothe them therewith, and speak to them the words of kindness and Justice". 
The meaning of this verse in the view of the majority of jurists is that the 
guardians should not deliver up wealth to the prodigal because this latter would 
be extravagant in spending it. Instead , it 
is incumbent upon the guardian to 
manage such wealth to the advantage of their wards in matters relating to 
clothing, food, shelter and the like. 53 To put it simply the doctrine of interdiction 
51 Tafur al-QurAib-i,, vol 5, p. 30 
52 Ahk&n al-Qur', fn, , vol 1, p. 251 5'Bahthflal-gajrp. 170 
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is manifested here. Nonetheless, as in the previous verse, Abu Hanhh was not 
convinced by this mterpretation and his argument here is two fold; one strand of 
which regards the meaning of the word prodigal itself and the other how his 
opponents interpret the word property (amwg) in this verse. As the first of these 
has been previously dealt with, the discussion will therefore be limited to the 
second aspect. According to Abu Hanifah, even though this verse shows the non- 
delivery of property to the prodigal, fis does not necessarily mean they are 
interdicted with regard to contracts such as sale. In addition, the pronoun (kum) 
in the phrase amwAlakum (your property) refers to the guardian not to the 
prodigal due to the fact that this verse is addressed to the guardian. He further 
argues that it is not possible that the commandment (khitýb) is meant for the 
prodigal because this latter is not fit to receive it. In reply to this criticism, the 
majority hold that the Qur'an has metaphorically related the property of the 
prodigal to the guardian because they have the right to administer this property, 
not that they are the real owner since there are differences between the two, as in 
the Quranic phrase (4: 29): "wali taqtuh7 anfusakurn "(do not kill yourselVeS)54. 
Furthermore, if we were to accept Abu Hanifidi's argument that property refers 
to the guardian, then the property of the prodigal should not be handed over to 
him in the first place. 
55 
3-It is narrated by Anas bin Malik that during the time of the Prophet PBUH 
there was a man whose mind was weak involved in selling. His relative came to 
the Prophet PBUH and said: 0 Messenger of Allah, interdict on such and such 
" (4: 29) Admittedly, a person does not kill himself, but can kill another as if they were one 
person. The Shar. Pah has always considered the believers as one person ; as such it addresses 
every person as it addresses all and vice versa. There are numerous example of this 
Ahkam Ta, ýarMrat al-Safiih, p. 41 
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person because he is selling things in a state of mental weakness, whereupon the 
Prophet PBUH then prohibited the man from selling. The man said I can help 
that, then the Prophet PBUH said: If you are buying say to the seller. No 
cheating', 56 . The ffadih shows that the Prophet PBUH had first wanted to 
interdict the man due to his prodigality. However, Abu Hanifah insists that this 
ffadih does not imply the legality of interdiction since the Prophet PBUH 
eventually allowed the man to be involved in selling and buying. At most, the 
Prophet PBUH has given guidance to the man on how to avoid being cheated 57 
In response, the majority of jurists argue that the retraction of the Prophet PBUH 
on interdiction is proof to the legality of interdiction itself, He would otherwise 
have refused the request from the man's relative at the outset to interdict him. 
4-It is narrated from al- Mughirah that the Prophet PBUH had forbidden the 
51 
wasting of wealth. Since the prodigal squander hisr property, which is forbidden 
I-- - by virtue of this tladih,, there is thus no way to conserve his property except by 
interdicting him. Nevertheless, the deduction that this Yadih justifies the 
imposition of interdiction is not conclusive in the view of some jurists. This is 
because the hadih merely indicates that wasting property is unlawful and there 
are other w-flawful things which do not lead to interdiction. 59 
5-It is also reported that 'Ali bin Abi Talib came to 'Uthmdn bin 'Affan and said 
to him: Abdullah bin Jafar had purchased such and such, I ask you to interdict 
him 
. 
(Upon knowing tMs) Zubayr interfered and told 'Uthman :I was his partner 
in that purchase. 'Uthmdn then replied: How would I impose interdiction on a 
56 Nan-ated by al-Tirmidhi, KitAb al-Buyd, Hadith no 1268 
5'Al-Mabsqtl vol 24, p. 16 1, 
58 Namated by Bukh5n, Kitib al-ZakA 
59 Mabda'al-Riýld, vol I pp. 324-325 
146 
person whose partner is Zubayr? 60 From this narration it is argued that the 
practice of interdiction was both permissible and prevalent among the 
Companions; this would not have been the case had they not heard it from the 
Prophet PBUH himself. Moreover, in this case 'Ali's request would have been 
approved by 'Uthman if Zubayr had not been a partner of Abdullah, meaning that 
interdiction was recognised by the Companions without anyone opposing it 
, which constitutes 'silent consensus' (ijmd sukdti) in the terminology of 
jurisprudence. 
Apart from this textual evidence the majority have also argued that the purpose of 
interdiction on the prodigal, is not only to protect his property, but also to preserve the 
right of the community as a whole in that by leaving the prodigal to squander his wealth 
freely without limitation, will eventually make him destitute, and thus the burden will be 
upon society to manage his affairs. Therefore, by interdicting him any possible harm that 
he may inflict upon society would be removed. 61 
This said, it is interesting to note that those who oppose interdiction (such as Abu 
Hanifah) have also invoked the Qur'an and Sunnah in their argument. Before preferring 
any one view however, it is fair to exan-ýine supporting evidence put forward by Abu 
Hanifah and his like. In (5: 1) the Qur'an reads : "0 those who believe fulfil your 
covenant". The general sense of the verse is to fulfil contract obligation, which Abu 
Hanifah argues does not here distinguish between the prodigal and others; thus although 
the prodigal is extravagant, he is still sane and as such, is fit to receive the legal 
60 Narrated by al- Bayhaq-i in Sunan Kubrg Kitg al-ffajr, gadih no 1133 6 
61 Ahk&n Taýarruf&, al-Sqfih, p. 50 
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commandment( khio). 
62, t seems, however that this verse is either wrongly understood 
or it is taken out of context, for there is no dispute that the verse refers -in general- to 
fulfilling obligation; however this generality has been made more specific in other verses 
to exclude the like of the prodigal. in addition, Abu Han-ifah has also relied on the same 
ffadih regarding interdiction used by the majority of jurists but he interprets differently 
saying that the Prophet PBUH did not interdict the man albeit his mental weakness , 
which connotes that interdiction was not legal in spite of the request from the man's 
relatives. 
63 
Apart from this evidence, in defending his view Abu Han-ifah has engaged in 
what is presently known as 'a human right debate'. He sees that the prodigal adult may 
not be interdicted because the denial of his legal autonomy causes a loss of humanity and 
equating him to animal; this is a greater harm than squandering wealth; but a greater 
harm may not be admitted to alleviate a lesser harm. 64 In this respect Oussama remarks " 
the substantial restriction of legal capacity would exclude the spendthrift adult from true 
membership in the human community, making it impossible for him to participate fully 
in what is genuinely human, the legally sanctified human act. This constitutes an injury 
to his soul,, an injury so grave in Abu Ijanifah's opinion that it overshadows the material 
benefits occasioned by his interdiction"65 
62AI-Hidgyah, vol 3, p. 281 
6'Al-Mabs qt, vol 24, p- 16 1, 
6'Al-Hidjyah, vol 3, p. 281 
65 Studies in Modem Islamic law and Juiisprudence, p. 113 
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More interestingly, perhaps, the argument used by Abu Ijan-ifah is that the 
prodigal is not interdicted in marriage -as accepted by all jurists 66 _ it is therefore 
illogical to interdict him in financial matters in the sense that marriage which is more 
important than contract and should thus be interdicted as such 67 In addifion, if a prodigal 
person admits of committing a crime punishable with prescribed punishment (bad) or 
retaliation (qis&) this admission is valid, and consequently, he is liable for bodily 
punishment. By analogy, Abu Hanifah argues that if the prodigal is free to act in matters 
relating to his body why then should we restrict him in financial affairS68 as according to 
the goal of Shartib life (nafs) takes priority over property(mil) 
Following Abu Hanifah in not imposing interdiction on the prodigal was Ibn 
Hazm; however he differs from the former in not fixing a specific age beyond which a 
66 There is no dispute amongst the jurists that marriage is permissible for the prodigal; however 
before such a contract takes place is it necessary to obtain the consent of the guardian. In this 
case, would a marriage without the consent of the guardian be legally valid and enforceable? 
Jurists are not agreed on this point as according to the Hanafl, the Malikil and Hanball, the 
contract of marriage is valid regardless of the consent of the guardian. They argue that marriage 
is not a financial contract in nature, and that as such the presence of prodigality in a person 
carries no effect. The Shafici, on the other hand maintain that a marriage without the consent of 
the guardian is null and void due to the fact that the contract itself involves dowry which is thus 
considered to be a financial matter. In response to this argurnent however the majority argue that 
even though a marriage contract involves property , the primary purpose of marriage is to protect 
oneself from committing a sin not to obtaiii a dowry. For this reason, they stress that if a prodigal 
person advances an excessive amount of dowry, the dowry should be reduced to an acceptable 
sum while the contract itself nevertheless remains valid. 
In my view, what has been upheld by the majority seems to be in accordance with a 
Hadih in which the Prophet PBUH was reported to have said "0 Young people whoever 
among you has the ability to bear marriage costs he should many as it will protect his eyes ( from 
seeing unlawful things) and protect him from committing a sin" This t1adih clearly stresses that 
the purpose of marriage is to protect one self from committing a sin not to obtain financial 
benefit. Further the ShWil seem inconsistent when they do not allow a contract of sale even with 
the ratification of the guardian while in the case of a marriage contract this consent is regarded as 
necessary. See BadAY a1-SanJ'i, 7, p. 171, Hkhiyat al-Dusi7q. 1, vol 3, p. 297, Al-Mughni, vol 
4, p. 523, Nihgyat al-MuPhý, vol 4, p. 367, Al-Hidffyah, vol 3, p. 283, Al-Shawkiini, Mubammad 
bin cAll, Nayl al-AwAk, DAr al-A7, Beirut, 1973, vol 6, p. 225 
" Abu Zahrah, al-Milkijyah, p. 291 
"'Mabda'al-Rid. j, vol 1, p-319 
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person should not be interdicted. According to Ibn Ham the prodigal is not subject to 
interdiction should he attain puberty with no mental disorder; regardless of his age . 
69As 
mentioned elsewhere, Ibn Hazrn interprets the word prodigal to be the insane or the 
minor as summarised in the following statement: "The interdiction of anyone's financial 
acts is not legally permissible-except those of the minor, and the insane, so long he 
suffers insanity... thus if a minor attain puberty or an insane person recovers, his 
freedom to dispose of his wealth is lawful, like that of any other person; no distinction in 
this regard is allowed between the freeman and the slave, or the male and the female"70 
This said, having weighed all the arguments put forward by the jurists concerned 
in support of their view, I am inclined to prefer the view of the majority of jurists which 
allows the prodigal to be interdicted as long as the elements of prodigality exist, the 
reason being their strong argument, be it from the Qur'an or the Sunnah. On the other 
hand, the arguments advanced by Abu Hanifah lack strength and are in my view 
untenable. For example, apart from the above discussion, when Abu Han-ifah draws an 
analogy between confession of criminality in court by the prodigal and acceptance of Ns 
right to engage in financial acts, it seems that this analogy itself is invalid known as 
'analogy between different things' (qiy& ma' al-firiq) This is because in prescribed 
punishment (ýudud) and retaliation (qiydy) the implementation of punishment depends on 
evidence which is obtained through admission whereas this is not the case in matters of 
property as it is subsistence (qim, ýn)to society and no one therefore enjoys absolute right 
to dispose of it. Likewise, financial matters cannot be related to marriage, due to the fact 
that marriage is proscribed to protect life (nafs) and dignity. With regard to the argument 
relating to human rights it should be noted that there is no absolute right in the Shariýab, 
69AI-Muýallj, vol 8, p. 278, 
70AI-Mupall, ff vol 8, p. pp. 278-279 
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meaning that if one wishes to exercise one's right which causes harm to others then one 
is not permitted to do so. 
A. for the opinion of Ibn Hazm's , 
it seems that he mostly bases his arguments on 
a literal point of view without taking into consideration either the effect of prodigality on 
the prodigal himself or upon society, thus, if we were to follow his view there would be 
an unbalanced situation in the society which in contravention to the goal of the Shariýah 
itself 
In short, the difference between views on interdiction is mainly because jurists 
have looked at this concept from different angles. For Abu Hanifah and Ibn Hazm, their 
focus is on human dignity which is considered to be the most valuable to human asset 
followed next by wealth itself However, the majority of jurists see wealth as societal 
-C - task (Wazz ijtimaiyyjb) in the sense that the owner of a property cannot dissoci . 
#ah - iate 
himself from the society in which he lives. As such he has no absolute right to dispose of 
property; rather its management must be in line with the interest of the community in 
which he lives,, as is evident from the Quranic injunction which makes the property of 
the prodigal as if it belonged to his guardian. Furthermore the Qur'dn considers such 
property as subsistence to society. Thus, the view of the ma ority, especially in modem j 
society should prevail; this is not to suggest however that by preferring this view the 
dignity of man is sidelined; on the contrary, by interdicting the prodigal this is also a 
means of preserving his dignity rather than circumventing it. 
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4.3.1.2 The emergence of prodigality after puberty and prudence 
The preceding discussions concern the state of prodigality if it occurs together 
with the attainment of puberty. There is no dispute amongst jurists that upon attaining 
majority (if in a state of prudence) a minor is no longer interdicted, in compliance vvith 
the Quranic saying ( 4: 6): " If then ye find sound judgement in them release their 
property to them" However the case is quite different if prodigality appears after a period 
of apparent prudence since jurists differ as to whether or not interdiction should be 
imposed inasmuch as they also differ on the question of prodigality at the time of 
puberty. According to the vast majority such as the Shdfii, Maliki and some Hanafi, 
interdiction in this situation is permissible due to the existence of prodigality as its 
justification. . This means that there 
is no difference in the view of the majority between 
the two situations of prodigality ( prodigality accompanied by puberty and prodigality 
after prudence)-On the other hand, Abu Hanifah departs from his view regarding a 
prodigal pubescent (safli bAligh) in that he holds that the occurrence of prodigality after 
a period of apparent prudence has no effect whatsoever on legal capacity of person 
involved. 71 In such a case the prodigal is not subject to interdiction and is therefore free 
to dispose of his property. This stance taken is quite understandable if prodigality appears 
after the age of twenty five; nevertheless if prodigality emerges before that age It is hard 
to reconcile this view with that held by him previously. This means that on the one hand 
Abu Hanifah holds that there should be interdiction on the prodigal before the age of 
twenty five, while on the other hand he seems to deny this. Whatever justification 
he may 
have for this contradiction, it seems to me that the view of the majority is preferable 
since they base their argument on a definite cause (illah). Hence, if there 
is prodigality 
" Al-Hidgyah, vol 3, p. 281 
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the interdiction is permissible and vice versa no matter how often this occurs and 
irrespective of age factors. It should be noted that the arguments invoked here are 
identic to those in the previous discussion; thus, these arguments will not be repeated. 
4.3.1.3 The nature of interdiction on the prodigal 
Having accepted that interdiction on the prodigal is permissible -as viewed by the 
majority of jurists, the question arises as to the nature of this interdiction that is whether 
it is autornatic(by force of law) or otherwise. In other words, is a court order essential in 
order for interdiction on the prodigal to take effect? The majority of juriStS72 such as the 
Maliki,, the Shafi'i, and the Hanball as well as Abu Y5suf of the Hanafi hold that the 
power to interdict is solely vested in the discretion of the judge; as such before judicial 
order is obtained all acts of a prodigal person are valid. It is argued that the ruling is 
necessary because the legality of interdiction itself has been disputed by some jurists; 
thus a court ruling is needed to resolve this dispute in accordance with the maxim "the 
ruling by a judge removes the disagreements" (pukm al-h9im yarfa' al-khihifl . In 
addition, the prodigal combines two harmful elements namely, disrespect of personal 
dignity and squandering his property, hence a court ruling will detern-ýine which harm 
should be uppermost. 
73 
On the other hand, some jurists such as Muhammad bin Hasan of the Han 174 
maintain that a person should be automatically interdicted the moment his prodigality 
exists. This argument focuses on the cause for interdiction itself, that is,, since the cause 
12 Bidgyat al-Mujtahid, vol 2, p. 210, Nih, #yat al-MuPtg, vol 4, pp. 364-365, a/- Mughni-, vol 4, p. 
296 
73 Bapthflal-ýIajr, p. 178 
74 Al-Hid, #yah, vol 3, p. 282, 
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for interdiction is wastefulness and destruction of wealth, whenever there is a cause there 
will be an effect. Muýamrnad also likens a ; hterdiction caused by prodigality to that 
caused by imbecility in the sense that since all jurists agree that imbecility does not need 
a court order,, the same is true with regard to prodigality. 
In my view, the interdiction on the prodigal does need a court ruling, as this is 
more appropriate in dealing with financial matters; otherwise, it is possible that chaos in 
such matters may ensue. Furthermore, to equate prodigality with imbecility is not 
accurate since there is no dispute in the latter whereas this is not the case in the former. 
However, I prefer to harmonize these two views so that in the event of the court being 
unable to give an interdiction ruling as expected, the ruling can be retrospective. This 
means that the judge can annul all transactions taking effect from the time prodigality 
occurs rather than from the time when the ruling is issued. 
4.3.2. Interdiction on the prodigal in the ECC 
The legality of interdiction on the prodigal is recognised by virtue of article 113 
of the ECC in which the insane, the imbecile and the unaware person are also interdicted. 
In order for interdiction to take effect, a court order is essential which means that the 
interdiction on the prodigal is judicial in nature. It appears that the ECC has adopted the 
view of the majority of Muslim jurists in requiring a court order 
before the interdiction 
can be imposed. It is to be noted that the Code makes no difference 
between prodigality 
accompanied by puberty or prodigality occurring after puberty In that 
both need to obtain 
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judicial order. However, contrary to Islamic law, there are circumstances in which a 
prodigal is interdicted even before obtaining a court order. These circumstances are: 
i- If a disposal (tassaruyq issuing is due to the exploitation of the situation of 
prodigality effected by the party who is aware of the existence of such 
prodigality. 
If the disposal is carried out resulting from an agreement between the 
prodigal and the other contracting party. 
The EgCC has confirmed these exemptions in a case brought to it when it held 
that " the interdiction ruling on the prodigal would only take effect at the time when such 
ruling is issued , with no retrospective effect on previous act unless there are secret 
arrangement( tawitu ) and deception (ghish)"75 The grounds on which the law bases 
these exemptions have been explained by al-Sanh5ri where he argues: 
" It frequently occurs that the prodigal who is to be interdicted would waste his 
wealth by conspiracy with other party or that this latter would take advantage in 
order to exploit the property... In these two circumstances the disposal is void if 
it involves no exchange of property such as donation, and is voidable if the 
disposal concerns the exchange of property"76 
From this argument, it seems that the purpose of giving specific rules to these 
circumstances is to protect the property of the prodigal, however, it is still somewhat 
I-- - vague as to why exemptions are restricted to these circumstances only since there could 
be a situation where a prodigal may waste his property. Perhaps the reason for this 
restriction (as in the case of insanity) is to protect other bonafide contracting party who 
may not be aware of the existence of prodigality at the time of concluding the contract. 
" EgCC, cas. no 6, dated 25/10/1956 
76 Al- Wasit, vol I p. 304 
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Moreover, the Civil Procedure Code (CPQ has stipulated an exemption in which 
a prodigal person is considered as interdicted even before a court ruling is granted on the 
basis that such a prodigal person might dispose of his property during proceeding by a 
secret agreement with another person. Article 1028 of the CPC states " the ruling stated 
in article 1026 shall not affect the other bona fide person except from the date the request 
is filed,, in the absence of this request the date shall start from the time when the order is 
registered"' 
In fact,, the registration of such a request cannot be completed unless the judge 
approves it, and there from the first injunction has been secured in order to protect the 
property of the prodigal. 'Abd al-Baqi remarks that if the interdiction request is filed to 
the court upon which the interdiction is granted and registered, this ruling shall have 
retrospective effect on the day the request is filed"77 
However,, there is a possibility that the court will not inunediately grant 
interdiction 
, 
in this case the period between the request and the approval might then be 
used by the prodigal to waste his property. Although the interdiction ruling is 
retrospective if successful it would nevertheless be in the interest of the prodigal, if the 
court were to grant a legal injunction immediately in that all disposals from the prodigal 
would then be null and void. 
It should be noted that by virtue of article 89 and 998 
78of the CPC , the power 
to file interdiction requests is bestowed on the attorney general and those responsible for 
77 Nazariyyat al-gaqq, p. 122 
" 89 reads: Other than suinmary proceedings the attorney general may interfere in the 
following, 
i. Lawsuit relating to the incapacitate and lacking in legal capacity and the absentees" while 
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the prodigal( dhawl ; sha'n). As such, the guardian of the prodigal and his heirs have the 
right to file such a request because they are regarded as dhawl . sha'n. Likewise, dhawl-' 
sha'n also have the interest to ascertain that their prodigal relatives would not squander 
property. In this it can be concluded that the system of public prosecution in Egyptian 
law is approximate to bisbah (soliciting good and advising against evil) in Islamic law, as 
Madk5r argues that" the ýiSbah in Islamic law in general resembles the public 
prosecution office in the present day', 79 
4.4 The effects of prodigality on contract 
4.4.1 Islamic law 
In determining the legal rules relating to acts issuing from the prodigal jurists are 
concerned to divide such acts into several categories such as financial and non- financial 
contracts. Although the focus of the present study is on financial contracts, reference will 
also be made when necessary to contracts which bear less financial significance. The 
purpose in so doing is to examine more closely how financial contracts in certain 
circumstances are inextricably related to a mixture of both financial and non- financial 
criteria. 
Before further detail it is worth reminding ourselves that we have seen how the 
jurists are agreed on the prohibition of 'handing over property' to a child if he attains 
puberty in a state of prodigality. This raises the question as to whether there is any 
article 998 reads: request of interdiction is to be filled by attorney general or those responsible 
(dhawlsha'n) 
'9AI-Madkhal Ii alfiqh al-Islami, p. 414, 
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difference between ' handing over property' and 'entering into a contract' as far as 
financial affairs are concerned. In other words, if handing over property to the prodigal, 
for example, is not permissible then would the prodigal be permitted to conclude a 
contract that involves his wealth? To answer this question whether in the affirmative or 
the negative will not be straightforward unless we first examine the words of jurists as 
regards contract entered into by a prodigal person, after which we can asses whether 
there is justification. for assigning different rules to handing over property or concluding 
a contract. 
Broadly speaking, jurists have taken different stances when discussmg the effect 
of prodigality on contract, notwithstanding their agreement that prodigality itself has no 
effect on legal capacity as for them the prodigal may nevertheless be addressed by legal 
injunction( khitib shar'i). The majority of jurists such as the Hanafi, the Malikl- and the 
Hanbali hold that a sale contract carried out by the prodigal should be suspended pending 
the ratification of his guardian; if the guardian's consent is obtained then the sale Will be 
valid and enforceable,, otherwise it will be null and void. The Hanafi have further 
explained that the relation to a contract enacted by the prodigal is similar to that of a 
discerning child . 
80 As such if, a contract is purely beneficial such as receiving a gift it 
would be valid regardless of the guardian's consent. Likewise, if a contract is purely 
detrimental such as giving a gift the consent would have no effect in validating such a 
contract. However in contractual matters such as sale, which has the potentiality either to 
be beneficial or harmfuL consent of ratification then assumes its role. Nonetheless, 
80 Muhammad bin al-Hasan of the Hanafi concluded that with the exception of the following 
cases disposal made by an interdicted person because of prodigality is similar to that made by a 
child These cases are; (1) It is permissible for the guardian to dispose of the child's property 
whereas this is not the case in the prodigal (2) Divorce and manumission initiated by the prodigal 
are valid whereas the child is not allowed to do so (3) Bequest from the prodigal is valid not but 
the child (4)Claini to lineage is permissible for the prodigal not the child , see, Abu Zahrah, al- Ahwil al-Shakhgyyah, DAr al-Fikr al-'Arabi- Cairo, n. d, p. 452, Babthfi al-. ffajr, p. 191 
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contrary to a discerning child, the contract made by the prodigal would only be valid if 
81 
the consent issued from a judge instead of the guardian. . The Maliki 
82 although they 
concur with the Hanafi in this respect, have differed from the latter as for them the 
ratification of a contract made by the prodigal vAll depend on the guardian rather than the 
judge; this also seems to be the Hanbali'ý 83 view. Thus,, it seems that both the Maliki 
and the Hanball have recognized that the prodigal is still fit to enter into this kind of 
contract; however this fitness is either not absolute , or 
it is too weak to conclude a 
contract,, and is thus strengthened by ratification required of either the guardian or the 
judge. 
f ci84 On the other hand, the Sha I have taken a strict view regarding a contract 
carried out by the prodigal . 
85According to them any financial contract issuing from a 
prodigal person would be null and void irrespective of the ratification, be this from the 
judge or the guardian. Indeed they maintain that such a contract will remain null and 
void even if it is in the advantage of the prodigal as they argue that validating a contract 
concluded by the prodigal is contradictory to the rationale and vvisdom of interdiction 
itself. The stance taken by the Shafi is not surprising if we look back at their view on 
other interdicted persons, such as the insane and the minor,, which lead us to conclude 
that the Shafi'i are consistent in invalidating financial contracts entered into by an 
interdicted person. Although they accept the role of guardian regarding the prodigal, their 
view on such a concept differs from that of the Hanafi and the Malik-i 
in that the guardian 
upon interdiction will be fully responsible for concluding a contract 
in the interest of the 
" H&hiyah Ibn 'Abidih, vol 6, p. 148 
82 Mawdhib al-Jall, vol 5, p. 62 
83 AI-Mughni, vol 4, p. 297 
84 Al-Nawawi-, Minh 4 al- TAlibin, DAr al-Macrifah, Beirut, n, d, vol 1, p. 59, 
81 This rule is the same with regard the child whether he is discerning or not. 
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prodigal. For them this power to supervise should not be compromised by the so called 
ratification (ij&ah) as it would go against the meaning of herdiction itself. 
In a complete contradiction to the Shafi'i, however Abu Hanifah 86 opines that a 
contract of the prodigal is valid whether it is ratified by the judge or not. This view 
stems from his stance in not imposing interdiction on the prodigal 87 as previously 
discussed. 
Having examined the view of the jurists, before deciding which view is preferable 
it is to be noted that with regard to the previous question, i. e., whether there is any 
relationship between the handing over of property to the prodigal and his contracts, it is 
quite clear that both issues concern the protection of the prodigal's wealth. This 
correlation is reasonable in the view of the majority of jurists in which they give either 
the same or reasonable rules for both handing over of property and concluding a contract. 
The Sha-fi Ci for example, apart from ruling that handing over of property is prohibited as 
long as the prodigality exists, have also extended this prohibition to contract in such a 
way that the prodigal is legally not allowed to conclude a contract. The same is true with 
regard to the view of both the Hanafi and the Maliki in this matter. As such, it is not 
surprising that we find the Quranic verse (4: 5) has been invoked as evidence to nullify a 
contract concluded by a prodigal person. 
However,, moving to Abu Hanifah's view, as mentioned elsewhere a prodigal 
person is of two categories; those who have attained the age of twenty five and those who 
86 Bidifyat al-Mubtadl, vol 1, p. 201 
81 In some cases, disposals issuing from an interdicted prodigal is valid such as in a case where a 
person reaches puberty in a state of prodigality but has yet to attain twenty five years old. 
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have not. The first category is not our concern here as the same ruling is to be found witfi 
regard to handing over of property- and concluding a contract. As regards the second 
category Abu Hanifah's stance is questionable. This is because on the one hand he agrees 
with other jurists in imposing interdiction on the prodigal who has yet to attain the age of 
twenty five, while on the other he validates a contract entered into by that prodigal. His 
argument is that the purpose of the prohibition of handing over property is to protect it Cap 
until the prodigal reaches the age of twenty five. Should this be the case, it is more 
appropriate for Abu Hanifah to concur Aith his disciple in relating a contract made by a 
prodigal person to that of a discerning child in that if a contract is purely detrimental to 
the prodigal such as giving a gift, then it wouId not be valid, hence his property can be 
protected through interdiction in accordance with Abu lianifah's view. It thus seems that 
the distinction between 'handing over property' and concluding a contract is untenable. 
In my view what led AH Hanifah to lay down different rules in th' is respect was perhaps 
to create a balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society; that is 
I-- by not handing over the property the right of society is protected, while the right of the 
prodigal is preserved by allowing his contract to be valid. However, ANi Hanifah was 
not prepared to uphold this balance permanently as when the prodigal reaches twenty 
five years old, his right prevails at the expense of that of others. This is in line with the 
principle wMch states that " humanity takes priority over property". However it seems 
that later Ijanafi jurists were not prepared to concur with their founder's view in their 
preference for the view of Ab5 Wsuf and Muhammad. 
In line with the view of the majority which places a restriction on the contract 
made by the prodigal, the question arises as to the gravity or degree of this restriction as 
far as financial issues are concerned. In other words apart from the extravagance of the 
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prodigal himself what kind of financial values should exist in order to invalidate or 
suspend a contract concluded by the prodigal? To answer fts question it seems that the 
jurists especially those of the Maliki and the Hanbal-i have divided the contract carried 
out by the prodigal into two categories ; those which involve his necessity and those 
which do not. Falling within the first category are requisites such as food, clothes and the 
like. It appears that this kind of contract is permissible as can be concluded from the 
f6flowing statement: 
" The disposal by the prodigal is valid if it involves trivial matterS88 such as 
(buying something) worth one dirham, the guardian has no right to reject this 
buying and the sale is therefore enforceable, the prodigal is not subject to 
interdiction for spending involving his food, his family's ....... This is because these matters are necessities and trivial". 89 
To the same effect the lianball maintain that the disposal carried out by the 
prodigal is valid in trivial matters even without the consent of his guardian since the 
underlying wisdom of interdiction ( that of wasting wealth) is here not significant. 90 The 
Shdfi C i, however, do not seem to take into consideration the amount involved; for them as 
long as there is a monetary element a contract should not be valid. 
This said,, it appears that the view of the majority is more moderate; hence it is 
preferable. This is because if we were to follow the Shdfi'i his would cause hardship in 
that the guardian would have to act for the sake of his ward in all things even in trivial 
matters. This hardship should be avoided as much as possible in Islamic law. From a 
contrary standpoint recourse to Abu Ijanifah's view may put the interests of the prodigal 
as well as society at risk, which also needs to be avoided according to the Sharlýp. 
18 Whether a matter is trivial or not depends on custom; if there are differences the authorities 
may intervene to decide in the interest of the prodigal in accordance with the maxim " The act of 
the ruler depends on public interest"( tasarrufal-in&n manatbi al-maslabah) 89Mdlik bin Anas, al-Mudawwanat al-Kubrg Djr Wir, Beirut, n. d, vo 15, p. 222 
90 Kashsh. #fa1-QinX, vol 3, p. 15 1 
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. 
4.4.2 The ECC 
Before progressing further, it is worth noting that the jurists are unanimous in 
counting prodigality as one of the impediments on legal capacity, however, its existence 
does not remove such capacity completely such as in the case of insanity, rather legal 
capacity of the prodigal is restricted. Although the ECC does stipulate that prodigality is 
considered as lack of capacity (njqiy al-ahliyyah), the extent of effect to which such 
impediment may have on the prodigal is not an area of agreement among the jurists, For 
instance, some jurists such as Jamaluddin Zaki maintain that the mental capacity of the 
prodigal is perfect ( k, -Pnil al-quwa al 'aqliyyah), and hence he is fit to carry out a contract 
if it is reasonable, an excess of which would lead to the restriction of legal capacity, 
although this is somewhat obvious since any impediment would be regarded as such if it 
has legal effect. Therefore if there is no possibility for instance for an insane person to 
conclude a contract the interdiction would be meaningless. The same is true with regard 
to the prodigal in the sense that in normal conditions his legal capacity is untouched. In 
other words, to verify whether a person is prodigal or not it is necessary to investigate 
whenever his spending or contract is carried out at the time of concluding of contract. It 
thus is suggested that the meaning of impediment (arid) should be looked at from this 
perspective as held by the majority of Muslim jurists . 
91 This is perhaps the reason why 
no ruling as to whether prodigality is impediment or not is found since judicial 
interpretation of the law is more practical than that given by the jurists. 
See the meaning of 'arid in chapter one, p. 31 onwards 
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Having said this similar to a disposal made by of the insane person , the ECC 
has divided the contract carried out by the prodigal into two categories namely, prior to 
the registration of interdiction ruling, and that after such a ruling has been registered. It is 
important to note however, that having secure a court ruling to interdict a prodigal person 
is not sufficient for the said ruling to take since it must first be registered. 
4.4.2.1 Prior to registration of interdiction ruling 
A contract entered into by a prodigal person before registration of an interdiction 
ruling is valid and enforceable regardless of the nature of contracts, be they purely 
beneficial, purely harmful or a mixture of beneficial and harmful. Thus article 115/2 of 
the ECC stipulates that "a disposal issuing from a prodigal person before the registration 
of interdiction ruling is not void or voidable unless such disposal is a result of 
exploitation or conspiracy". It is clear therefore that this article has laid down a principle 
by virtue of which the prodigal before being interdicted enjoys full legal capacity , and 
thus any disposal issuing from him is valid and produces its full legal effect. For 
instance,, in the case of a contract of sale the ownerslýp would transfer from the seller to 
the buyer as soon as the contract takes place, nor can such a disposal be contested on the 
grounds of lack of "will"' as in the case of an insane person and an imbecile. 
92 This is 
because these latter cases the "will" is absent, where as in the prodigal his will is valid 
due to the fact that his reason is intact. 93 
'2 As mentioned elsewhere a contract concluded by the insane before regisrration 
is valid, 
however, the validity of such contract may be contested on other question of law that the 
insane 
lacks of will. 
9'Mad, ff Ahliyyat al-$abl, p. 275 
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In asserting this rule the EgCC held that "a disposal issuing from a prodigal 
person before the registration of the ruling is not void or voidable"94while m another 
ruling it was held that the interdiction ruling has no effect as regards disposal before the 
date of the registration of the ruling. 95ThiS stance adopted by the Code is in accordance 
with the view of the majority of Muslim jurists who hold that an act issuing from the 
prodigal is valid if no interdiction proceeds from the judge. Apart from this, it seems that 
the Code as well as the judiciary have emphasized procedures rather than substance in 
determining the legal effect of a contract made by a prodigal person. However, can it be 
said that the Code totally bases on this principle while overlooking reality? In other 
words, if the implementation of procedures will undermine the purpose and spirit of the 
law then would that be reasonable and therefore have to be maintained ? The following 
exceptions do demonstrate that the Code has also taken into consideration if the 
implementation of the textual provision would cause harm, other options should be 
resorted to. These exceptions are: 
i- In the case of exploitation-meaning that if a person exploits the state of 
prodigality and accordingly carries out a contract involving the prodigal , 
such a contract would be void or voidable. The EgCC has interpreted the 
word exploitation Ostigh1jo as taking advantage of the state of prodigality 
so as to conclude a contract in order to exploit and enrich oneself from 
the property of the Prodigal. In a case brought to the Court the appellant 
argued that the defendant had taken advantage of the said prodigality in 
order to buy a piece of land belonging to the appellant at a lower price. 
The court held that such transaction was carried out under exploitation 
(istighlil), as such it is void even though the interdiction ruling has yet to 
9' EgCC, cas. no 397, dated 28/5/1970 
95 EgCC, cas. no 397, dated 13/12/1985 
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be registered. 96 Tberefore, it is not sufficient to establish exploitation by 
mere awareness of extravagance of the prodigal, rather, it must be 
established that the other contracting party has exploited the prodigal's 
weakness. However, it should be noted that there is no clear cut measure 
to create a balance between what the prodigal can give and take, as such it 
is left to the discretion of the trial judge to determine the measure of 
prodigality, and the Court of Cassation has therefore no right to interfere 
as long as the judgement is based on reasonable grounds. 97 
ii- In the case of secret agreement-whereby a prodigal person has agreed with 
the other contracting party to conclude a contract. To illustrate, if a person 
feels he will be interdicted due to his prodigality, then he agreed with 
another person to dispose of his property so as to escape the law. Such a 
disposal is void or voidable. 98 
4.4.2.2. After registration of interdiction ruling 
Article 1151 1 of the ECC stipulates that " an act entered into by a person placed 
under interdiction for imbecility or prodigality after the registration of the ruling of 
interdiction will be governed by the provisions regarding acts performed by discerning 
minors". This means that if a contract is beneficial to the prodigal it will be valid 
regardless of the consent of the guardian. Likewise if the contract is detrimental 
in nature 
then the prodigal is not legally allowed to enter into it even with the consent of the 
96EgCC, cas. no 446, dated 14/11/1968 
9'Madg Ahliyyat al-$ab j, p. 276 
98 Abd Baqi, Nazariyyat al-'Aqd, p. 284 
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guardian. However, for a contract which has the potentiality to be beneficial or harmful 4; ý-- 
then the consent of the guardian is required, meaning that the guardian may choose to 
either ratify or nullify such a contract. 991t can be concluded that in terms of legal 
capacity the prodigal is classified by the ECC as possessing incomplete active legal 
capacity (ahliyyat aj-ada'al-njqiýah) after the ruling of interdiction is registered 
4.5. Summary 
Prodigality as an impediment to legal capacity has been recognised by both 
Islamic law and the ECC since both systems use the same terminology ie. 'awdrid al- 
ahliyyah. However the concept especially that related to how to determine prodigality 
and its scope is wider in Islamic law, while on the other hand the meaning of prodigality 
in the ECC is restricted to financial matters only. To govern matters relating to 
prodigality the doctrine of interdiction has been introduced in both Islamic law and the 
ECC where such interdiction has to obtain judicial order before it can take effect. As for 
a contract entered into by the prodigal it seems that the ECC is more concerned vAth 
procedure rather than substance as it depends on the registration of interdiction ruling in 
order to ratify or nullify such a contract whereas this is not the case in Islamic law. 
" AI-Suddah, Mayadir al-Iltiz&n, pp. 176-178 
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CHAPTER FIVE : THE THEORY OF DURESS (IKRAI-I) IN 
CONTRACT 
5.1 Introduction 
The subject of duress (ikrih) has been studied from various perspectives M both 
Islamic law and in the ECC. Under Islamic law, duress seems to be treated by classical 
jurists within their works on impediments to legal capacity. Hanzdi jurists especially 
devote a specific chapter to this subject alone' while other jurists study duress along with 
various juridical acts. Modem scholars such as al-Zarqd 2 and Abii Zahrah, 3 on the other 
hand, tend to discuss duress under 'defects of consent' as treated by Civil law jurists. 
Whatever the case may be, whether duress is an impediment to legal capacity or whether 
it constitutes a defect of consent,, its effect on contract is significant to the extent that 
some judges throughout Islamic history would reject any contractual document unless the 
'absence of duress' is clearly stated therein 5 This is despite the fact that there is a general 
maxim which states that the apparent situation in a contract is voluntary. As for the ECC, 
besides treating duress as a defect of consent, it has also recognized its presence as a 
basis for compensation. This chapter will thus be devoted to studying the effect of duress 
on contract in both Islamic law and the ECC and will to this end include the definitions 
of duress, its elements and conditions as well as its effect on contracts. 
See al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabs4t, vol 24, p. 38 , al-KAs5n-l, al-Badk', vol 
7, p. 175, al-Bukh5ri, Kashf 
al-Asr. ffr, vol 4, p. 383. It is narrated that Muhammad bin al-Uasan, a disciple of 
Abii Hanifah 
had written a magnificent book on duress which caused him some conflict among rulers. 
2 AI-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-'Amm, vol 1, p. 3 66 
3A I-Milkiyyah, p. 4 10 
See for instance al-Sanhun, al-Wasit , vol 
1, p. 334 
It is reported that al-Nasafl the judge rejected admission (iqrffr) document 
because the wording 
admitted voluntarily" was not stated. See Mabda'al-Ridfffi al-'Uq i7d, vol 
1, p. 41 I 
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5.2 The meaning of duress 
5.2.1 Islamic law 
As a matter of fact, there is not much evidence from the primary sources 
expounding the meaning and concept of duress. Perhaps the most frequently quoted 
Quranic verse concerning duress can be found in (2: 256) which reads: " No compulsion 
in religion". However, this verse is not clearly directed at the effect of duress on contract. 
Similarly the Arabic word for duress i. e. ikrjh and its derivatives are also to be found in 
(16: 107) and (24: 33). In addition, the Uadih " liability is exempted from a duressed 
person" is regarded as the most reliable source concerning the legal rules of duress. Apart 
from this textual evidence however, there is no conclusive text on this concept. This is in 
tum has prompted the jurists to discuss the subject mostly from their own perspectives. 
LiteraUy, ikrA is derived from the root word ka ra ha which is constructed as 
6 
akrahahu meaning 'to force someone to do something against his wishes'. The word 
7 kurh is also the antonym of ýubb (love), as such, these two terms are used in an 
opposite sense, as in for example in the Qur'dn (2: 216) which reads: "But it is possible 
that ye dislike a thing which is good for you and that ye love a thing which is bad for 
you" 
Technically, jurists have offered various definitions of duress. Al-Sarakhsi for 
example, defines fis as follows: " by duress one designates the action of one person 
6 Al-Q&n as al-Mubit, p. 1252, Mukht& al-$iýA, p. 683 
'717 Al-Bardisl, Zakariyya al-Ikrih bayn al-Sharlah w., a al-QkiCm, Majallat al-Q, #nt7n wa al- 
Iqti, y, ffd, 1960, vol 2, p. 2 
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against another suppressing the consent of this latter person or vitiating his free Will,, 
8 Aj_ 
Zayla Ci on the other hand considers duress as an action directed agamst a person which 
suppresses his consent while al- Bukhdr-i defines it as forcing a person to perform an act 
against his wishes by way of any threat of which the person exerting duress (mukrih) is 
capable, so that the duressed person (mukrah) is intimidated and deprived of free 
consent. 9 A more precise definition is given by Ibn Hajr by stating that duress is to force 
another person to do what he does not wishlowhile other definitions are found to be 
almost identical to those previously given. Contemporary jurists for their part give no 
differing definition of duress , except by either modiýýg or accepting those offered by 
their predecessors. For instance, Abu Zahrah states that duress is an order from one 
person to another to commit an act or utter words under threat of the infliction of evil in 
the case of non-compliance". AI-Zarqa' refers to duress as a physical or moral constraint 
directed against a person in order to compel Nm to ratify or not ratify a juridical act, 
while MadkTjr sees it as to force a person to do something, be it verbal or in deed without 
his consent other than by way of the Sharlib . 
12 
It is observed that jurists emphasize through these definitions the important 
elements of duress according to their own priority. Al- Sarakhsi, for instance, 
identifies 
the elements of duress, i. e the person exerting duress and the duressed person. 
In the 
same way, al- Zarqd's definition to some extent highlights the act to 
be done under 
duress (mukrah 'alayh). Nonetheless, none of these definitions are sufficiently 





9 Kashfal-Asrjr, vol 4, p. 3 82 T bi Sharb Sahlh al-Bukhdr r, Ddr al- 'OAI-'Asqalan-l, Ibn Uajar Abmad bin 'All, Fatfi al-Bffr 
Mdrifah, Beirut, 1379 H, vol 12, p. 311 
" Al-Milkiyyah wa-Nazariyyat al-'Aqd, p. 11 
12 Nazariyyat al-'Aqd, Dir al-Naho7t al- 'Arabiyyah, 
Cairo, md, p. 133 
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suggested by some authors, duress should be defined as the exercise of an unlawful 
pressure on a person to create in him the kind of fear which causes him to enter into a 
contract. 
13 
5.2.2 The ECC 
The Code is silent regarding the definition of duress; however, article 127 has 
inspired jurists to give this concept a definition. Article 127 /1 states that a contract may 
be annulled for reason of duress, or if a contracting person concludes that contract under 
the influence of fear unjustifiably implanted in him by the other contracting party, when 
such fear is based on founded grounds. In the light of this, al-Sanhiinli 14 defines duress as 
a pressure that affects a person's will forcing him to enter into a contract. Another 
definition given by 'Abd al-Bdqi is almost identical to that of al-Sanhiiri in which he 
states: "duress is a pressure directed upon a person in an unjustified manner which 
engenders fear in him resulting in the act of concluding a contract in order to avoid 
harm", . 
15 
Nevertheless,, neither definition is accurate enough to clarify the notion of duress. 
Ths is because the word 'pressure'(flaghAin) contained in these definitions covers 
everything irrespective of the source of duress; that is, this term covers both duress and 
the state of necessity. Qlar i7rah) caused by its presence. For instance, those who sell their 
property to pay their debts may have done so under pressure, and this pressure may come 
from human beings as well as from other sources such as economical factors. In addition, 
13 Abd Wahhab Ahmed EI-Hasan, The Doctrine of Duress in Sharia, Sudan and English Law. 
Arab Law Quarterly, Feb, 1986, p. 231 
14 Mayj4dir al-tlaqq, vol2, p. 189, al-Wayj4 vol 1, p. 334 
15 Quoted from, Mu'min, 
_Umar 
al-Sayyid, aI-Ikrjh al-Mufsid Ii al-Rifflfi Q&7&7 aI-Mu'&naI& 
al-Madaniyyat al-ImirSi, Dir&ah Muqffranah bi al-Q&7Cm al-Madani al-Misr] wa al-Fiqh al- 
Isl&nj, - Dar al-Nahýlat al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1998, p. 12 
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it is argued that not every pressure will engender fear, as there may be situations in which 
a person is forced to sell his property where no suggestion of fear is present. In spite of 
this,, the EgCC has to some extent agreed with those legal and jurisprudential definitions 
given as indicated in one of its rulings : "According to the judicial ruling of this court 
duress which negates consent is constituted by threatening the contracting party with 
massive danger to him or his property, or by invoking other means which for him are 
intolerable or of which he cannot rid himself. As a result, a state of fear is established 
forcing him to admit acceptance of that which is against his wishes" . 
16 
Another jurist, Jamil al- Sharqdw-i, has offered a closer definition to the nature of 
duress; according to him duress is a fear forcing a person to conclude a legal 
act. 17 According to this definition it seems that in order to establish duress the source of 
0- fear should come from within human beings themselves. This interpretation in fact 
differs from the vast majority of juristic opinion, where the preference is to use the word 
"pressure" (daghtFm) instead of fear (rahbah) which makes possible the inclusion of a 
situation other than duress. It is the writer's opinion that according to article 127-129 of 
the ECC duress is confined only to that issuing from human beings whether they are 
contracting parties or not. As for other kinds of pressure, while acknowledging that the 
said articles are not conclusive,, there are other provisions in the Code which are more 
related to "external pressure, " such as that concerning exploitation (istighlil) and the 
like. 
16 EgCC, cas. no 96, dated 8/2/1951 
17 MayAdir al-Iltiz&n, p. 143 
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5.3 Duress and necessity ((IarEwah) 
5.3.1 Islamic law 
Some jurists do not differentiate between duress and necessity; 
18 this is somewhat 
misleading since necessity is a state in which a person will suffer severely (or may even 
die) if he fails to carry out an act which is forbidden under normal circumstances. 19 
Thus, in this sense, necessity includes duress and also additional factors. To put it simply 
necessity is a wider concept than duress, since every form of duress is necessity but not 
vice versa. For this reason, relationship between duress and necessity should be looked 
at from two aspects; namely legal consequences arising and actual sources. That is in the 
case of duress the source consistently issues from human beings, whereas this is not the 
case in necessity, which may be exerted by either a situation or a human being, and the 
consequence may be the same or it may differ. If the source is human then the term 
duress is identical to necessity, although the former is used in preference. In the same 
way the legal consequences may not be the same for some jurists such as the Shafi, l 
20. 
for whom for example sale under necessity is valid but void if made under duress. 
5.3.2 The ECC 
According to most jurists duress in the ECC seems to have a wider sense than that 
of Islamic law, since it includes situations other than duress exerted 
by a human being, 
as can be understood from the using of the word pressure. 
This term 'pressure' which 
"Al-Jkni' li Apkkn al-Qur', lýi, vol 2, p. 225 
19 Qdsim, Yusuf, Nazariyyat al-. Vari7rah, DAr al-Nah& al-'Arabiyyah, 
Cairo, n. d, p. 89, 
20 Nihffyat al-Muptf, vol 3, pp. 374-375 
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discussed earlier in the view of most jurists such as al-Sanh5ri and Abd Baqi includes 
both duress and necessity Hence, unlike Islamic law necessity in the ECC is considered 
as a part or a branch of duress. 
5.4 Types of duress 
5.4.1 Islamic law 
Generally speaking, the jurists have classified duress into two categories; just 
duress and unjust duress the latter of wl&h can be divided into several categories: 
5.4.1.1 Unjust duress ( ikrAli bighayr baqq) 
Jurists are not agreed in classi6ing the ty-pes of duress falling within this area. 
According to the Hanafi, duress can be divided into constraining (mulji') and (non- 
constraining (ghayr mulji') which are also known as a complete duress and incomplete 
duress respectively. Both types nullify consent( riýj), but only the former vitiates choice. 
These kinds of duress are established when the threat is either directed against the person 
under duress himself or against his properties. Here, al-Bazdawi,, one of the Hanafi jurists 
has added another type of duress known as 'moral duress'(ikrA adabi)in which a threat 
is not directed against the person under duress but rather against to his relatives, such as 
a threat to imprison his father or his son . 
21 However this kind of duress is included under 
non constraining duress by most Hanari scholars, due to the fact that it negates only 
consent but does not in their opinion negate choice. 
21 Sharp al-Manffr p. 3 69, al-Badff 7' , vol 7, p. 
175 
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On the other hand, the majority of the jurist amongst them the Shafi' 1,22 the 
Hanbali 23and the Malik-i 24 although concurring with Hanafi in classiP g duress into ., 
in 
constraining and non constraining, nevertheless dIffer in other aspects of mterpretation. 
This is because according to them, 'constraining duress' is so called when a person under 
duress has no power or choice, such as in the case of a person being thrown onto another 
person resulting in the killing of that person. In this example, the person thrown has no 
power to avoid such an act, as if he is in effect a tool of a person exerting duress. As for 
non constraining duress this occurs when the situation does not amount to the 
constraining one 25 and this may include some aspects of duress as understood by the 
Hanafi. 
Apart from this, the Zdliiri have divided unjust duress into duress on utterances 
and duress on deeds, thus the former causes no effect unless it is accompanied by the 
consent of the Sharlah done intentionally, such as forcing to pronounce cause to 
I'll abandon Islam (kalimat al kufr )As for deeds their effect very much depends on the 
types of act to be done under duress (mukrdh 'alayh)) as to whether this act is permissible 
in a state of necessity or not. Thus, what is permissible under the rule of necessity such as 
drinking wine, will also be permissible under duress. Likewise, if a thing is not allowed 
under the rules of necessity such as the act of killing, this will also be forbidden under 
duress. 26 
A]-Ghazali, al-Wasilt, vol 5, p. 389 
'Al-In. yjf, vol 8, P. 439 
"MawAhib al-JaIll, vol 4, p. 248 
25AI-Ghazd1l, AN lianud, al-Wasit, edited by Mutianimad Tamir, Affr al-Sal&n, 
Cairo, 1417 h, 
I' edition, vol 5, P. 389, In Qayyim, 1'1, ffm al-Muwaqqf m, Dgr al-A, 
Beirut, 1973, vol 4, p. 88 
26 In Ham, al-Mupalhý vol 8, pp. 329-330 
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A deeper study of these various classifications has led to the follomng 
conclusion. Firstly, concerning the Hanafii's classification, as far as contract is concemed. 
there is no significance in dividing duress into constraining and non constraining as 
evident from the works of jurists when they discuss the law relating to a contract made 
under duresS. 2' Furthermore, the impression of the word constraining (mulji) used by 
the majority of jurists such as throwing a person a high place does not support Hanaf's 
classification. Secondly, with regard to the Zahir-i their classification is more concerned 
with the acts to be done under duress not duress itself It seems that the classification of 
the majority of jurists is preferable since it clearly puts a limitation on what is considered 
to be duress and what is not. Furthermore this classification is more concerned with the 
field of contract. 
5.4.1.2 Justified duress (ikrAh bi haqq) 
Justified duress also known as 'legal compulsion' (ijbir shar'i), is an action 
taken by the authorities to force a person to carry out a valid act relating either to another 
person or to public interest such as forcing a debtor to repay his debt. 28 The, jurists are 
unanimously agreed that in order for duress to be justified, the acts to be done under 
7 
duress must be in conformity with Sharnh rules. Thus, when this requirement is fulfilled, 
then duress is enforceable despite the absence of the consent of the person under duress. 
27 Madkiir, Muhammad Salam, Nazariyyat al-'aqd, p. 136, He says "The differentiation between 
constraining and non constraining duress with regard to contract 
brings no real effect other than 
a mere classification of duress. This is because the jurists while 
discussing contract made under 
duress do not distinguish between the numerous types of duress 
" 
2' MOammad Shaqrah, 'Tsa Zaki, al-lkrA wa Atharuhuf! al-Taýarrqfa-t, Maktabot al-Manar al- 
Islftiyyah, Kuwait, 1986,1' edition, p. 59 
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This is because in the case of contradiction between his consent and the consent of 
Sharfah, the latter will prevail. 
According to the Shari 7 'ah 'legal compulsion' can take several forms; namely 
compulsion to avoid harm or enforce special rights and compulsion for the sake of public 
interest. With regard to the first, this refers to a person who has been asked to fulfil 
certain obligations towards others but who has refused to do so resulting in the need to 
invoke the authority of the Shari'ah. For example, the judge has the power to compel a 
debtor to sell his properties in order to repay his creditors. The same is true in the case of 
tax collectors appointed by the ruler ('ummdl sultan) whereby they are forced to return 
what has been collected unjustly from the people. However, the inclusion of legal 
compulsion under the category of duress is not accurate (as maintained by the Hanafi 
)since the most important factor in determining duress is not regarded. The reason 
behind its inclusion by most jurists is perhaps the apparent similarity between the two 
types of duress. Despite this, it should be noted that in the case of legal compulsion there 
are two conflicting kinds of consent, one is that given by the person under duress while 
the other is granted by the Shari 'ah, but the consent of Shariah must prevails by 
necessity. Thus, gravity of compulsion used in this regard should not be excessive in 
conformity lA4th the maxim " necessity is judged on its degree"( al-ýarFrah tuqaddaru bi 
qadariha). Therefore, for example, the judge cannot impose the selling of the most 
valuable properties of a debtor (in order to settle his debts) 
if there is a lesser property 
whose value is sufficient to repay the debt. 
The second type of legal compulsion concerning public 
interest is utilized to 
protect the public in a case where there is conflict of 
interest between the individual and 
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the public interest that cannot be harmonized as for instance, to force land owner to sell 
his land in order to build a mosque. 29 Another example cited by Mdlik is that if the price 
of a particular food is artificially very high, then the ruler may ask whoever is responsible 
to bring it to the open market. Likewise, the ruler is permitted to make personal property 
public property, with reasonable compensation; he is also aflowed to force his subjects to 
carry out certain actions in order to preserve public interest. In imposing this policy, the 
doctrine of committing the lesser of two evils ( irtikib akhaf al -ýhrarayn)has to be 
carefully observed, so both individual and public interest are balanced and not at the 
expense of one another in compliance with the ýbdih " Ij pbrar wa la Or, 7r " 
From above discussion, it is quite clear that legal compulsion cannot be classified 
under duress except on the basis of apparent similarity i. e. the use of force by the 
authorities for instance to sell a debtor's property in order to settle the debt. However, 
this force should not amount to causing injury to the debtor as it would have been in the 
case of unjust duress. Realizing this perhaps has led some jurist to prefer the term ijbir 
rather than ikrdh although this preference is still not convincing enough since both terms 
are synonymous from a literal point of view. 
5.4.2 The ECC 
Similar to Islamic law duress in the ECC are of two categories; just duress and 
unjust duress. The former normally refers to situation in which a legitimate means is used 
to obtain a legitimate goal such as a creditor's threat to file a bankruptcy notice if the 
debtor fads to settle his debt 30 . In regard to unjust 
duress however which is the primary 
concern of the code, its existence may either nullify both consent and choice (such as in 
29 Häshiyat al-Dus üqz» vol 3, p. 6 
'0 AI-$uddah, Maýýir al-Iltiz&n, p. 212, Shanab, Dur asfiNazariyyat al-Iltiz&n, p. 177 
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the case of a person seizing someone's hand to force him to sign a contract of sale), or 
may simply negate the consent but not the choice; in this latter case the person under 
duress is left to commit the lesser evil in order to avoid harm. Duress can further be 
divided into physical (m&6) where this involves physical harm to the duressed person, 
and spiritual ( nafsi) where there is a threat to cause harm to him or his property as well 
as his reputation provided that it is proven that such duress will cause fear and anxiety in 
the duressed person" 
AA part from this,, duress may be positive or negative; the above-cited examples are 
of positive duress when the threat issues directly from the person exerting duress. An 
example of negative duress is in the case of a person agreeing to carry out certain work, 
but who is under threat by another not to carry out that work. In such a case failing to do 
that work will cause great danger to the duressed person such as in the instance of a 
doctor who refuses to cure his patient unless the patient pays an exorbitant cost for 
32 
treatment . 
It is to be noted that unlike Islamic law,, the ECC does not classify duress into 
constraining and non constraining. This is because the deciding factor here In 
determining duress is the presence of fear in the duressed person that as a result causes 
him to conclude a contract. As such, duress may be established even if the threat is not 
grave provided that the fear exists. 
5.5 Measurement(Miy4r)of Duress 
31 AI-Fiqi, Uthman, Dur üýf! Nazariyyat al-Iltiz&n, p. 160 
32 Ib id 
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5.5.1 Islamic law 
5.5.1.1 Subjectivity (Nafsl) 
In Islamic law, the perspective of both 'subjectivity' 33 (nafsi or dhiti) and 
'objeCtiVity"34(mauddi) play an important role in determining the existence of duress.. 
With regard to subjectivity it is sufficient that the fear of a threat is the motive for the 
duressed person to carry out an act, be it a verbal or deed in view that by meeting the 
demand of the person exerting duress, the duress party will avoid immediate or future 
injury. Tbus, the actions of the duressed person are caused by a psychological condition 
that is disrupted by the presence of fear and intin-ýidation. 
The existence of fear has been recognized by the SharPjý as a means to test the 
-0-. faith of its followers. As for example, the Qur'dn (2: 155)says: be sure we shall test you 
with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods, lives and fruits, but glad fiding to 
those who patiently persevere. Thus, duress is deternuned by the presence of fear itself 
regardless of its degree; indeed some jurists like the Hanari even maintain that anything 
causing distress and sadness can be regarded as duress, as they also hold that the noble 
would be distressed by harsh words, or the vile by a severe beating. 35 
The actual degree of fear and distress is subjective in the sense that it varies from 
one person to another according to several factors such as age,, sex, - 
knowledge and 
others. Therefore, for instance, a threat could be duress for one person but not for others 
due to the above factors. It can thus be said that Islamic law mainly employs subjective 
33 What results from a threat such as fear and anxiety 
34 Means used to constitute duress such as beating, imprisonment and so on 
BAI-Mabs CY, vol 24 p. 39 
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measurement in determining duress. However, as will be seen, objectivity is not totally 
neglected. 
5.5.1.2 Objectivity (Maw(ldi) 
It is clear that subjectivity is the basic factor in Islan-k law in determirfing 
duress; however, the importance of objective measurement is nevertheless recogrUsed 
This can be observed in the classification of threats by jurists where these are divided it 
into 'severe threat' and 'less severe threat'. 36 An example of severe threat is the threat to 
kill or cause loss of limb, or long imprisonment, all of which constitute duress for most, 
irrespective of their status. In contrast, in the category of less severe threat subjectivity is 
of greater importance. 
In short, it is concluded that Islamic law has taken into consideration both 
subjectivity and objectivity in determining the presence and validity of duress, which in 
turn refutes the claim that Islamic law recognizes only subjectivity in its doctrine. It is 
however noteworthy that the combination of subjectivity and objectivity cannot be found 
in the works of some jurists such as al-Ghazali and Imam al- Haramayn; 
37 in their 
opinion objectivity is thought to be the only measure to determine duress since its 
presence is constituted only if it involves a threat to kill. 
" Kashfal-Asr&, vol 4, p. 3 83 




5.5.2 The ECC 
Most jurists are of the opinion that subjectivity is preferred in the Code as being 
similar to Islamic law. This is both because the fear caused by duress is subjective with 
regard to the victim of duress and because this fear varies from one person to another. 
Thus, when a threat is posed to a person, his property or his reputation, this will make 
him believe that great danger is about to occur even if the danger is not real; in other 
words, this is sufficient to constitute duress if the means used can cause immediate fear 
in the duressed person. 38 Article 127/3 clearly states that in determining duress, the sex 
of the duressed person, his age, societal status and health must be taken in 
consideration,, as well as circumstances that may contribute to the gravity of duress. This 
article clearly confirms the adoption of sub ective measurement by the Code, as j 
supported by the majority of jurists in their works as Abu Sat-it for example stresses :" 
We conclude that the New Code has in general confined the condition of duress to the 
same condition imposed by the Old Code after removing the flawed article 135 which 
contains both objective and subjective approaches. which did not prevent it from being 
seen as subjective, However, the New Code consists only of subjective approach (article 
127/3) wlýich is considered as a valid approach"" 
In addition,, the judiciary has interpreted the phrase " reasonable grounds" 
(qjimah ala asis) contained in article 127/1 as Subjective approach In one ruling, for 
example, the EgCC held that since the appeal had denied the presence of duress exerted 
on the seller on grounds relating to her personality and to the circumstances leading to 
" MasWir al-Haq, vol 2, p. 195 
39 MasAdir al-Iltiz&n, p. 168 
182 
the conclusion of the contract, the judgement did not contravene the approach provided 
by law in assessing duress. 40 
However,, despite the overwhelmingly supported view clain-ýing 'subjectivity' in the 
New Code, according to some article 127 and 128 therein imply the adoption of 
'objectivity' in addition to subjectivity. I am inclined to prefer this view for the 
following reasons: 
I-It is not sufficient for a trial judge to accept that a contract is concluded under 
duress by a mere claim from the duressed person that he was in fear; rather the judge 
must to take into account objective circumstances . Otherwise, anyone who wishes to 
escape his obligations can easily do this on the pretext of fear especially when the degree 
of danger is determMed only by the duressed person himself. However, by resorting to 
objective approach the duressed person cannot claim to be in fear if the threat thereto is 
not significant. Furthermore, part of one ruling of the EgCC indicates that " since the 
basis for the plaintiff to claim compensation is that his resignation was not willing, rather 
it was forced by the Minister of Justice threatening to detain him unless he resigned... and 
since article 127 states that in assessing the degree of duress, the sex of the person 
falling under its influence, his age, health conditions and other conditions that are bound 
to affect the gravity of duress, shall be taken into consideration, and since the plaintiff 
was an experienced judge he should not have been troubled by what had been said to 
ý!, 41 him. Therefore the claim for compensation should be dismissed . 
2-Article 128 of the ECC reads that if duress emanates from a source other than the 
contracting parties, the duressed party may not request the annulment of the contract 
4OEgCC, cas. no 392, dated 25/1/1962 
" EgCC, cas. no 44, dated 11/11/76 
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unless he proves that the other party was aware or was presumed to be aware of such 
duress. Indubitably, this demonstrate the use of objectivity rather than subjectivity since 
the fights of the other bonafide contracting party are considered in order to achieve the 
stability of the transaction. 
3-The inclusion of the state of necessity into duress which occurs incidentally when 
another person takes advantage of a situation to obtain high payment combines 
subjectivity and objectivity such as in the case or a drowning person asking fdr help from 
another, or in the case of a surgeon demanding exorbitant payment in order to conduct an 
operation. 
It is thus observed that the ECC has followed Islamic law in adopting both 
subjectivity and objectivity in order to determine the existence of duress although the use 
of subjectivity is more apparent in the legislation. In other words, the emphasis of 
subjectivity does not totally deny the adoption of objectivity. 
5.6 Elements or duress 
Four elements are required before a state of duress can be said to exist; a person 
exerting duress( mukrih), a duressed person (mukrah), threat by duress (mukrah bih) 
and act to be executed under duress (mukrah 'alayh)) 
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5.6.1 Conditions of a person exerting duress 
5.6.1.1 Islamic law 
The person who exerts duress must be able to execute the threat. This is because 
it is not conceivable that the duressed party will carry out the demand of the person 
exerting duress if he knows that the latter does not have the ability to realize his 
threat. In such a case the act carried out by the duressed party is considered to be 
voluntary thus has valid legal effect. In line with this according to Abu Han-ifah, 42 
duress is not valid unless it comes from rulers who have the power to carry out the 
threat which constitutes that duress; thus, he excludes duress coming from sources 
other than the ruler( sultJý7) such as thieves for example. He argues that the duressed 
person can ask help from the ruler to remove the threat but not vice versa. 
Nevertheless the majority of jurists have broadened the meaning of duress to include 
that which issues from the rulers and elsewhere, according to which every act 
constituting a threat is considered as duress regardless of the source of that threat. 
Some jurists suggest that this difference between Abu Hanifah and his two disciples 
merely a difference of time, in the sense that during Abu Hanifah's time the power 
to threaten was vested only in the ruler whereas this situation had later changed 
during the time of Abii Yiisuf and Muhammad. 43 
The question is then raised as to whether moral influence (nufjdh adabi) fall 
within the realm of duress , such as 
in the case of husband and wife, in which the former 
has authority over the latter, or between the ruler and his subject or the teacher and his 
pupils as well as between a lord and his servant. In such examples, if those concerned 
" Al-Mabs qt, vol 24, pp. 43 -44 43 Masidir al-Haqq, vol 2, p. 206 
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carry out an unjust act as directed by a person in authority because of feeling of fear, will 
this act be valid? Here the Hanafi hold that a command from the ruler will constitute 
duress even if this is without threat; the same is true if such a command comes from a 
husband to his wife a view which is followed by Murshid aI-ffqyrJn as it states* "The 
husband shall have power over his wife but whomsoever forces his wife by beating her, 
or by preventing her from visiting her family so that she will waive her dowry for him, 
such an act from her- in a state of fear-will be null and void and thus he is still obliged to 
pay the dowry', 44 It thus seems that the source of duress is less significant whether it 
comes from ruler to his subject, from a father to his children . This 
is because as long as 
the duressed person fears something harmful may occur if the demand of the person 
exerting duress is not met then duress is said to exist. 
5.6.1.2 The ECC 
While the term 'power and ability' are not clearly stated in the Code, nonetheless 
their connotations are to be found in other term contained in article 127, such as the 
words sultAn and grave danger. Here both words indicate that the person exerting duress 
as having the power and force, is able to inflict harm on the duress person if his demand 
is not met a meaning which is similarly found in the Penal Code. Thus the gravity of 
danger and the force are detern'uned by the duressed person since the person exerting 
duress has psychologically led him to enter into a contraCt. 
45 
In addition,, moral influence too may constitute duress if used to reach an illegal 
goal as is obvious from the code. In line with this Jamaludin Zaki states: " as 
long as the 
44 Murshid al- gayr, §n article 293/2 
45AI_ Sanhuri, al-Wayj4 194 
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factor in determining duress which annuls a contract is the pursuit of an illegal goal even 
if the means is legal, the use of moral influence -such as a father on his son, .-... if this 
originally does not constitute duress, it will become duress if the goal is illicit" 
The Code does not recognize duress if it involves a third party other than the 
contracting parties. If this happens to be the case, the duressed party enjoys no right to 
nullify the contract provided that the other contracting party was not aware of the 
existence of such duress as spelled out in article 128. In the event of the duressed person 
insisting on the annulment of the contract,, the bona fide party has the right to counter by 
claiming compensation; the best form of such compensation here would be to ask for the 
contract to remain valid. 
47 
5.6.2 Conditions of a person under duress 
5.6.2.1 Islamic law 
The duressed party must have a strong belief that the threat exerted will be 
realized in the event of non-compliance with the demands of the person exerting duress. " 
In the absence of such belief then duress may not be claimed; rather there exists a mere 
threat bearing no consequences. This is because in order to comply lAith the demands of 
the person exerting duress, the duressed person has to be almost certain that the threat is 
serious. It is noticeable here that the Shariah does not require that the duressed person be 
completely certain (yaqjn); rather near certainty (ghalabat al-.? ann) is sufficient if 
certainty is hard to prove. 
Jamaludin Zak-1, al-Waj&fi al-Nazariyyat al OAmmah li al-Iltiz&n, n. p, 1978, p. 85, see EgCC, 
cas. no 23, dated 25/2/1943 
47 Mas, #dir al-&qq, vol 2 p. 197 
"Al-Mughni-, vol 7,292 
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Further more the duressed person is not able to defend himself, or to escape the 
threat by asking help from another;. in other words, the duressed person has no choice 
but to comply with the demand of the person exerting duress. 
In the event that the duressed person is able to defend himself, he is allowed to do 
so provided that the degree of defence matches the extent of duress exerted meaning 
that the force used must be gradual; otherwise if unnecessary or excessive force is used, 
the duressed. person is liable to pay compensation for whatever damages may have been 
caused. The jurists have based this principle upon this prophetic tradition : "A person 
came to the prophet PBUH and asked him. 0 Prophet what is your opinion if there is a 
person who wants to take my property. He replied. Do not give it to him, The man 
ftulher asked, what if he fights me, the prophet PBUH replied fight him back, He then 
asked,, what if I am killed, the prophet replied you will be a martyr, The man next asked, 
what If I kill him,, the prophet pb uh replied that he would go to hell". Thus as Al- 
Shauka-ni,, comments, a person is permitted to fight those who want to seize his property 
unjustly regardless of the amount of such property- small or substantial; indeed some 
jurists even opine that such fighting is compulsory" 
It is equally important to note that jurists are unanimous on the point that duress 
should involve the duressed person or his property. The example given is quite 
comprehensive in that such duress is here exerted on a person to sell his property, 
otherwise harm will either be inflicted upon him himself or his property. However what 
if the duress itself causes harm to the person exerting duress in physical terms but cause 
49 Nayl al- AwAk, vol 6, p. 75 
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harm to the duressed person in spiritual terms? As an example, if a child says to his 
father " If you do not sell such and such a property to such and such person I will kill 
myself, then in this situation the son is obviously a person who exerts pressure whereas 
the farther is the person under duress. To suggest that the rule of necessity applies here is 
to avoid the issue and is furthermore inaccurate,, unless it is acknowledged that necessity 
covers acts issuing from human beings as well as other causative factors. So then, can 
the rule of duress apply here? To answer this question, reference must be made to 
measurement of duress; by then referring to proof from Qur, an (2: 155) it can be deduced 
that if the fear is present then a state of duress exists. 
5.6.2.2 The ECC 
In order to establish duress upon the duressed person, the Code requires the 
presence of a state of fear as a result of a threat, which then forces him to conclude a 
contract. The word fear (rahbah) here incorporates both immediate and future danger 
which will vary as discussed previously from one person to another 50 . This said, 
however,, if the duressed person were able to escape a state of duress , what then is the 
position? Here as in Islamic law the Code also recognizes the doctrine of self defence 
which allows the duressed party to use force to protect himself from duress. 
Nevertheless,, the right to defend oneself is not absolute, meaning that certain conditions 
have to be observed, such as non use of excessive force. In this regard, article 166 clearly 
states " whoever causes harm to others in order to defend himself , 
his property or a third 
party or his property he shall not be held responsible for his acts so long as he does not 
exceed the necessary limit in his defence, otherwise he shall be obliged to make 
reparation in observance of the principle ofjusfice"' 
' Shanab, Dur i7sflNaMrijyat al-Iltiz&n, pp. 173 -174. 
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5.6.3 Conditions of a threat used to exert duress (nmkrah bih) 
5.6.3.1.1slamic law 
This is the means used by the person exerting duress in order to force the 
duressed person to carry out the demand. However, before further discussion it is 
important to determine whether the threat alone can constitute duress or whether this 
should be followed by other actions such as beating and so on. The majority of jurists, 
1 52 -53 among them the Hanafi", the Maliki, and the Sha-rici are of the opinion that the threat 
alone would be sufficient to establish duress. This is because the principle embodied in 
allowing a duressed person to carry out a demand is to avoid punishment or hurt; if the 
hurt has to occur first then the spirit of concession (rukhsah)will be meaningless. The 
Hanbali,, on the other hand have imposed the execution of threat as a condition for the 
validity of duress. They based their argument on a narration whereby non believers 
coerced 'Ammar into renouncing Islam; having learned of this, the Prophet PBUH said : 
"The non believers had put you in the water and forced you to renounce Islam. If they do 
this again repeat what you have done". Thus,, in this hadith the non believers had carried 
out the threat before 'Ammdr asked the Prophet PBUH. 
Besides this,, the threat must be imminent, as thus if the threat is in the future, 
duress is not established due to the fact that futurity gives the duressed party opportunity 
to escape duress by asking help from the authorities. However, while this condition is 
stipulated by the majority of jurist; the Maliki on the other hand do not impose this 
AI-Bada'i, Vol 7, p. 176 
9&hiyat al-Dus aqi-, vol 2, p. 3 70 
53 Rawflat al- Talibm, vol 8, p. 59 
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condition as for them duress may be imminent or in the future as long as the state of fear 
is found to be present 54 
5.6.3.2 The ECC 
The code does not specify the means to be used; rather duress is constituted if 
there is great danger surrounding either the duressed person, his property or his honour . 
The deciding factor is how grave the degree of duress was for the duressed person not 
the actual means used. In line with this, fear may be created in a person by using means 
which might be perceived as ridiculous by others such as exerting threat by way of 
magic. (sihr) 55 The Code is also in conformity with the Malikli in not restricting danger 
to only that which is imminent, . as al-Santifiri affirms : "The determining factor is that 
which concerns the psychological status of the contracting party as he might be fearful 
of a future threat which is sufficient -to nullify his consent. The deciding factor is 
therefore measured by the presence of fear in the duressed person and not the threat be it 
imminent or in the future"56 
It should be noted too that the Preliminary draft of the ECC also proposes that in 
order to contitute duress presence of immediate danger/threat is necessary as stated in 
article 176 which read. " the fear is in effect present if the duressed person feels that a 
threat is imn-ýinenf' However the wording was later changed to become as stated in the 
existing code state. 
57 
549ashiyat al-'Adawl, Dgr al-Fikr, Beirut, 1412 H, vol 1, p. 152 
55 MasAdir al-Haqq, vol 2, pp. 207-209 
56MasAdir al-Haqq, vol 2, p. 192 
57 Al-Argh bayn al-Shad ah wa al-QAn &7, p. 12 
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5.6.4 Condition of an act to be done under duress (mukrah 'alayh) 
5.6.4.1 Islamic law 
This is the most important element of duress since it is the cause for the state of 
duress, without which the person exerting duress will not pose a threat to the duressed 
person. This act can be either in the form of an utterance such as offer and acceptance in 
contract or in the form of a deed such as delivery of a sold item. Certain conditions must 
then be identified in order for an act to be done under duress to be valid; that is only in 
the presence of these conditions, which must exist, will duress be established. Firstly, 
this act must be unjust; this has been agreed upon by jurists as previously discussed. The 
second condition is that the act must be specified in the sense that the duressed party has 
only one course of action and no alternative is offered. For instance, if the person 
exerting duress has specified that the duressed person should sell any given land , then 
this is sufficient to constitute duress. 
However, if the acts are multiple and not specified, such as duress to force a 
person to divorce one of his wives, sell one of his cars or rent one of his premises then 
duress is still said to exist in such situations since the duressed person is fearful of the 
consequences if he does not comply with the demand. " 
Tbirdly, for a situation to constitute duress the duressed person must not act 
differently from that action which is specified by the person exerting duress . Tberefore, 
if the person exerting duress demands that the duressed person sells his property, for 
58 Mubdrak, $abn al-Sa'daw-1, al-IkrA wa Atharuhu 'ald al-Ria-ff bi al-Iltiz&n fi al-Fiqh al- 
Isl&nj, Dir&ah Muq Aranah, PhD Thesis, Cairo University, p. 118 
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instance, but instead of selling, he donates the property, then duress is not established 
because he has not complied with the demands of the person exerting duress. However, 
this raises the question of what conditions constitute duress when non compliance 
revolves around settlement figures ? That is if the demand is that the duressed person 
should sell the property for a price of one thousand, but instead he sells it for either more 
or less than the stipulated figure. Jurists are not agreed on this point as some such as the 
the Shafili , the 
Hanafi and the Hanball hold that such discrepancies have no effect on 
duress while others opine that duress is not established if the final sum is less. 59 It seems 
that the distinction between settlement figures is preferable. 60 
5.6.4.2. The ECC 
The ECC does not stipulate the specific conditions detailed by Islamic law as to 
acts to be done under duress , aside 
from the condition of being unjust. If the purpose of 
duress is unjust then legally the state of duress is established, however if the purpose is 
just then this would not constitute duress in the eyes of the law, regardless of the means 
used be this legal or illegal, a principle which is clearly stated in article 127 of the ECC 
61 
59Al-Mabs at - vol 24, p. 52 
6'Al-Ikrjh wa Ath&vhu 'ala al Riýlj,. p. 120 
61 See al-Sanhu-n, Masidir al-Haqq, vol 2, p. 194 
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5.7 The effects of duress on contract 
5.7.1 Islamic law 
Prior to a discussion of the effect of duress on contract some important points 
related to the presence of duress on a person should be noted To begin with, jurists are 
unanimously agreed that duress does not completely remove legal capacity. This holds 
true if reason (caql) is regarded as the basis for active legal capacity. As the duressed 
person is still capable of responding to legal commandment (khiob shar C17) since his 
acts will be judged by the SharlAb as sinful, deserving of reward, valid or void, this 
leads directly to a consideration of exactly what effect duress does in fact have on the 
duressed party. Jurists have attempted to addressed this question by focusing on two 
problems; namely the effect of duress on intention(qasd) and consent(riýa), and on 
whether the person who exert duress or the duressed person should be held liable for an 
act carried out under duress. 
62 
As far as the first issue is concerried, jurists have used the term choice(ikhtiyjr) 
and intention (qasd) interchangeably, terms which imply the intention to carry out an act 
which wavers between realisation and non realisation which is within the doer's power 
to achieve by preferring one alternative to the other. 63 On the other hand, consent(riýb) 
indicates feeling pleasure by someone at doing something in which his interest lies. 64 
Although the majority of jurists maintain that both terms are identical, the Hanafi hold 
that there are nevertheless disparities between the two. This is due to the fact that choice 
refers only to the intent underlying the cause upon which the effect of the deed depends, 
" Kashfal-Asrjr, vol. 4, p. 383, al-Taqri-r* wa al-Tahbj-r, vol 2, p. 276 
63AIunad Hassan, The Principle of Islamic 'urisprudence, p. 366, see also, Sharh al-Talw, ýh 'Ali 
al-Tawdih, vol 2, pp. 549-550 
64Ibid 
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whereas consent is the desire to achieve that effect. Hence, according to the Hana(i. 
duress can influence either of these two elements, that is, its effect can either negate 
consent and will (Mayar), negate consent but not will, or lastly, it may not negate either 
consent or Will. 65However, the majority of jurists opine that choice refers to intention, 
which in turn encompasses consent. 66 
With regard to an act carried out under duress as to whether liability should be 
related to the person exerting duress or the duressed party, originally any act whatsoever 
should be attributed to its doer in accordance with the Quranic verses (53: 38-41) which 
read: "That no bearer of burden can bear the burden of another, that man can have 
nothing but what he strives for, that the fruit of his striving will soon come in sight, then 
will he be rewarded with a reward complete". However, in a case where duress involves 
contract, liability for the act carried out will lie with to the person exerting duress as 
maintained by the Sha-fi,,. 67 
This said, jurists are not agreed as to the validity of a contract of sale made under 
68 duress. According to the Maliki, and some Hanafi like Zufar, a sale concluded by a 
person under duress is upheld valid, but its effect is suspended (mawqi7fi. Al- Zufar 
argues that this kind of sale is valid because it resembles the sale made by an 
unauthorized agent( fuýldli) in the sense that both instances do not fulfil the requirement 
of a proper contract; therefore, if the sale made by an unauthorized agent is suspended, 
the effect of duress on the sale will accordingly be the same. In other words, al-Zufar, 
65AI-Taqrj-*r wa al-Tahbr-ý, vol 2, p. 276, Kashfal-Asrffr, vol 4, p. 383 
"6Ibid 
"Sharý al-Talwjh , vol 2, p. 196. 
On the contrary the Hanafi hold that acts done under duress can 
still be related to the duressed person. See, al-Taqrr wa al-Tahbir, vol 2, p. 277 
6'AI-BadjY, vol 7, p. 182, see also, Mub5rak, al-Ikrihs wa Atharuh 0'al, # al-Riý]A, p. 196 
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having no direct textual evidence to support his view, has resorted to analogy (qiy&) in 
his argument. However, this analogy between the unauthorised agent and the duressed 
person seems untenable, for a deeper analysis shows that there is 'disparity' between the 
two, terminologically known as analogy between two different things (qiy& ma al- 
f&iq). This is because in the case of an unauthorised agent the seller does not possesses 
the sold item (mabj) whereas this is not the case in the sale made by the duressed person. 
Thus the use of analogy itself is invalid. 
af 6 On the other hand,, the majority of jurists such as Sh 19 and Hanbali'o opine that 
the existence of duress in a sale contract renders it null and void ( bký, and thus carries 
no effect whatsoever. They base their opinion on the Qur'an (4: 29) This verse clearly 
indicates that every kind of property exchange will not be lawful unless it is carried out 
by mutual consent of the parties concerned. The Qur'dn has considered void every act 
carried out without consent; as such, undoubtedly , consent 
is 'absent' if a contract is 
concluded under duress,, rendering such a contract as void. In this regard, Ibn Arabi 
states: " this verse is evidence of the voidance of the sale carried out by a duressed 
person, due to the absence of consent !., 71 Moreover, their view is also supported by a 
Prophetic tradition "Allah has lifted from my followers ( the liability of) mistake, 
forgetfulness and duress, , 72 which shows that every act issuing from a person under 
duress is not considered lawful. Apart from this evidence, the majority of jurists also 
argue that a sale by a cluressed person is similar to that of a jesting person (hjziý in the 
sense that both of them in reality do not intend to conclude that contract. Therefore, 
69Mughn-i-al-MuPtq, vol 2, p. 7 
70Al- Murdawl, al-Iny, #f, vol 4, p. 265 
" Apkkn al-Quran , vol I, p. 411 72 Narrated by In Majah and Tabrani 
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accepting that the sale by a jesting person is void, in the same vein the sale made by the 
duressed person should also be void according to the rule of analogy (qiy&). " 
In addition, according to the Qur'an if a person is forced under duress to abandon 
Islam, this abandonment is regarded as void; he is still therefore a Muslim in the eyes of 
the Sharlah . This is because his consent was not given. Similarly, if he is forced to enter 
into a contract under duress such a contract should in the same way be voided. In 
jority of Hana r74 addition to these views, the ma I hold that a sale made under duress is 
irregular (f&id), but can be ratified by the consent of the duressed, person himself They 
maintain that consent is a condition for a contract to be valid,, and not a condition for its 
conclusion (in 'iq&l). According to this, in the case of the absence of conditions for 
validity, such absence will not make the legal rule (huk7n) absent similar to other kinds of 
irregular sales. The only difference between a sale carried out by a duressed person and 
other irregular sales is that in the former the doctrine of ratification (ij&ah) applies, 
whereas this is not the case in the latter. This is because the irregularity In other sales 
such as usurous sale (bay ribawi) is for the right of Shar' that carmot be removed by the 
consent of the contracting parties. On the contrary, in a sale made by a duressed person, 
the right of the contracting parties prevails; hence duress can be removed through their 
consent. 
75 
In other words duress in their view does not prevent the concluding of contract as 
along as its elements are fulfilled . However, 
duress will only make the sale 
unenforceable in the absence of 'complete consent'. Therefore, if the duressed person 
Al-lkrA bayn al-Sharj-'ah wa al-QinCm, p. 32 
Al-Mabydt vol 24, p. 93 
75 H&hiyah Ibn 'Abid, [n, vol 6, p. 130, Rustwn Bdz, Sharfi al-Majallah, pp. 559-560 
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gives his consent, the sale will be enforceable. If duress involves only concluding a sale( 
17), offer and acceptance) not delivery (tas ffn and the duressed person delivers the sold 
item with full consent,, this delivery can be considered as ratification. If duress is on the 
buyer alone, then both the buyer and the seller have the right to revoke a contract before 
taking possession; however, if duress involves the buyer and the seller, both of them 
have the right to revoke regardless of the fact Of taking possession76 
Having discussed the evidence put forward by the above jurists, it seems that the 
view which upheld that the contract made under duress is suspended is more preferable. 
This is because event though such a contract is concluded in the absence of consent of 
the duressed. party, this consent can later be obtained through ratification. 
5.7.2 The ECC 
Article 127/1 of the ECC states that a contract may be annulled for reasons of 
'duress'. In addition article 139 stipulates that the right to annul the contract shall be 
terminated with explicit or implicit approval and consent, and that consent shall be based 
on the date the contract is concluded without derogation to the rights of third parties. In 
the case of 'annulment' the contracting parties shall return to their pre contracting status. 
If this proves to be impossible, a court ruling may be passed for equivalent 
compensation. Article 140 further states that" the right to annul the contract shall be 
prescribed by limitation if the party holding that right does not adhere to it within three 
years, and the validity of this term shall begin in the case of incomplete legal capacity 
from the date this cause is terminated, and in the case of error or fraudulence from the 
76 
Al-Badk'vol 7, p. 186 
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date of its detection, while in the case of duress it shall begin from the day it is 
elirninated. In all cases the right of nullification for error, fraud or duress shall not be 
upheld after the lapse of fifteen years from the time the contract is completed". 
All these provisions clearly show that a voidable contract can be ratified because 
its existence is legally recognized and has legal effect; thus , there is little difference 
between a 'valid' and a 'voidable' contract 77 except as concerns the contracting party 
who may wish to annul the contract in his favour. 
This means that a contract made under duress may be suspended pending either 
validation by the person under duress or invalidation. He is also required to be in a 
necessary state of capacity and his consent should be free from any influence. 18 
It can be said that the Code is in accordance with the view of Maliki and Zufar 
which considers the contract of the duressed person to be suspended where it differs as 
regards the period of validation. As stated, the period is three years from the removal of 
duress and fifteen years from the completion of the contract. 
Despite this, some Jurists such as Jamil Sharqawi consider a contract made by a 
the duressed person to be null and void. As such, the concept of ratification does not in 
his view apply here on the basis that " the lack of 'will' caused by its defect renders it 
non-existent in the eyes of the law. This is because, the absence of the necessary 
condition has led to the non-existence of 'will' itself Therefore, the will of the duressed 
Al-Badrawl, al-Napariyyat, p. 286 
"A]-Suddah, Mayidir al-Iltiz&n , p. 
286, Tulbah, al-Ta'liq ala Nuyay al-QinCm al-Madan_,, vo 1. 
p. 129 
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person... is not of any legal effeCti, 79Nevertheless , this view appears to be inconsistent 
with the provision of ECC itself in applying the doctrine of voidability to a contract made 
under duress. 'O 
5.8 Revocation of a contract made under duress 
5.8.1 Islamic law 
In Islamic law,, the concept of revocation applies only within the Hanafi and 
Maliki schools of law. Other schools,, such as the Shdfi'i and the Hanbali, -due to their 
views in invalidating a contract made under duress- did not discuss this problem in their 
works. For this reason, discussion of the rights of the contracting parties to revoke a 
contract made under duress will refer only to the Hanafi and Malik-i. Generally, the 
Hanafi and Maliki are agreed that the right of revocation rests with the duressed person; 
however, the question then arises as to whether the person exerting duress also enjoys 
the same right. According to the Maliki, the duressed person has absolute right to 
revoke the contract; however, the person exerting duress may revoke it only with the 
approval of the duressed person. The Hanari concur with the Maliki's view provided that 
taki ing possession is completed. Nevertheless , 
if 'Possession' has yet to take place, both 
the duressed person and the person exerting duress have an equal right to revoke the 
contract. They contend that the legal force of a contract before taking possession is 
considered to be very weak. Thus, either party has the right to terminate a weak contract, 
79 Al-Sharqdwl, Jam-11, May9dir al- Iltizkn, p. 109 
" See Article 127 of the ECC 
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whereas this is not the case after taking possession of property by which a contract has 
81 been corifirmed. 
5.8.2 The ECC 
In this respect the ECC seems to have adopted the Malik-i's view; thus, it is not 
permissible for the person exerting duress to annul the contract without the consent of 
the duressed person, as may be understood from article 139, which reads " if the law 
vests either contracting party with the right to nullify the contract, the other party shall 
not claim that right. This is also supported by article 127 which gives the right for those 
under threat to revoke the contract. 82 
5.9. Summary 
Not every form of duress will cause modification of rules relating to contract, 
rather in order for duress to legally exist certain conditions must be fulfilled. These 
conditions encompass the four elements of duress; namely the person exerting duress, 
the duressed person , the threat used to exert 
duress and the acts to be executed under 
duress which are to be judged according to both subjective and objective approaches in 
Islamic law. As for the ECC although the overwhelming number of jurists are of the 
opinion that duress applies a subjective approach, a number of judicial rulings imply the 
contrary; that is to say a combination of both approaches can be traced. The doctrine of 
interdiction is irrelevant with regard to duress, nevertheless duress is counted as an 
" Al-Mabs a, vol 24, p- 94 
82 Al-Suddah, Mayffdir al-Iltiz&n, pp. 214-215 
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impediment to legal capacity due to the fact that its existence modifies legal rules of 
contract from those concluded under normal circumstances. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE DOCTRINE OF MISTAKE (GHALA 7 
.) 
AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON CONTRACT 
6.1 Introduction 
The basis of mistake (ghala. 6 as an impediment to legal capacity is directly 
related to a prophetic tradition " liability is exempted from a mistaken person". ' 
Although the ECC has stipulated that mistake is clearly regarded as impediment to 
consent, there are clairns that as far as Islamic law is concerned the concept of m1stake 
has not been developed or recognised by Muslim jurists. Some even wrongly opine that 
Muslim jurists are not aware of the existence of mistake as an impediment to consent, 
and in turn an impediment to legal capacity itself. To verify the above claims, this 
chapter is therefore devoted to expounding the theory of mistake in both Islamic law and 
the ECC. In doing so, it is vital to first investigate the meaning of mistake, the question 
as to whether this exists in Islarnic law and its effect (if any) on contracts. In addition, the 
study will also examine the criteria, conditions and measurement necessary to establish 
mistake. 
6.2 The notion of mistake 
6.2.1 Islamic law 
6.2.1.1 Definition 
In the literal sense,, the Arabic word ghalat means to miss the correct part of 
something unintentionally. It is construed " ghalaP flal-pis,; h",, that is to make a mistake 
'Part of gadlh narrated by Ibn Majah in his Sunan 
203 
in calculation when the correct part is MiSSing. 2 From these meanings it can be seen that 
ghala t and khata' are used interchangeably. It is also evident from the work of jurists that 
when they discuss the subject, they tend to use these terms synonymously. Abu Zahrah3' 
for instance, has mentioned both the term ghalat and khala' vvithout dIfferentiating 
between them; and this is true in general with regard to the early Muslim jurists. 
Nevertheless,, for the purposes of technicality, the English tenn 'mistake' will be 
used throughout this chapter to cover both ghalat and khata'. However, if the use of the 
Arabic term is inevitable the word ghalat is preferred in order to match Islamic law 
against the ECC. This is because although there is no difference between ghalat and 
khap' in the parlance of Muslim jurists, in the ECC it seems that the term kha&7' is more 
frequently used to denote criminal or tortuous liability, whereas the word ghalat on the 
other hand is more related to contract. This perhaps has justified the drafter of the ECC in 
using the terms differently. Rayner seems to be influenced by the Civil law approach 
when she asserts that the usual term for error (Mistake) is usually only applied in a legal 
sense in criminal law to denote the absence of criminal intention; 4 she further argues that 
" it may yet be found within the fiqh to refer to the doctrine of mistake. 
5 However, 
Rayner's opinion seems to contradict the view of classical jurists when they used the 
term khap' to refer to what is known for Rayner as the doctrine of mistake. 
2 Al- 
- 
Q&n as al-Mufiltt, p. 680 
3 Al-Milkiyyah, p. 416 




Although there are generally quite a number of citations concerning 'mistake' 
that can be found in the Qur'dn and the Sunnah, there is no specific legal definition in 
these sources. The jurists for their part have thus attempted to define the concept of 
mistake. According to al-Bukhar-i for example a mistake is an act or a word issuing from 
a person uriintentionally. 6 This defmition in fact encompasses another meaning of 
mistake which has been identified by later jurists as imagining a thing to be different to 
how it truly is. Similarly, this definition is taken to cover every kind of MIstake be it in 
contractual transactions,, criminal acts or others. 
However in the realm of contract, it is the modem jurists who play an important 
role in formulating the concept of mistake to match their counterparts in the Civil law. 
Therefore it is not surprising to find that these jurists have specified a special heading 
under defects of consent( 'uyi7b al-ri(Ij ) to discuss the subject of n stake, a speci ication 
which is in total accord with what has been done by the Civil law jurists. In this regard, 
Abu Zahrah has proposed that mistake may be defined as an act of imagination where the 
perceptions of the contracting parties about subject matter are contrary to reality. 
7 It is to 
be noted that Abu Zahrah in this definition has limited the occurrence of mistake to 
subject matter (maqi7d 'alayh). Interestingly, his approach is followed by a large nw-nber 
6 Kashfal-AsrAr, vol 4, p-380 
7 Al-Milkiyyah, p. 416 
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of modem jurists8which seems to correct the assertion that they have followed the Civil 
law approach. However, this is not to suggest that these jurists are not aware of the 
existence of other kinds of mistake. This is because as suggested by some authors that the 
above definition concems only the specific meaning of mistakes ( mana- khj, ý). At anN. 
rate-in my opinion- to require both a specific and a general meaning of a concept is 
superfluous if there is no significant legal consequence in doing so. Furthermore, this 
separation- between general and specific meanings- was not known to the early jurists. 
For this reason, it would be in the interests of legal discussion to have a comprehensive 
definition of mistake to include every aspect of this concept as far as contract is 
concemed 
In the fight of this, it is preferable to define the term mistake as inconsistency 
between the utterances of the contracting parties and reality, which occurs 
unintentionally. 91t may also be defined as a false or inexact representation of reality 
which may be form to different elements of a contract. 
10 
6.2.1.2 Does the concept of mistake exist in Islamic Law? 
The above heading may lead the reader to enquire about its relevancy. 
The 
justification for its inclusion is that if it should follow quite a long discussion about the 
meaning of mistake; this inevitably flags the existence of such a term, should 
this 
question be raised, which in turn may seem to be a contradiction 
in terms. This is because 
See for example, Madkfir, al-Madkhal, p. 514, Qasun, Yusuf, 
Mabffd'i al- Fiqh al-Isl&ni, p. 
324, , al-Khafif, 
Ali, Afik&n al-Mu', tnaIN, p. 137, Musa, Yusuf, al-AmwW, p. 
403, Shalabi, 
Muhammad Mustafa, al-Madkhal, p. 403, Ramadan, Abmad 'Abd al-Rahman, 
Nazariyyat al- 
Ghalaf wa Atharuhu fi al-'Uq W f! al-Fiqh al-Isl&nt_* Dir&ah 
Muqffranah, PhD Thesis, Cairo 
University, 1996, p. 19 
9Mabda'al-MýIff, vol 2, p. 801 
10 Rayner, The Theory of Contract, p. 177 
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while in the first place we acknowledge that that there is a legal mealung for mistake at 
the same time we are in doubt as to the existence of the concept. In fact, what prompted 
the writer to raise this question is the diversity of opinions as regards the actual e\istence 
of such theory in Islamic law. Thus, clarification is needed before further discussion 
since there is a notion held by some authors that Islamic law is not concerned with the 
concept of mistake. For instance Nqýb stresses that "the concept of error as it exists in 
Western juridical system is not to be found in the system of fiqh". " Quite similarly, 
Rayner asserts that the principles of ghalat are certainly not to be found in any 
systematically theoretical exegesis among the SharPA authorities. 12 Indeed some jurists 
such as 'Abd al-Baqi go even further to maintain that the nature of Islamic law is not in 
accordance with the essence of mistake itself In this respect he says, 
"The truth is that mistake being considered as an automatic physiological matter 
which is built on imagination, and which contradicts reality and issues 
spontaneously from a person, is not in conformity with the objective tendency of 
the SharAah. This is because the SharPah with regard to relations among people 
depends on the apparent condition rather than the hidden one in order to maintain 
stability in their transactions. As such we firid that in the case of any conflict 
between an apparent will and a hidden will the former will prevail. Consequently, 
this idea conveys that in concluding a contract mistake is not recognized by 
,, 13 Islamic law 
Looking at Nayla's statement, the implication is that the concept of mistake is 
more systematically studied in Western jurisprudence; however one cannot judge 
whether she is in fact criticizing the way Islamic law deals with the subject. She has also 
attempted to justify the fact that Muslim jurists have built up a whole juridical edifice 
relative to the object of obligation with certain options for which one finds exclusive 
requirement particular to Islamic law and which reduces to a minimum all risk of error 
"Obeid, Nayla Comair, The law of Business Contracts, in the Arab Middle East, Kluwer 
International, London/The Hague/ Boston, ! 996, lt edition, p. 108 
" Rayner, The theory, p. 176 
13 Cited from, Mu'min, 'Umar al-Sayyid, al-Ghalat al-Mufsid 1i al-Ri4A, fi al-Qancm al- 
Mii'ftalat al-IM&Ad, Dir al-Nahdfft al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1997, p. 252 
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for the contracting parties. 14 As for Rayner, her assertion is justifiable if we are unable to 
find a specific chapter in classical works devoted to the concept of mistake, a matter 
which indeed seems to be true with regard to the vast corpus of classical manuals. 
However, there are also jurists such as Mirghinani who have discussed the concept of 
mistake under a special heading within a topic termed " Da'wJ al-Ghalat I ft al- 
qismah". 15 Furthermore it is not necessary in Islamic law to ascribe a special heading to a 
specific matter before it can be discussed. Indeed some discussions may even be found 
unexpectedly in certain places; 16 this is not to deny however that such a concept is in 
existence,, and Rayner herself seems to recognize this. Elsewhere in her book she claims 
for example that there is no theory of contract in Islamic law wherein she overlooks the 
fact that Ibn Taymiyyah had compiled a special chapter regarding this subject. In short, 
Nayla and Rayner's statement merely deny the existence of a complete theory of mistake 
not,, the concept itself, or in other words, their claims refer more to the form not to the 
substance which is- in my opinion- to some extent accurate. 
However 'Abd al-Baqi'ý opinion should here be examined carefully, as his claim 
does not only concern formality; rather he doubts the need to adopt the theory of mistake 
in Islamic law. It is quite clear for example that the above argument is based on the 
adoption of objective tendency by Islamic law whereby all acts issuing from a person 
should be judged according to his apparent will (ir&tah Ohirah). For instance, in a 
contract of sale,, this is concluded when there is offer and acceptance. Is it true therefore 
" The Law of Business Contract, p. 108 
15 AI-Hiddyah, vol 4, p. 49, 
16 It is worth mentioning what has been said by 'Awdah in this regard " It is not easy for a person 
who is looking for a specific legal problem to find it immediately, rather he is supposed to read 
the works chapter by chapter meticulously. A person may not find what he is looking for but he 
incidentally finds it in a place where he did not expect to do. See, cAwdah, cAbd al-Qddir, al- 
Tashrl a1-Jinff'1a1-Is1&n1-MuqAranan bi al-Q&7rm al-Waffi, Maktabah DAr al-TurNh, Cairo, 
n. d, vol 1, p. 10 
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that Islamic law especially in the case of mistake is based entirely on objective tendenCV? 
Referring to the work of Muslim Jurists it appears that they are not un'ted on this issue, 
meaning that some prefer objectivism while others tend to opt for subjectivism. 
According to the Hanafi, in the case of conflict between an apparent will (objective) and 
an imer will (subjective) the former will prevail. To this effect al- Bazdawi states that 
"If a contract of sale is concluded mistakenly, such as a person wanting to say 
Subb,; mallah but in a slip of the tongue saying I sell to you such and such then the 
17 
contract is valid" . Ibn Humam also stated that a sale should be valid-but not 
enforceable- .... 
if the contract is concluded mistakenly. " It is thus clear from these 
quotations that the Hanafi have preferred to opt for an apparent will regardless of the 
intention of the contracting parties. 
On the other hand, the majority of jurists hold that the 'hidden will' (ir&tah 
bifinah) is to prevail whenever there is a conflict between the two wills. For instance, al- 
Sha-fici asserts that a divorce uttered mistakenly is not valid, due to the fact that what 
merits validity is not mere words but the intention of a person. 19Likewise, Ibn Qayyim 
an eminent Hanball jurist has stressed that among Allah's mercies to his servant is the 
concession of not counting against them any acts which issue mistakenly. He even 
equates the act of mistake with forgetfulness and slips of the tongue. 20 Interestingly, the 
Majallah which is based on Hanafi law, has also adopted the same approach; thus article 
2 stipulates that matters are judged according to intention. This means in turn that any 
" Kashfal-AsrAr, vol 5, p. 35 1, 
18 Fath al-Qa&ý, vol 3, p. 143 
" Al-Taqrj, 'r wa al-Taffi ir- p vol 2, p. 273 
20 Ibn al-Qayyim, fl&n al-Muwaqqi'Pl, edited by Tdha 'Abd al-Ra'af, DAr al-A7, Beirut, 
1973, 
vol 3, pp. 105-106 
209 
21 contract or declaration is judged by intention to render it legally valid. More clearIN, 
article 3 states that in contract effect is given to intention and meaning not to words and 
phrases. According to this principle of archaic sale with redemption (bay' al-wafj) is 
considered as a pledge albeit the word sale is used. 22 
The above discussion shows clearly that 'Abd al-Baqi's claim cannot be 
generalised, since it refers only to one school of law i. e. the Hanafi. However the Hanari 
themselves in certain instances have resorted to subjectivity in their work. In addition 
there is strong evidence from the Qur'an to support the existence of the concept of 
mistake in Islamic law inter alia as follows: 
I-In (33: 5) Allah says " But there is no blame on ye if ye make mistake therein( what 
counts is) the intention of your hearts" 
2-In (2: 286) Allah says " Our lord condemn us not if we forget or fall into error" 
Thus,, these verses and others like them clearly recognise both the concept of mistake and 
in turn its impact upon human deeds, including contractual matters. On the basis of the 
above discussion the writer concludes that Islamic law does recognise the concept of 
mistake although its existence may never be as systematic as in modem law. 
6.2.2 The ECC 
Of the five provisions in the ECC regarding the concept of mistake, none have 
clearly touched on its actual definition. Similar to Islamic law, it is the jurists xN17ho 
attempt to elucidate its real meaning. In so doing some of them opine that a mistake is a 
" Ahdash, Mohamed A, The Effect of Mistake on contractual Relations under English and 
Islamic law A Comparative Overview, the Islamic Quarterly, pp. 27.28 
'2Rustum Salim, Sharh al-Majallah, pp. 19-20 
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psychological situation which causes a person to imagine something contradicting 
reahty23while others refer to it as an illusion in a person's mind causing him to imagme 
something contrary to reality and which subsequently motivates him to conclude a 
contract. 24 ough these two meanings seem to be identical, the latter is more accurate 
and specific with regard to the present study, due to the fact that this defmition covers 
only the area of mistake within the ambit of contract. Elaborating this definition Mu'min 
maintains that this false imagination has led a person to conclude a contract into w-hich 
that person would not have entered had he known the reality. 
25 Mistake occurs as for 
example; in the case of a person buying a statue that he believes to be antique but turns 
out to be counterfeit. Likewise,, if a person presents a gift to another believing this latter 
is his relative but who proves to be foreigner a state of rt-ýistake is said to exist. This 
principle also seems to have been supported by a judicial ruling; although there is no 
clear ruling as to the exact meaning of the term mistake, the EgCC in a case brought to it 
has laid down the principal that any product of the imagination contrary to its reality 
which affects the will at the time of concluding a contract is considered to be a mistake 
as applied in article 120-124 of the ECC. As such, the contracting party concemed may 
seek the nullification of a contract concluded by mistake. 26 This ruling implies that not 
every type of mistake shall be a valid reason to nullify a contract; rather such a mistake 
must have an effect on the 'will" of the contracting parties. 
" See, Abd FattA, Nazariyyat al-c Aqd, p, 297, al- Badraw-i,, al-Nazariyyg al-' Ammah li al 
Iltizkn, p. 181,1 
" See, Sultan, Anwar, al-Mujaz fi Masadir al-iltizam, p. 90, al-Sharqdwl, al-NazariyYat a -c 
Ammah, p. 114, Al-Suddah, Nazariyyat al-c Aqd, p. 225, Yahyd, 
' Abd Wadiid, Durds fi Mabgdi' 
al-Qjn ai p. 222, 
2'Al-Ghalatal-Mufsid 1i al-Ria, #, pp. 11-12, 
26 EgCC, cas. no 349, dated 12/7/ 1994, Al-c Anirils-1, Anwar, 
' Uyi7b al-Riaii 117 al-Qkan j1- 
Madam-Munsha'at al-Mac&if, Alexandria, 2003, Isedition, p. 157 
211 
It is to be noted that a mistake as understood by the ECC is almost identical to 
that definition given by modem Muslim jurists; however it is hard to prove which 
influences the other. This is because as previously discussed the theory of mistake in 
Islamic law is not as systematic as modem law including the ECC; as such modem 
Muslim jurists such as al-Zarqa' have followed the criteria laid down by the ECC m 
order to build a theory of mistake. In an attempt to correlate the two systems the 
definition of mistake given by Civil law jurists is followed. This is enhanced by the fact 
that the definition of mistake in classical work is different to that given by Civil law 
jurists. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that contemporary Muslim Jurists did not 
benefit from their predecessors; rather, in my opinion since the work of modem jurists 
also incorporates classical meanings it is easy to portray such meanings in modem work. 
Perhaps this fact also contributes to the claim that Islamic law does not recognise the 
theory of mistake as it exists in the Western jurisprudence, 
6.3. Conditions of mistake 
6.3.1 Islamic law 
It could be taken at a first glance that the right to determine whether a situation of 
mistake has occurred is vested with the mistaken party. However, the question anses as 
to what extent his claim should be entertained and the mistake consequently be 
remedied? While it is indubitable that this claim must be taken into consideration, the 
fact remains that the right of the mistaken party to nullify the contract is not absolute. In 
fact, the existence of a mistake creates a dilemma between two interests; that of the 
stability of transaction and that of the individual right. If a decision whether or not to 
nullify a contract is based solely on the stability of that contract this means the 
doctrine 
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of mistake has no place at all in Islamic law, a matter which has been proven to be 
otherwise, Likewise,, if the right of the individual always prevails, this might lead to the 
abuse of the concept of mistake without adequate basis. Therefore, it is worth examining 
the criteria established in order to ascertain the existence of a mistake. In other words, 
what are the measures used to determine whether a mistake has occurred? 
Here,, although the classical jurists did not explIcItly provide guidelines as to what 
measures they employed, analysis of their work leads us to conclude that there are three 
approaches utilised therein. These approaches in the language of modem law are 
subjective ( dhiti), objective ( mawýbfi) and a combination of the two (rnuzdawaj). In 
general, jurists are divided into two groups using objective and subjective approaches 
respectively. However, it is noted, that this generalisation does not always hold true 
when it comes to a specific discussion. In the case of mistake for instance, some jurists 
even depart from their own doctrine because of certain specific considerations. The 
following discussion will therefore clearly categorise juristic opinion as to measures 
used to determine the existence of mistake. 
6.3.1. lMistake must relate to a desirable quality (marghgbfik) 
This is a quality which is essential in a thing in order to differentiate between one 
such thing and another. It is moreover this quality that causes the contracting party to 
enter into the contract in the first instance. Ibn Nujaym emphasised that the requirement 
of this desirable quality could be either clearly mentioned or tacit. 
27 Despite the fact that 
most mistakes concern the subject matter of the contract it is to be noted that mistake 
27 Al -Bahr al-Rg'iq, vol 6, p. 26 
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may also occur in its other elements such as the contracting party or value 28 . For mstance 
in the contract of leasing the hirer will normally take into consideration the criteria for a 
hired person before making a contract but should there be a mistake in these criteria he is 
then entitled to seek remedy. It seems therefore that the contracting party who claims the 
mistake is the one who initiates the revocation of the contract; thus, the subjective 
approach is here more apparent. However, the actual conditions imposed therein indicate 
that such a claim is not based solely on a subjective tendency since this could othervase 
lead to instability in matters of contract. Jurists have thus incorporated certain objective 
conditions in order to consider the claim of the mistaken party, as follows. 
Acceptable in view of sound mind 
If a person buys a cow on the understanding that it is lactating, this state of 
producing milk can be considered as 'a desirable quality' in the view of those of sound 
mind . Lack of this quality will thus constitute a mistake that entitles the buyer to seek 
remedy. However, if the buyer claimed that he bought the cow because he believed the 
said cow to be handicapped, then he is not entitled to revoke the sale due to the fact that 
his desirable quality has no merit in the view of those of sound mind. In the event that a 
desirable quality cannot be determined by ordinary people, expert opinion should be 
sought. To this effect Ibn Hurnam states "whoever buys a jewel believing it to be red but 
which turns out to be yellow, then he has the right to opt ( for either ratification or 
nuflification)... this is to be judged by an expert". 29 
2' See detail on p. 232 onwards 29 SharP Fatp al-Qadir, vol 5, p. 201 
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The above example appears to suggest that the claim of the mistaken party alone 
is not sufficient to create a legal basis for mistake, and thus, the subsequent nullification 
of the contract. Rather his claim must be supported by strong proof in order to be valid. 
thus demonstrating a combination of objective and subjective approaches to deternune 
the existence of rnistake. Having said this, the question arises as to whether a case where 
a desirable quality is clearly stipulated would also be ruled as constituting a mistake. I 
would tend to the view that in the absence of the stipulated desirable quality, then the 
state of mistake should be established regardless of the opinion of the expert. Hence, if a 
buyer stipulates that he wants to buy a thin camel, but the seller sells him a fat one, the 
sale is then revocable. TNs is because the condition put forward by the contracting party 
takes priority over the views of the expert as long as it does not contravene Islamic 
principals. 
30 
The requirement of the objective approach is further proven by the condition that 
a desirable quality should be deduced from circumstances leading to the making of the 
contract. As such,, whoever buys a female camel which turns out to be male, if then the 
buyer is a Bedoln he has the right to rescind. However, if the buyer is a journey man 
then he is not entitled to revoke. 31 In this example the custom of the buyer is considered 
to be an indicator that his intention is to buy a female camel for milk. 
In addition, the alleged mistake must be obvious and apparent to all contracting 
parties. This can be said to exist either when the party has declared the desired quality 
'0 According to some jurists, in order for mistake to be valid, the desirable quality should 
be 
lawful, hence if the contracting party claim that the cow is for killing, mistake is not established. 
In addition, the desirable quality must be systematic. I would prefer not to consider 
this as a 
specific requirement for mistake since it *involves the general principal of contract 
itself, meaning 
ýý the subject matter of a contract must be legal. 
' H&hiyah Ibn 'Abid; i, vol, p. 94, Masidir al-Haqq, vol 2, p. 128 
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for which he concludes the contract or from circumstances of the case. Therefore m the 
case of a person buying a jewel without informing the seller for instance that blue is his 
desired colour but which turns to be red, the sale would be binding. Another example 
cited by al-Hattab is that Malik was asked about a person selling a musaI14 carpet) after 
which the buyer found it to be silk, whereupon the seller said that had he knoývn it Nvas 
silk he would not have sold it at that price. Malik ruled that the muyjII, 4 should remam 
with the buyer and that the seller thus had no right to It. 
32 
This ruling lays down the principle that the mistake is not recognisable as such if 
it only involves one party ( in this example the seller) This is because if we were to 
entertain the right of the seller to nullify the contract, at the same time this may cause 
harm to the buyer without reason. However, if the mistake is clear to both parties he who 
claims the mistake has the right to invalidate the contract. 
6.3.2. The ECC 
Article 120 of the ECC states that if a contracting party makes a substantial 
tnistake he may request invalidation of the contract, in the event that the other 
contracting party has either committed the same mistake while being aware thereof or 
that is easily recognisable. It is thus clear that in order for mistake to be a legal basis for 
nulldying a contract two conditions must be fulfilled; namely, the mistake should 
be 
substantial and it should be connected to the other contracting party 
32 MawAib al-Jali7, vol 4, p. 466 
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6.3.2.1 The substantiality of the mistake 
This means that a mistake has occurred in an important matter which in turn 
influences the contracting party to enter into a contract. What makes a mistake 
substantial has been clearly defined by ECC in that it stipulates that a n-ýistake shall be 
substantial if it is so serious that the contracting party would have refrained from 
concluding the contract had he not made that mistake. 33 Most jurists argue that by virtue 
of this provision the ECC has adopted a subjective approach in determining mistake 
because it leaves the claim of mistake to the contracting party. 34 Nevertheless, article 
121 /2/A 35 seems to suggest that the ECC also recognises objectivity in determining 
substantiality . This 
is because the existence of mistake therein cannot be based on the 
claim of the contracting party alone ; rather this claim should be balanced against 
circumstances leading to the conclusion of contract. Hence in my view, there exists a 
combination of both objectivity and subjectivity in determining mistake. The need for 
the objective approach apart from subjectivity is vital to balance the two separate 
interests: the mistaken party and the stability of the transaction. To elaborate an a 
previous example, if a person buys an antique item from an antique shop which turns out 
to be counterfeit, and he then claims mistake, his claim is based on both the subjective 
approach (claim from the contracting party) and the objective( that is going to the 
36 
antique shop is a sign that his will is to purchase the antique) . 
33 Article 121 
34 Al-Sharq5wi, al-Nazariyyat al-'Ammah, p. 119, 
35 It reads: A mistake shall be substantial, particularly if it occurs in a quality of the object that is 
essential, or should be considered as such by the contracting parties in view of the contract 
surrounding the circumstances and the bonafide requirement that should exist in the deal. 
36 Al-Sharq5w-1, al-Na, ý--ariyyah, p. 119, May9dir al-Haqq, vol 
2, p. 106 
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This said,, it should be noted that substantiality depends very much on the 
purpose of the contracting party. Therefore, for instance, if a person buys something 
because of its antiquity and believes at the same time that such an item is made of gold, 
but he later discovers that the item is actually antique but not gold, he cannot revoke the 
contract because the fact of antiquity is of substance here , not the material 
37 Likewis e, if 
his intent in buying the item is because it is made of gold at the same time believing the 
item to be antique, and the item is in fact not gold, then the state of mistake is said to 
exist giving the mistaken party the right to revoke the sale even though the item is 
antique, because antiquity here is not substantial. Mention should be made that although 
article 121 states two situations which constitute nýistake,. it does not exclude the other 
possible situation that may be interpreted as mistake such as mistakes as to value. This is 
because the Code has mentioned these situations merely as examples. 
6.3.2.2 Mistake must be connected to the other contracting party 
One of the most important issues raised in the theory of mistake is perhaps that 
related to balance the interests of the mistaken party against the interest of the other 
contracting party. As for the mistaken person, granting him the right to revocation based 
on his defective consent protects his interest. On the other hand, ratifying the contract on 
the grounds of stability of contract can only preserve the other contracting party m that 
he is not to be surprised to revoke the contract as a result of a mistake. In giving solution 
the ECC has attempted to harmonise the interests of both parties. 
" Article 120 among 
others thus stipulates that the mistaken party may nullify the contract provided 
that the 
37 Masidir al-Haq, vol 2, p. 106 
38 Al-Jamm5l, al-NaKariyyat al-cAmmah li al-Iltizknit, P. 
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other party has either committed the same mistake , is aware of the mistake or can 
recognize it without difficulty. 
By virtue of this article mistake could either be common to both contracting 
parties or individual; it is therefore agreed upon that the common mistake in which both 
contracting parties are involved allows the mistaken party to rescind the contract. The 
question of whether the interest of the other party is taken into consideration does not 
arise due to the fact that he has also fallen into the same mistake. To illustrate, in the 
case of a seller who sells an item believing it is gold and a buyer who purchases it in the 
same belief, and who later discovers it to be silver,, either party can ask to rescind the 
contract as long as the mistake is substantial. 
As for an individual mistake which involves only one party, would this then be 
sufficient to nullify the contract? Some jurists are of the opinion that individual mistake 
alone can be a valid legal basis to nullify the contract. They argue that the notion of 
common mistake is not in accordance with justice on the grounds that it does not take 
into account the concept of defective consent in that mistake of this kind should only 
revolve around the will of the mistaken party regardless of the will of otherS39However, 
this view appears to be inconsistent with the Code which does not consider individual 
mistake unless two criteria are fulfilled: (i) if the other contracting party is aware of the 
mistake and (ii) whether it is easy to recOgnise the mistake. In the first case, once the 
other party is aware of the existence of mistake it is incumbent upon him to alert the 
tnistaken party, failing which he is considered to be mala fide, and consequently has to 
3'Al- Sharqawl, al-Namriyyah, p. 124, According to this view it is suggested that hidividual 
mistake can nullify the contract; however, the mistaken party has to compensate the other party 
based on tortous liability. 
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face a remedy imposed by law. Similarly, in the second case, the other Pariý, ' even though 
not male fide, is considered to be negligent and should bear the consequences 
accordingly. 
6.4 Legal rules relating to mistake in contract 
6.4.1 Islamic law. 
In general, the presence of mistake in contract may either cause no legal effect 
whatsoever to the contracting parties or render a contract non binding, m the sense that 
the contracting party in whose favour mistake occurs has the right to revoke or ratiN 
such a contract. In this latter case- with which this study is more concerned- the parties 
concemed are govemed in Islamic law by special remedy termed option (khiyjr) 
Therefore it is worthwhile to examine this concept and its connection to n-fistake. 
LiteraUy, the Arabic word khiy& means to choose the best between two things. In 
the legal sense, this term refers to the right of the contracting parties to either nullify or 
40 
validate a contract due to legal cause . In exercising 
his right the contracting party is 
said to have chosen the best option in his judgment between nullification or ratification. 
The relationship between option and mistake is so close that some writers- as 
discussed- 
have ruled out the need to introduce a comprehensive theory of mistake to correspond to 
Civil law ; according to this view the doctrine of option alone is sufficient to provide 
for 
any problem that may arise. 
41 
4OMughnlal-Muht,! ý, vol 2, p. 43. 
"See Mabda'al-Riai. Vol 2, p. 799 
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6.4.1 .1 Types of option 
It should be noted at the outset that doctrine of option is considered to be an 
exemption of the general principle of contract; that is to say the original principal of 
contract is bindingness (luz&n). Jurists have asserted this principle as, for example, is 
evident in the words of Babart-i "Option is not one of the criteria in the contract of sale; 
on the contrary a sale (contract) should be free of option , thus.... a large number of sales 
do not accept option"42 
However,, despite being an exemption to the general rule, jurists are divided as to 
the extent option is of this exemption; Notwithstanding this, there are two types of 
khiyjr, which act as remedy in cases of mistake , namely; option of inspection(khiy& al- 
ru'yah) and option of defect (khiyk al-'ayb). 
6.4.1.1.1 Option of inspection (khiy. -b, al-ruyah) 
This is an option whereby the contracting parties have the right to choose whether 
to validate a contract entered into or to nullify it after the subject matter has been seen. 
As is obvious from the nomenclature, the contract is concluded before the buyer has the 
opportunity to see and inspect the subject matter (maq5d 'alayh) . 
According to the 
Hanafi this type of option is permitted by the Sharlah itself, this means that the buyer 
has the right to decide when he sees the subject matter even though he does not stipulate 
this at the time of concluding the contract. The Prophet PBUH is reported as saying - 
If 
" Al 'In, #yah, vol 5, p. 125, 
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someone buys an item without seeing it, then he has an option when he sees it--4 3 The 
Hanafi also rely on the narration that OUthman bin 'Affain sold a piece of land to TAah, 
when neither of them had seen the land. Someone told Talhah he had been cheated to 
which he replied: I have an option because I bought an item that I have not seenThe 
matter was then taken to Jubayr bin Mut' am who ruled that Taffial, indeed had this 
option. This incident took place in the presence of companions none of whom contested 
the ruling which constitutes consensus Qjmd)as to its legality. 
On the other hand, in his new edict al-Shafi`-i ruled that the sale of an absent 
object is null and void regardless of whether or not it was described44He argued that this 
sale consists of uncertainty (gharar) which is forbidden by the Prophet PBUH. 
Furthermore according to al-Shdfi'l the ffadiih advanced by the Ijanafi is weak as later 
i and Darqutni. 451t SeeMS CT stated by at-Bayhaq that the reason for which al-Shdfi i 
invalidates the sale of an absent object is the possibility it may incur uncertaintv. 
However such a concern may be eliminated through two steps; first the contracting 
parties especially the buyer can obtain the item specification through description from the 
seller. For example if the subject matter is a car the seller should describe to the buyer its 
make,, colour and so on. The second step is to give the buyer the right to a final decision 
after he has seen the sold item. This right is actually what is known as option of 
inspection (khiy. 5r al-ru ýyah). Thus, the view of the Hanafi is more acceptable especially 
when the transaction takes place in the present. The Shafi'i view can thus only be valid if 
the buyer is in ignorance of the subject matter. 
43 Nan-ated by al- Bayhaqi from AbfI Hurairah, Hadih no 10426 
44 Al- Umm vol. 2, p. 20, al-Fiqh al-Islfti (English edition), vol. 1, p. 216 
45 Al-Fiqh al-lsl, @ni (English edition) vol I, p. 217 
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It is to be noted that the doctrine of option is developed on the notion of mistake 
itself. This is because in the case of sale for example, the buyer who decides to annul the 
sale after seeing the subject matter is supposed to do this because the subject matter does 
not tally with previous belief In other words he has made a mistake of perception and 
this mistake is remedied through option of inspection. To cite al-Kdsani 
" The sale of an unseen object is not binding. This is because ignorance of 
quality(of the sold item) will affect the will (of the buyer) and thus make it 
defective. This defect of will necessitates option owing to the fact that the seller 
may later regret his decision when he sees( object). ... his regret can therefore be 
remedied through option'. '46 
Similarly Rayner states: 
"Thus when the buyer contract to buy an unseen article without disclosing his 
intention as to that article to the seller and upon inspection he discovers that the 
article does not fit his original intention he may seek remedy in mistake under the 
option of inspection', 47 
The above statement connotes that mistake can cause defect of 'will" since the 
tnistaken contracting party relied on certain aspects of the object following which he 
could not find the said aspect. As such his consent is defective and he is entitled to option 
of inspection. This said, it should be noted that option of inspection applies only to the 
buyer not the seller. This is due to the fact that the former is not able to inspect the object 
at the time of contracting whereas In the case of the latter the object 
is already in his 
possession and he is therefore assumed to have full knowledge of the said object. 
46 Al-BadAY, vol 5, p. 292 
" The Theory of Contract p. 190 
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6.4-1-1.2 Option of defect (khiyjr al-'ayb) 
This is a type of option which gives the contracting party the right either to 
nullify or validate the contract if there is a defect in the subject matter provided that the 
contracting party is not aware of the existence of such defect at the time of contracting. " 
For instance, in a sale contraq, the buyer is automatically entitled to annul the contract if 
he discovers upon transfer of possession that the object of contract is so defective as to 
diminish its value . 
49 According to Rayner the origins of khi jr al-'ayb are somehow Y 
obscure but they are generally thought to have evolved from the tradition concerning 
animal whose udders have been tied (muýarrjt). She further suggests that this option is 
- 50 more likely to have been the result ofjuristic reasoning. 
In fact the Hadith Muýarrjt is not the only legal evidence used by jurists to 
deduce the legality of option of defect as other textual evidence can be found in this 
regard. It is reported for example that a man bought a slave. He then found a defect and 
returned the slave to the seller whereupon the seller complained that the buyer had 
benefited from the slave. The prophet PBUH then ruled that 'profit goes with liability' 
1) 
5 (al-kharij bi al ý]=An 'This ffadih thus shows that the seller believed however that 
there was no defect as to his subject matter'. If on the other hand he is aware of any such 
defect,, then the buyer is entitled to annul the sale on these grounds, despite benefifing 
from the sold item. This is because such benefit is legally permissible on the basis that if 
that item perishes then the buyer will be fully responsible. It is to be noted that unlike 
" Madkfir, al-Madkhal, p. 649, Abfi Zahrah, al-Milkiyyah, p. 403 
49Rayner, The Theory of contract, p. 327 
'0 Ibid 328 
" Narrated by Abi! Ddwiid, Kitg al-Buyd, ffadih no 35 10 
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option of inspection, jurists are unanimous on the legality of option of defect on the 
gTounds of the above evidence. 52 
Havmg said this, the question arises as to the connection behveen option of defect 
and mistake. If this linkage is apparent as to option of inspecfion, then one may argue 
that since the buyer in the contract of sale is satisfied with the condition of the sold item- 
the situation of rt-ýistake should not have arisen. However a deeper invesfigafion proves 
the contrary; that is to say there is a close linkage between mistake and option of defect. 
This is because being free from defect is one of the conditions of a contract be it 
explicitly or implicitly. Thus, if a person buys something defective without being alerted 
by the seller about the existence of such a defect, then the buyer can rightly assume that 
the sold item is free from defect. At the same time it is incumbent upon the seller to 
comprehend and accept this assumption. In the event of the buyer encountering a defect 
he has the right to revoke the sale while the seller is not in a position to reject such 
revocation. The right to revoke in this case is based on mistake itself since the buyer has 
assumed that the subject matter is free from defect but this is later proven to be the 
opposite. 
53 
This is supported by the fact that in order for option of defect to be practically 
valid, the buyer must not be aware of the existence of defect of the subject matter, 
Otherwise option of defect cannot be utilized to revoke the sale since the 
knowledge of 
the buyer as to the defect at time of contracting indicates that he 
has consented to such 
defect. This means mistake does not occur in the presence of consent; 
however, if there is 
no awareness of the defect this indicates that the buyer proceeds to conclusion of 
the 
52 AI-Mughw', vol 4, p. 15 
See the definition of mistake on pp. 205-206 
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contract based on his assumption a discrepancy in which constitutes rt-ýistake, which in 
turn can be remedied through option of defect. 
6.4.2 The ECC 
Unlike Islamic law which recognizes preventive mistake, the provision here in the 
ECC concerns only mistake that is regarded as defect of consent. As regards preventive 
mistake its existence renders a contract void ab initio As such the rules of absolute 
nullity apply here. However, in the case of defect of consent, a contract made under 
mistake will render it voidable. This means that once the contract is concluded it is 
legaffy said to be existent pending further action taken by the contracting parties. If 
mistake is fulfilled in all conditions, then the mistaken party may either ratify the 
contract or nullify it. According to this Code if the rtýiistaken party chooses to ratify the 
contract he may do this in accordance with the condition of ratification, after which the 
contract becomes valid and binding. In a case where the party is silent the contract is 
considered valid and binding either three years after mistake or fifteen years after the 
conclusion of the contract. 54 It should be noted that such ratification may either be 
explicit or tacit. 
In the event that nullification is sought, the mistaken party must file a petition to 
the court within the above period. Once the request is ffled it is within the jurisdiction of 
the trial court to decide whether the presence of mistake is established or not, and the 
Court of Cassation does not have the right to intervene in such decisions as 
long as they 
4AI-Suddah, Maýýdir al-Iltiz&n, p. 248, 
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are based on legal justification 55 . Altematively the mistaken partý, is entitled to annul the 
contract without judicial process provided that the other contracting party agrees to this 
annulment. 
It appears that the Code gives the right to ratify or annul to the parties concemed 
without reference to the court unless there is a dispute on the matter. Although the right 
of the mistaken party takes priority in annulling a contract allegedly made under mistake 
he cannot abuse such a right in a manner that may be seen as taking advantage of the 
other contracting party. Thus, for example, the mistaken party may not request the 
annulment of the contract if the other party is willing to accept the force of contract as if 
no mistake had occurred in accordance with article 5 of the ECC which forbids the 
abuse of this right. Similarly, a party who makes a mistake may not nullify the contract if 
the purpose of such annulment is only to cause harm to the other party, or his interest is 
small compared to the harm borne by the other party in the case of annulment. 56 
In addition,, the doctrine ofvoidability (buthiýi nisbi) does not apply if rt-ýistak-e in 
law occurs in the contract of reconciliation (aqd al-sulh), as article 556 of ECC stipulates 
that mistakes in law of reconciliation contracts shall not be challenged. In fact, as long 
as mistake in law fulfils its requirements as in the case of mistake in fact, then the rule 
-I- should also be imposed on a reconciliation contract; however, this contract Is 
nevertheless exempted due to the fact that the parties concerned are supposed to have 
agreed to settle their dispute regardless of what the law has to say. Accordingly 
if one of 
the parties is mistaken and quickly becomes aware of this, he then has no right to annul 
the contract after the dispute has been settled and thus 
55 Nazariyyat al-Ghala. 4 p. 2 00 56 M-Suddah, MayAdir al-IltizAin, p. 195 
both must rehnquish any such 
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right. It57 seems that in tfiýs case the mistake per se is not considered to be substantial and 
accordingly it has no effect on the validity of the contract. 
Observing the remedy provided by the ECC through the system of voldability, 
one may conclude that there are a number of similarities to the system of option in 
Islamic law. Both systems agree that the mistaken party is entitled to nullify or ratify the 
contract which will take effect from the time of contracting. Similarly, with regard to the 
exception in ECC whereby the mistaken party does not have absolute right to annul the 
contract, although there is no clear juristic discussion within the doctrine of option, it 
appears that Islamic law has another approach to address the problem through the 
58 principle of " abuse in exercising right" and the same matter is applied in the ECC. 
However the two systems differ as to limitation of the period during which the 
parties are eligible to exercise their right whether to ratify or armul the contract. While 
the ECC has limited the period to three years from the discovery of the mistake and to 
fifteen years from concluding the contract, there is no such limitation in Islamic law as 
jurists stipulate only that there should be sufficient period of time for the parties to decide 
according to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the contract. Thus, if the 
rnistaken party is silent about the mistake for a sufficient period of time, tNs indicates 
that he has tacitly approved such mistake even if the period has not yet exceeded three 
years; consequently the contract would be regarded as permanently valid for the sake of 
transaction stability. In my view, although the limitation imposed by the ECC does not 
seem to contradict Islamic rules,, it is recommended that the matter be left to a judge to 
determine once the case is brought to court. 
"Al- Sanhiin, al- Wasit, vol 5, p. 540, al-Badr5wil, al-NazariwAt al-'Aammah, pp. 265 -266, 
-'8Nazariyyat al-Ghala. 4 p. 206 
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6.5 Effects of mistake on contract 
6.5.1 Mistake as to subject matter(ma'qad'alayh) 
6.5.1.1 Islamic law 
Mistake as to the subject matter is the most prominent category in Islamic law 
given that most juristic discussion involves its analysis .a nustake of this kind is 
defmed as relating to the appearance of the subject matter -be it in terms of essence or 
quality- after the conclusion of contract when that item is in a state contradicting what is 
apparent at the time of contracting 59 Such a definition clearly divides this kind of 
raistake into two categories; namely mistake as to essence (substance) and n-fistake as to 
quality. Commenting on these categories, jurists have for instance maintained that if a 
sale contract is concluded on a male slave found later to be female the sale is null and 
void due to the difference in essence. However if the subject matter is a female sheep 
later found to be male,, this will only render the contract suspended but not void meaning 
that the buyer has the right to option as to non existence of quality. " 'Mis raises tlie 
question as to what form of measures are used by the jurists in determining whether 
things are different or not. Further investigation into the work of jurists demonstrates 
that they devised their system of distinguishing between the two categories not with 
regard to material substance involved, but with regard to the usufruct of the subject- that 
is the use to which it is intended to be put and principally with regard to the properties of 
that subject that the contracting party has in mind when he forms the contract. 
61 
"Mabda'al-R41j, Vol 2, p. 800 
" See al-Hidgyah, Vol 3, p. 47, al-Baýr al-Rg'iq, Vol 6, p. 89. Kashshgfal-Qind', Vol 
3. p. 165. 
61 Rayner, The Theory of Contract, p. 180 
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Therefore the measurement applied is subjective and flexible varying from one thing to 
another; as an example, vinegar and molasses ( both made from grape) are considered to 
be two different things due to their different purpose. On the other hand the male and 
female sheep are considered one because the purpose of animal is its meat; as such their 
sex therefore makes no difference. " Another example is if the purchase of an animal is 
for its meat after which the buyer discovers the animal to be blind; here the contract is 
valid because the defect of blindness is hardly pertinent to the purpose of sale, that is to 
63 
obtain its meat . 
In this regard Ibn Humam asserts " Essence in jurisprudence is meant for what 
has a different purpose regardless of the real essence, '64Tbus in the light of these criteria 
the jurists have ruled whether a contract should be valid, void or voidable. Tbe Majallah 
for instance states that if a person buys a jewel which proves to be glass the sale is 
void, but if he buys something for its quality but later discovers such quality is absent in 
the subject matter he then has the right of option. 65 
This said some jurists are of the opinion that the lack of quality will also render 
the contract void as in the lack of essence; however this view seems to be inconsistent. 
This is because a contract is based on non-existence , 
it is thus agreed that the sale of a 
non-existent object is null and void ab initio. This is not the case in the lack of quality 
because the subject matter is still in existence. 
66 
62 AI-Mabs qt, vol 13, pp. 12-13, 
6' Rayner, The Theory of Contract, P. 180 
6'Fath al-Qad, ý, vol 5, p. 206 
65 Article 3 10,3 08 
66Mabda'al-RiVV, vol 2, p. 808 
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6.5.1.2 ECC 
Article 121 of the ECC clearly touches upon the quality of subject matter. Even 
though what is spelt out in this article is merely an example it also states that mistake is 
deemed to be substantial if it occurs in the quality of subject matter. However this article 
is silent regarding the essence of subject matter as mistake as to essence will render the 
contract void not voidable, which is not of concern here. In the case of nustake as to 
quality, the Code provides that if such quality is the main reason behind the contract then 
that contract is voidable at the option of the contracting party. The examples for this type 
of mistake are numerous; for instance in one case the Court of Appeal has ruled that a 
mistake is considered substantial and will consequently render the contract void where a 
sold car is thought to be new but in fact is old and has been previously refused by 
another buyer 
67 
It is worth pointing out that article 121/2 establishes the principal that in order to 
determine the substantiality of quality the intention of both parties must be taken into 
consideration. This is somewhat vague since in fact only the mistaken party has the right 
to determine whether a mistake is substantial or not. As regards the other party, although 
68 
he is protected , 
his intention is not considered in determining substantiality. For 
instance,, if a person buys a car in the belief that the car is new where it proves to be old 
in this case,, the age of the car serves as that substantial quality which causes 
him to 
67 cited from al- Ghalat al Mufsid, p. 86 
Al-Jammal, Mustafa-, al-Nazariyyat al-' Ammah li al- Iltiz&n&, al-D, #r al-J&niiyyah. n. p, 
1987, p. 106 
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conclude the contract regardless of the opinion of the seller. Therefore it is suggested that 
article 123 be made clearer in order to confine it only to the mistaken party 
6.5.2 Mistake as to person 
6.5.2.1 Islamic law 
This kind of mistake concerns the contracting parties themselves; unlike mistake 
as to object, mistake as to person is not widely applied in the field of contract. That is to 
say there are only few contracts in which, where n-iistake of person occurs this would 
have an effect. This is because in most contracts mistake as to the person with whom one 
is dealing is irrelevant because one is willing to contract with everyone. 69 The contract 
of marriage, pre-emption, lease and bequest are often quoted as being affected should 
mistake as to the person take place in the sense that the party who suffers as a result of 
mistake is given the right to annul the contract. Mistake as to person may either relate to 
the identity of the contracting party or to his quality. An example for the former is in a 
contract of pre emption. whereby the rationale of its legality is to avoid neighbouring bad 
people; thus a pre emptor is given the right to pre- emption if he is of the opinion that the 
presence of his prospective neighbour is not conducive to his well being. HoweN, er, in a 
case where the pre emptor has mistakenly waived his right as to objection to the new 
buyer who later turns out to be persona non gratia to him, this waiving is in fact effected 
by mistake and hence the right to pre emption remains . Ibn 
Nujaym clearly confirms this 
principles as follows: 
" If the pre emptor were told that the buyer(of the property) is such and such a 
person and he is agreeable- but who later turns out to be another person, then the 
pre emptor has the right to pre emption. This is because people are 
different in 
69 Rayner, The Theory of Contract, p. 191 
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terms of morality..... some of them can be good neighbours while other are not. Agreement to one person does not necessarily mean agreement to others .... ý 
7) 
This prmciple is also supported by Murshid Hayran where it states that " if the 
pre emptor knows the buyer's name and accordingly agrees but it then becomes clear that 
the buyer is another person then he still has the right to pre-emption"" 
The above quotation clearly shows that mistake as to person plays a vital role in 
invalidating the contract, nonetheless; some such as Qurrah Dagh-i claim that the case of 
pre emption is not an acceptable example for the application of rr 72 ýistake as to person. 
According to him the pre emptor is not part of the contracting parties as the contract is 
concluded between the seller and the buyer whereas the pre emptor has no role in this 
73 
contract. Although this argument might sound reasonable-in my opinion- the case of 
pre-emption can still represent mistake as to person due to the fact that pre-emption 
unlike other contracts is inextricably related to the contracting party. Therefore, the seller 
is obliged to presume that his would be buyer is a person conducive to the pre emptor, 
otherwise this latter may claim that he has fallen into mistake. Since pre emption 
involves only immovable property and there is no other way to avoid harm being 
inflicted on the pre emptor, his rnistake shoWd therefore be treated as if he is one of the 
contracting parties. 
With regard to mistake involving the quality of the contracting party. 
its effect is 
obvious in the case of a contract of lease whereby a person is hired 
for his service. For 
example, in the case of a wet nurse, if a person hires a woman to 
feed his baby assunung 
Al-Bafir al-Rj'iq, vol 8 p. 144 71 Arficle 145, 
Mabda'al-RiVi, vol 2, p. 810 
Ibid 
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that such a woman has the quality of being a good nurse, but who proves to be otherNNise. 
the hirer has the right to revoke the contract on the grounds of mistake. To this effect Ibn 
Nujaym states: 
"If the baby vomits because of the milk, his guardian has the right to revoke the 
contract. Similarly if the hired nurse is a thief or a bad person... or an adulterer or 
an insane person, the right to revoke remains valid". 74 
Thus, it can be seen that if the purpose of hiring is not met then it will consfitute 
mistake as to quality which gives to the hirer the right to terminate the contract. 
However if the mistake does not affect the purpose of hire, the hirer may not annul the 
hire on the grounds of mistake; for example, if the hired woman was thought to be 
beautiful but turns out to be ugly, the contract may not therefore be annulled because 
this quality has nothing to do with the feeding of the baby. In short it can be said that 
mistake as to person in Islan-& law may to certain extents constitute grounds to revoke a 
contract. 
6.5.2.2. The ECC 
Article 121/2/B of the ECC stipulates that "the mistake is deemed to be essential 
more particularly when it has a bearing on the identity or one of the qualities of the 
person with whom the contract is entered into, if this identity or quality was the principal 
factor in the conclusion of the contract" This means that if the identity of the contracting 
party and his characteristics are taken into consideration while concluding a contract and 
have then motivated the other party to enter into the said contract, mistake according to 
these criteria (identity and character)are deemed to be substantial and consequently 
render the contract voidable. This kind of mistake generally 
involves donation 
74 Al- Batr al-Rj'iq 8, p. 26 
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(tabarru') such as in the case of a person giving a gift to another believing the donee is 
his relative but who proves instead to be a foreigner. Although there is a view arnong 
jurists that this kind of mistake has no place in most financial contracts, contracts of sale 
and lease have proven otherwise. 75 In contracts of lease, for instance, if a person hires his 
house to a woman believing she is of good character but who turns out to be harmful to 
neighbours then this will constitute grounds for terminating the contract. However, it is 
to be noted that this substantiality is only regarded for the purposes of contract, hence, In 
the previous example the lessor cannot terminate the contract if he later find out a woman 
is ugly when she was believed to be beautiful. Thus in a case brought before the EgCC 
the plaintiff requested the termination of contract because the defendant who was an 
architect was not a member of an architect's club. In dismissing the plaintiffs claim the 
Court held that although the defendant was not registered in such a club, he was 
nevertheless licensed to practise his work;, as such, non registration could not be 
considered as substantiality for mistake, thereby causing the contract to be annulled " 
It should be observed that unlike mistake as to the subject matter which concerns 
only its quality not its essence, article 121/2 establishes that mistake as to essence is of 
the same effect as mistake as to quality all of which affect the will but not the contract. It 
is not clear on what reasons the ECC has based in this provision in order to equalize the 
two. If the reason for not considering mistake as to essence as relevant is 
due to the 
nature of traditional theory which has been abandoned by the ECC, then 
by the same 
token this theory should be abandoned throughout and not be used selectively. 
In mý, 
opinion there is no reason to distinguish between the two. 
Al-Jammal, al-NaMriyyah, p. 109 
EgCC, cas. no 221 dated 6/5/1954 
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6.5.3Mistake as to value 
6.5.3.1 Islamic law 
It is to be noted that mistake as to the value and the doctrine of deception (ghubn 
)are so interrelated that it is hard to distinguish between them, which leads some jurists to 
discuss the two concepts interchangeabl Y. 77 This is because mistake as to value would 
normally causes deception, in which the mistaken party would have not entered into the 
contract had he known the real value of the subject matter at the time of concluding the 
Contract. 
78 It is noteworthy that not every type of deception can annul a contract if it 
exists together with mistake. Jurists are agreed that slight deception ( ghubn y&ir) 
causes no effect whatsoever on contract as this kind of deception is ven, hard to avoid if 
not impossible. With regard to excessive deception (ghubn fAhish) this has been 
estimated by the Majallah as deception if it is not less than one twentieth of the total 
price respect of the goods , one tenth 
in respect of animals, or one fifth in respect of real 
79 
estate. It would thus seem that the jurists have different views as to whether or not to 
give the contract. 
ive The Shafi'i hold that a mistake accompanied by deception alone does not gi 
rise to revocation, 80 but must also be accompanied by deliberate deceit (taghrr). In an 
example given by al-Sharbini, if a buyer buys a piece of glass in the belief that it is a 
jewel and he pays a considerable sum for it, or if a seller sells a jewel believing it is a 
Mabda'al-RiOff, vol 2, p. 812 
i ers It should be note mere deception has a wider scope than m stake, as in the case of ap on 
being aware that he is cheated, but where he still wants to enter into a contract 
for certain 
reasons. In this case the state of mistake is not established and as such no remedy 
is given. See 
MasAdir al-Haqq, p. 143 
" Article 165 
80 Mughnlal-Mupti! ý, vol 2, p. 65 
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piece of glass and receives a minor consideration for it, in the first case there is no option 
81 for the buyer and in the second there is no option for the seller. On there other hand . 
if 
the seller were to sell that jewel labelling it as such, the Shaf'-i hold that here deception is 
accompanied by deceit (taghrk) , thus the sale may be rescinded at the option of the 
buyer. 82 
The same view is held by the Hanari and the Ijanbali except that the latter have 
added the grounds for annulling a contract all of which revolve around deceit (taghri). 
It may thus be summarized that according to the majority mistake has no impact on the 
contract if not accompanied by some kind of deceit on which the grounds for nullifying 
a contract is mostly based. 
-Ibe Mahki on the other hand do not require mistake as to value to be 
accompanied by deception. For them mistake alone can constitute sufficient grounds for 
tlie annulment of a contract provided that it is of the type classified as a big mistake 
(ghalatfAish). It has been stated by al-DasTjqi that if the buyer pays higher than a third 
of the price, the sale is revoked ....... 
if he is ignorant of what he has done .. 
83 before the 
passing of one year. 
A-Dasaqi's assertion indicates that in order for a contract to be revoked, three 
conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly the deception must exceed a third of the price in a 
sale or be under priced by a third more in a purchase. Secondly, the claim 
for deception 
" Ibid 
82 Rayner., The Theory of Contract P. 196 
83 H&hiyat al-Das aqi, vol, 3, p- 140 
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must proceed within one year of the action which gave rise to the dI eceit. 84 This said, it is 
observed that despite these conditions mistake as to value only applies and has its effect 
on contract in the Maliki school which seems to be based on reasonable grounds. With 
regard to the view of the majority which requires the presence of deceived to annul a 
contract it appears that deceit alone can be grounds to rescind the contract regardless of 
other factors. Therefore, a deceived person can seek remedy through other means 
provided by the Shariah such as the doctrine of option 
6.5.3.2 The ECC 
The ECC does not clearly stipulate this kind of mistake in its provision; however 
the jurists conclude that it is recognized tacitly by the Code within article 121-121, 
According to Mustafa. al-Jarnal mistake as to value is mistake in assessing the value of 
the subject matter. It may be the result of mistake in the quality of subject matter or in the 
other contracting party such as mistake as to the share from inheritance or the prestige of 
the trademark sold to the client. " . Aside 
from this, there is another type of mistake as to 
value such as in the case of a person selling an antique item for a cheap price because he 
is ignorant of the actual price. In this example it appears that mistake is accompanied by 
deception as in Islarnic law. Since deception is governed by exploitation (istighIjI)in the 
ECC some jurists are of the opinion that the question of mistake as to value does not 
arise here. In other words, mistake as to value cannot be counted as one type of mistake 
in terms of legal remedy because the provision in exploitation is sufficient in itself to 
tackle this kind of nýstake. 86 
Rayner, The Theory of Contract, p. 197 
This kind is covered in the previously mentioned article 
86 Nazariyyat al-Ghala. 4 p. 241 
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However this view seems untenable as there is a difference between mistake as to 
value and deception in the sense that in the latter it is a condition that a deceived party be 
aware of the actual value whereas this is not the case in the former, rather in the case of 
ghubn the deceived party would have not concluded the contract had he known the real 
price. Moreover, the rules of exploitation only apply if one of the contracting parties 
takes advantage of the other whilst there is no such condition in mistake as to value, 
mewing that the state of mistake exists even if there is no exploitation 87 
6.5.4 Mistake as to law 
6.5.4.1 Islamic law 
It is a common belief that mistake as to law is synonymous wiffi ignorance of the 
law itself There is ample discussion from a jurisprudential perspective regarding 
ignorance; however, the following discussion will confine itself only to mistake within 
the ambit of contract. What lead to similarities between rnistake and ignorance is 
perhaps the fact that mistake can be said to have occurred when the contracting party is 
in ignorance of legal rules at the time of contracting. As such, rt-ýistake as to legal rule 
(hulan shar'i) is also expressed as ignorance of such a rule. 88 
Generally, ignorance of legal rules is not excusable unless there is strong 
justification for this such as in the case of a person newly converted to Islam 
living in 
unislamic environment, or a person who is ignorant of very detailed knowledge. 
Al- 
Qarafi states that the Sharlip has excused in many cases such ignorance as 
it also count 
Ibid 
18 Mahmaýdni, al-Nazariyyat al-'. Ammah, p. 419 
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in many cases; the criteria for this is what is hard to avoid is excused and what is easy is 
not89 
. However, Qarafis statement does not offer a solution to the question as to how a 
thing is defined as either hard or easy. in other words, what is the measurement used to 
differentiate between an excusable mistake and inexcusable mistake? It seems that 
jurists have attempted to answer this question by dividing ignorance into categories, 
namely ignorance with negligence and ignorance without negligence. With regard to the 
former the Shar, ýah does not consider such ignorance to be an excuse; for example, if a 
person makes a contract involving usury (ribj) he can not claim a state of ignorance 
because he is supposed to know its legal rules, and is therefore considered negligent. In 
the former a case here, where a person would not be considered negligent is where he 
sells a share from his from inheritance for one thousand pounds believing that he only 
inherits one fourth, not knowing the fact that he is entitled to half In line with this, if a 
person buys a movable property on which the seller's neighbour later claims pre- 
emption, and the buyer agrees M the belief that pre-emption also applies here, what then 
would be the effect? 
Here,, according to the jurists if the ignorance occurs in a well known matter, then 
it constitutes no excuse whereas in unknown areas it is excusable. In the above example, 
jurists have ruled that ignorance of pre-emption (shufah) is not excusable since its 
provision should be known. Here the same question again arises as to how to 
determine 
whether or not a thing is well known. Since there is no definite measure, I am inclined to 
recommend standardising rules so that ignorance of the Sharlah shall 
have no effect on 
matters of contract. This is because gaining knowledge is incumbent upon a 
Muslim. In 
Al-furuq, vol 2, p. 15 0 
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contract for instance,, before concluding the contracting party should be aware of whether 
what he is going to do is unlawful or not as supported by the Qur'dn in (21: 7). Moreover, 
the excuse of ignorance in certain cases is applicable to concession (takhfi, ý only, as a]- 
ShdfN argues " If ignorance were to be an excuse this means that ignorance is better than 
knowledge due to the fact that a person will not be ask to perform legal cluties. 90 
6.5.4.2 The ECC 
Similar to Islamic law,, mistake as to law is always related to ignorance of the laxv 
itself. Inasmuch as there is a possibility of mistake of fact mistake as to law may occur at 
the time of concluding of the contract. Likewise, it may also involve all kinds of 
previously mentioned mistake (value, person, subject matter). For instance, if a person 
makes a contract with another whose age is eighteen in the belief that this is the age of 
prudence, not knowing that the age of prudence has been raised to twenty-two, then this 
ignorance constitutes mistake in the law concerning person. 91 The ECC thus regards a 
contract under mistake as voidable at the option of the mistaken party. Article 122 of the 
ECC clearly states that in the absence of a provision of the law to the contrary, a mistake 
in law entails the nullification of the contract if the mistake fulfils the elements of a 
inistake in fact". The EgCC has also upheld this principle in one of its rulings92Despite 
the clarity of this provision, the question arises as to whether it constitutes an exception 
to the general principal of law which states that ignorance in law is not excusable. Some 
jurists hold that the theory of mistake has been wrongly treated as it should not be seen as 
ignorance of law itself, but the two aspects must be treated separately since each has its 
'0 AI-Zarkashl, al-Manthi7rflal-Qawj'id, edited by Taysir Fd'iq, Wiz&& al-Awqfff U, a al-ShIl'cm 
al-Islkniyyah, Kuwait, 1405 H, 2 nd edition, vol 2, p. 17 
91 A]- Badrdwi, al-Nazriyyat al-' Ammah, p. 2 63 
9' EgCC, cas. no 846, dated 13/12/78 
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own rule in order to avoid conflict within this general principal. It seems however that 
this view is not convincing, as it is difficult to speak of mistake as to laxv xvithout 
involving ignorance as the two are inextricably linked. 
In reality, a deeper study of the principle " ignorance in law is not excusable" and 
the doctrine of "mistake as to law" demonstrate that no conflict exists here. This is 
because the said principle serves as a means not to avoid the implementation of law on 
the pretext of ignorance of such law. 93 Therefore a creditor who charges more interest 
than that legally allowed may not request annulment of the loan contract claiming that 
he is in ignorant of the law because this would lead to non implementation of the laxv. 
However, if the purpose in applying the principle of mistake is to implement the law, 
then the mistaken party may annul the contract such as a person regarding himself as 
obliged to settle a debt he thought to be civil which but turn to be natural. 
in my view, since the ECC here makes clear provision; then the question of 
ignorance should not be raised due the fact that most of the principles bear the criteria of 
predominance rather than universality, as can be found in much legislation other than that 
of the ECC 
6.6 Summary 
The theory of mistake contrary to some claims has its roots 
in Islamic law. It is 
discussed under the term ghalat and khap I synonymouslY. Similar to the principle of 
duress (ikrih) in order to determine the existences of mistake 
both objective and 
93AI_ Sharqdwi, MOsadir ol-Iltiz&n p. 123 
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subjective approaches are used which is agreed upon by both Islamic law and by the 
ECC. The ECC has included the doctrine of mistake under defect of consent; however, 
its effect will lead to that caused by impediments to legal capacity ('awkid) meaning that 
the use of different terminologies is not of significance as long as the substances are the 
same, Both Islamic law and the ECC are agreed that no doctrine of interdiction is to be 
imposed on the mistaken party as in the case of duress. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The present study has been an attempt to analyse similarities and differences 
between Islamic law and the ECC focusing on the concept of impediments to legal 
capacity (awkid al-ahliyyah) . The aim in this has been to pinpoint contradictions in the 
ECC and to suggest revisions to bring rulings in line with Islamic law. For this reason 
throughout the study certain issues have therefore been raised and each of which has 
been discussed within the chapters concerned. These issues are now summarized below, 
recommendations for legislative revision are also suggested. 
1 -As stated then, the focus of this research has been the concept of impediments to legal 
capacity in Islamic law from different angles; that is, both varying perspectives on 
principles of Islan-iic jurisprudence (uyi7l al-fiqh) and of jurisprudence (fzqh) itself were 
examined. These perspective fall into three categories, as follows. As to the first 
category, scholastic study is more related to the fitness of a person to receive legal rules 
(hulan shar'i) within the framework of the conditions of 'a person upon whom an 
injunction is addressed' (mahkCpn 'alayh) On the other hand the scholars of fiqh, have 
.5 on 
the validity of legal acts. focused their works on the effect of impediments (awkid 
Thirdly, yet another approached by modem Muslim scholars where a method using 
modem law is applied, employing a different set of terminologies relating to 
legal 
impediment. Since these approaches are inextricably linked the present study combines 
all three. 
It is observed that the issue of temunology is quite significant and confusing; 
for 
example, while the classical jurists use the term 'impediments 
to legal capacitv 
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(aw&id), the ECC has chosen to divide the concept into 'impediments' and defects of 
consent ('uy5b al-rio). This mode of classification has influenced contemporary Muslim 
jurists to the extent that in their discussions on contract they specify a special heading for 
'defects of consent'. The writer concludes however, that there is little apparent 
justification for so doing other than the need to balance principles of modem law against 
those of Islamic law. The study further found that this mode of classification was a result 
of disagreement in defining and determining what should fall under the terrn 
'impediments to legal capacity. Classical jurists, for example -in the view of some 
contemporary scholars- have widened the meaning of impediment; the present stud), 
found that such widening is founded on the fact that what is meant by impediment is the 
opposite of the legal effect of legal capacity (ahliyyah) and rather than representMg the 
opposite of the basis of such legal capacity itself-, as such this disagreement is in the 
writer's view Of little importance. Therefore I have preferred to define 'impediment' as a 
matter affecting legal capacity resulting either in its removal or change in legal rules. 
With regard to the ECC although there is little debate on this issue, it seems that the 
differentiation between 'defects of consent' and 'impediment to legal capacity' in fact 
falls within what is known to classical jurists as the difference between the type of 
impediment that removes the legal capacity and the type of impediment that changes the 
nature of legal rules. 
in addition, the study found that the concept of legal capacity is almost identical 
in Islamic law and the ECC ranging from definition to classification (see chapter 
1). Both 
systems recognize the existence of receptive and active legal capacity, 
however only the 
latter can be affected by the presence of impediments. 
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2. As has been seen,, minority (sighar) in Islamic law as an impediment to legal capacity 
has been discussed extensively. It is nevertheless concluded that the Prophetic H. adih- 
liability is exempt from... a minor until he reaches puberty" together with another ffadith 
in which the Prophet PBUH said "ask your children to perform prayer when they are 
seven" have contributed to the division of the category of minor into non discerning and 
discerning. As to the contract drawn up by the minor the majority of jurists do not 
validate such a contract when entered into by a non discerning child regardless of its 
nature, be it purely beneficial, purely harmful or a mixture of both beneficial and 
harmful. However, there is a view held by the Hanball -which the writer favours - that a 
sale carried out by a non discerning child may be validated if the subject matter is tnvial. 
while a decision as to the actual degree of triviality of subject matter Nvill be referred by 
custom. With regard to a contract effected by a discerning child it was found that the 
majority of jurists have given different rulings according to the nature of the contract 
concerned. If for example, a contract is purely beneficial to the child then the contract is 
valid regardless of the consent of the guardian. On the other hand, if the contract is 
detrimental then it would be invalid whether or not the consent of the guardian is 
obtained. The role of the guardian is thus only apparent when the contract involves 
benefit and harm, a view which the ECC has also adopted. it is further concluded that in 
discussing the issue of the effect of impediments on contract it seems that both classical 
and modem jurists use the terminologies loosely when referring to contract, 
disposal 
(tasarrufi or obligation (iltizAm). The study has therefore been careftd to 
differentiate 
between these terms; based on analysis on chapter two, it is thus concluded that while it 
is acceptable to use the term disposal to refer to contract the opposite cannot 
be the case. 
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3- It is also found that insanity Oundn) is the least disputed impediment in both Islamic 
law and the ECC as both systems agree to include this concept under one heading i. e 
impediments to legal capacity (awirid al-ahliyyah). Nevertheless the exact meaning of 
the term is not agreed upon; the difficulty in giving an accurate definition of the term 
'insanity' may be due to the fact that it involves medical concept in the first place. It is 
concluded that Islamic law as well as the ECC look at the effects of insanity on human 
beings in order to formulate its definition. It seems here that the Egyptian jurists have 
followed Islamic law. It is also noted that medical experts have developed 
comprehensive definitions and classifications Of msanity; this is not surprising if it is 
accepted that the purpose behind such classifications is to diagnose, treat and cure mental 
illness with which jurists are not concerned. Nevertheless the ECC has opted not to be 
bound by the assessment of medical experts; I have suggested that the judge concerned 
may not be bound to a specific medical meaning; on the other hand he may not ignore 
absolutely medical opinion. It is further noted that with regard to the effect of a contract 
carried out by an insane person, Islanuc law has ruled that his contract is null and void if 
the insanity is continuous (muffiiq), although, in the case of intermittent insanity-( ghayr 
mutbiq) his contract is then valid during lucid intervals. On the other hand the ECC has 
emphasized procedural matters by dividing the acts of the insane into periods before an 
interdiction has been registered and thereafter where in the case of the former the 
contract is valid. Nevertheless,, it is argued that while it is acceptable to base rulings on 
procedures in certain circumstances such basis may lead to adherence to procedure at the 
expense of reality. By this is meant that if an insane person carries out a contract before 
interdiction is registered this means that he is acting without due legal capacity It is 
suggested that this situation arises because the ECC does not categorize insanity as in 
247 
Islamic law. Based on findings discussed the writer would therefore recommend that the 
ECC revise its provisions here to be in line with Islamic law. 
Apart from insanity, both Islamic law and the ECC have recognized another 
mental illness called imbecility ('atah). The research found that since the effect of 
imbecility in Islamic law is well treated as justifiable rulings are given to differentiate 
this concept from insanity, on the other hand the ECC has unjustifiably applied nýles of 
insanity to imbecility while at the same time recognizing a distinction of actual 
defmition. 
4. Another important focus of the study was the concept of prodigality (safah) as an 
impediment on legal capacity. It was thus established that according to Islamic law this 
term has a variety of meanings and interpretations such as ignorance and shallowness. 
From a literal point of view every aspect of human acts be they religious or financial is 
thus covered. However, the jurists have narrowed down the concept to refer only to 
financial dealings. As has been established in this research; the researcher found that, III 
Islamic law, only overspending on permissible items can be considered as act of 
prodigality. With regard to other phenomenon stated by the jurists such as sinfulness 
(fisq) and meanness (bukhý , evidence 
discussed show that these circumstances cannot 
be regarded as forms of prodigality and subsequently, cannot be subject to interdiction. 
In the ECC, the ruling of Court of Cassation has only confined prodigality in financial 
matters regardless of the religious integrity of the prodigal 
As to the effect of prodigality on contracts, analysis shows that much 
debate has 
arisen among the Muslim jurists as to whether or not a prodigal person can 
be interdicted. 
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The arguments invoked oscillate between two contradictory factors; whether to observe 
the dignity of human beings or to protect their wealth-(see chapter 4). The researcher has 
found that as long as prodigality is proven to exist then interdiction is pemussible 
whether this interdiction is at the expense of human dignity or property although such 
interdiction shall only take effect through obtaining a judicial order. While concurring 
with Islamic law as to the legality of interdiction the ECC is more concerned with 
procedural matters in the sense that a contract entered into by the prodigal may be voided 
only after the registration of interdiction ruling. Otherwise, such a contract will be valid 
as if it issued from a prudent person. However, it is concluded here that the stance taken 
by the ECC renders the prodigal vulnerable to exploitation by another mala fide party if 
the contract is concluded before the registration of the interdiction rulMg. Realization of 
this has perhaps led the ECC to incorporate a safety clause stipulating that there are thus 
two conditions in which the contract is null and void regardless of the interdiction ruling. 
It is also found that little attention is given to the criteria specifying the type of contract 
into which a prodigal person is not allowed to enter; for this reason the researcher 
favours the opinion of the jurists who have ruled that the prodigal is free to contract 
involving small matters and necessity such as food, clothes and the like. 
5-The writer also finds that in the light of discussion regarding the underlying theory of 
duress (ikrA) the root of the concept can be traced to the a prophetic tradition " liability 
is lifted from a duressed person". it was further found that unlike other impediments, 
Muslim jurists especially those of Hanafi, have devoted a specific chapter 
in their 
writings to discussing this concept. From the study of the diversity of views regarding 
the 
definitions of duress,, the researcher has opted to define it as the exercise of an unlawful 
pressure to create in a duressed person the kind of fear which causes 
him to enter into a 
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contract. It is concluded that although there is no provision in the ECC stipulating the 
definition of duress jurists nevertheless seem to agree with that Of Islamic law. HoxveN, er, 
a critical problem of terminology is noted whereby some jurists of both Islamic law and 
the ECC refer interchangeably to duress as necessity (ýIardrah); in the researcher view 
this is found to be inaccurate since every form of duress is necessity but not vice versa. 
Little difference is noted with regard to the classification of duress, however both 
Islamic law and the ECC recognize the existence of just and unjust duress. In order for 
duress to exist certain measurements are to be applied. It is found that that in Islamic law 
both objectivity and sub ectivity are used based on evidence from the Qur'dn and j 
Sunnah. On the other hand, although, the ECC has adopted subjectivity in its approach, it 
is found that in a number of ruling the EgCC has implicated the adoption of objectivity as 
well as subjectivity although this is not explicitly stated. Thus, it is suggested that the 
ECC clarify in its provisions the nature of measurement used in order to remoN,, e 
ambiguity. 
As for findings relating to the effect of duress on contract, both Islan-fic law and 
the ECC agree that the actual legal capacity of a duressed person is not removed, rather 
some legal rules would be affected if duress were present. The researcher would 
recommend that a contract entered into by the duressed person should be suspended 
ratlier than voided in line with the view of MaRi and some Hanafi due to the 
fact that a 
suspended contract can later be ratified when the state of duress no 
longer eXists. It was 
found that this is also the stance taken by the ECC. 
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6-It is concluded that with regard to the concept of mistake (ghala, 6, contrary to the 
claims of some jurists this concept has its roots in Islamic law and is discussed under the 
term ghalat and Map' synonymously. Yet the treatment of this concept by Muslim 
jurists is not as systematic as in modem law; Islamic has also emphasised the effect of 
mistake on contract by introducing remedies such as the doctrine of options (khiyAj, ). 
Similar to duress in order to determine the existence of mistake both objective and 
subjective approaches are used. TNs use of both approaches is agreed upon by Islamic 
law and the ECC. The ECC has included mistake under the 'defects of consent' rather 
than under 'impediments to legal capacity', however, under a different terminology this 
inclusion is of little significance since the outcome is identical to that of 'Impediments'. 
Both Islamic law and the ECC are agreed that no doctrine of interdiction is to be imposed 
on the mistaken party as similar in the case of duress. 
Ac for final concluding remarks, there are more similarities than differences 
between Islamic law and the ECC relating to impediments to legal capacity. In the case 
of discrepancies suggestions have been made to remove them. As 
for similarities, it is 
concluded that ECC has actually referred to one of its sources 
i. e. Islamic law in dealing 
with the subject of impediments to legal capacity. 
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GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS 
A number of references have contributed to the compilation of this glossary such 
as Rayner's the Theory of Contract in Islamic law, Faruqi's Law Dictionary and Jamal 
J Nasir's the Islamic law of Personal Status as well as the writerýs own translations. 
Ididarn al- C aqI absence of reason 
%hat al-'aql mental impediments 
'ahd covenant, treaty 
abka-m legal rules 
ahkarn al-usrah family law 
alýah legal capacity 
dlliyyat al- ad-a' active legal capacity 
ahhyyat al-wujiib receptive legal capacity 
ahwal shakhýiyyah personal status 




caqd al-ýulh contract of reconciliation 
caqidah belief 
caql reason, mind 
catah imbecility 
'afiyyah donation 
dthdr shariyyah legal effects 
cawdrid impediments 
'awarid muktasabah acquired impediments 
C awario samdwiyyah natural impediments 




bay' ribawl usurous sale 
bukhl miserliness, cupidity 
bul5gh puberty, majority 
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bulfigh tabi'i natural puberty 
buRigh taqdiri assumptive puberty 







dhawi sha'n person responsible for others 
dhimmah engagement 
diyah blood money 
fa- sid irregular 
fa- siq sinful person 
fawri immediate 
fiqh Islan-fic jurisprudence 
fisq sinfulness 





ghayr mulji' non constraining 




ghusn see,, fur5c 
badath see ghuldm 
hadd prescribed punishment 
bajar interdiction 
bdlah qan5niyyah legal status, condition 
harakah motion 




bisbah soliciting good and advising against evil 
bud5d prescribed punishment 
iba-dah act of worship 
ibtila' tribulation, testing 
idrak discernment 
ifla-s bankruptcy 
ighm. 55' faintness 
ihtila-m wet dream 
Jj5zah ratification 
Jjbar shari licit duress 
Jjmac consensus of jurists 
ijmd'sukiiti silent consensus 
ijtiha-d legal reasoning 
ikhtiyar choice 
ikrdh duress 
ikrah ghayr mu. 1ji' non constraining duress 
ikrdh mulji' constraining duress 
ikra-h nafsi spiritual duress 
ikrah bi ghayr haq unjust duress 
ikrah adabi moral duress 
'illah. cause 
iltizam obligation, debit 
inbdt appearance of pubic hair 




irddah maboah pure will 
irddah mudrikah discerning will 
iradah munfaridah unilateral will 
ira-dah bdtinah hidden will 
ir5dah will 
irfikab akhaff al-dararayn committing the lesser of two evils 
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jam C collection 
Janin womb, foetus 
junfin insanity 
junan asfl regular ins i ani ty 
junun ghayr mutbiq intermittent insanity 
junfin juz, partial insanity 
juniin kulli full insanity 
juniin mutbiq continuous insanity 
juniin tan' irregular insanity 
kalimat al kufr words pronounced to abandon Islam 
kdmilah complete 
khafif al-aql lack of intellect 
khata' see ghalat 
khiffah shallowness 
khitab legal commandment 
khiya-r option 
khiyar al-'ayb option of defects 
khiydr al -ru'yah option of 
inspection 
luzTJm bindingness 
ma'na khas specific meaning 
macqTjd 'alayh subject matter 
macriff good deed 
ma'tiffi imbecile 
mabl' sold item 
maddi objective 
mani' al-taklif hindrance 






marad al-mawt death sickness 
masa'il problems 
majnUn insane person 
mabjTjr interdicted person 
mawq5f see mucallaq , conditional 
maz. ýihir al-safah phenomena of prodigality 
mawdni' mas'iiliyyah obstacle of responsibility 
maudUci see ma -ddi 
madyUniyyah indebtedness 
marad illness 
marghUb fih desirable 
micydr nafsi subjective approach 
mu'dkhazah wdqiciyyah realistic punishment 
mucallaq suspended 





muhdbi. person who favourites other 
mujbar see mukrah 
mukallaf a person upon whom legal 
injunction is addresed 
mukrah person under duress/ duressed person 
mukirah calayh act to be done under duress 
mukrah bih threat used to exert duress 
mukrih person exerting duress 
mu]ji' constraining 

















nazrah maddiyyah objective theory 
nazrah shakhsiyyah subjective theory 
nifa- s post natal blood 
nisydn. forgetfulness 
nuffift adabi moral influence 
nuý7uý shariyyah legal texts 
qabfl li al-ibtdl see butlan msbi 
qaýd) intention 




qiyas ma al. fa-riq analogy between two different things 
rabt fie 
rahbah fear 
rashid prudent person 




rushd prudence, maturity 




shadd to fasten 
safah. prodigality 
saf1h prodigal person, spendthrift 
ýighar see ghulam 
shahawat desires 
shakhsiyyah personality 
shakhsiyyah qaniiniwah legal personality 
shakhsi or dhati subj ective 
shari 'ah Islamic law 
shart pre requisite 
shufah. Pre-emption 
shubb miserliness 




sultah shar 'iyah legal authority 
sultdn ruler 
tdahhud commitment 
ta'ahhud shakhsi personal undertaking 
tabdhir wastefulness 
tabarru' donation 
7 tdbir expression 
ta'dil modification 
tadlis hiding 




ta-ri' unexpected matter 
tasarruf disposal 






























fixed wage/ quoted wage 
contingencies/ extraordinary matters 
principles of jurisprudence 
defects of will 
defects of consent 
legal duty, obligation 
owner of debts 













EgCC, cas. no 40, dated 21/6/1934 
EgCC, dated 28/4/1985 
EgCC, dated 16/2/1982 
EgCC, dated 4/3/1980 
EgCC cas. no 1290, dated 13/6/1979 
EgCC dated 16/1/1971 
EgCC, dated, 7/4/1955 
EgCC, dated 20/6/1957 
EgCC, cas. no 6, dated 25/10/1956 
EgCC, cas. no 397, dated 28/5/1970 
EgCC, cas. no 397, dated 13/12/1985 
Egcc, cas. no 446, dated 14/11/1968 
EgCC, cas. no 96, dated 8/2/1951 
EgCC, cas. no 392, dated 25/1/1962 
EgCC, cas. no 44, dated 11/11/76 
EgCC, dated 25/2/1953 
EgCC, dated 12/7/ 1994 
EgCC, cas. no 221 dated 6/5/1954 







































































3. Law of Guardianship Over Property (LGP) 
Article 61 81 
Article 62 82 
Article 65 109 
Article 66 109 
4. Civil Procedure Code( CPQ 
Article 89 156 
Article 998 156 
Article 1028 156 
c 5Majallat al-AtkAin al- Adliyyah 
Article 2 209 
Article 165 236 
Article 308 230 
Article 3 10 230 
Article 946 126 
Article 979 106 
Article 980 106 
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